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FOREWORD
The Transport Crashworthineu Study was conducted under NASA Contract No. NASI-16076
funded jointly by NASA and the FAA. Technical Monitors for this contract were L. Vosteen and
D_ R.G. Thomson of the Langley Research Center and C.A. Cait,fa of the FAA Technical Center.
• _ E. Widmayer was Principal Investigator, assiBted by O.B. Bret_deof Airworthinese Safety.
D.L. Parks of Crew Systems and D.W. Twigg of Boeing Computer Services made significant
_i ' I contributions to section 5, Current State of Crashworthiness Technology, and contributed all of
appendix D. Ray E. Horton of the Advanced Composites Development program contributed section
r 4.4. a part of section 4.0, tiffed, Advanced Materials. K. H. Diekenson was the Program Manager.
The study was conducted under the supervision of W.W. Bingham, head of Structures Research
, Division of Structures Technology.
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COMMERCIAL JET TRANSPORT CRASHWORTHINESS
EDWARDWIDMAYER, JR. AND OTTO B, BRI_NDE
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company
1.0 SUMMARY
This report presents the results of a study to identify areas of regearch and approaches that may
-, result in improved occupantsurvivability and creshwortldness of transport aircraft. This study was
jointly sponsored by National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). The thrust of the study is the definition of areas of structural crachworthlne_
for transport aircraft which might form the basis for a NASA/FAA Research Program.
NASA and the FAA are planning a 10-year research and development program to improve the
structurai impact resistance of general aviation and commercialjet transport aircraft. As part of this
program para_el studies have been conducted by The Lockheed California Company, The Douglas
Aircraft Company, and The Boeing CommercialAirplane Cor_pany to review the accident experience
of commercial transport aircraft, assess the accident performance of structural components and the
status of impact resistance technology, and recommend areas of research end development for that
10-year plan. This report gives the results of the Boeing study.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
Tile scop_ of the study from tile contractual statement of work is:
"A study to define approaches to improve the crashworthine_ of transport aircraft is described in
this statement of work, Aircraft accident data and current aircraft design practices will be u_i to "
define a range of crash conditions that might form the basis for developing crashworthinesa design
technology. In addition, analytical and/or experimental techniques required to determine the
adequacy of craehworthy design features will be defined and the adequacy of existing metheda and
techniqu_ will be evaluated. While meeting the specific objectives of this study, consideration
should be given to rite increasing role advanced composite materials might play in the design of
future transports.
Resume of tasks:
L To review and evaluate transportaircraft accident data to define a range of crash eitnations that
ma.__fformthe basis for developing improved crashworthinesa design technology,
2, Identify structuralcomponents and aircraft systenmthat significantly participate in or influence
the crash dynamic behavior of an aircraft in the scenarios defined in 1.
3. To define areas of research and approaches for improving erashworthinesa.
4. To identify test techniques, test data, analytical methods, etc. needed to evaluate the crash
dynamic response of transport aircraft."
BACKGROUND
Safety is the primary consideration in the design and operation of commercial transport aircraft.
For over 40 years the FAA with i,a predecessor the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA),
NASA and its predece.s,sorNational Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA}, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the airlines, anions, the manufacturers and other foreign
government agencies have contributed to the development and advancement of safety in
commercial aviation. Their efforts have resulted in the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) which
define the minimum standards for safety. These regulations are continually reviewed to ascertain
the adequacy of the standards. This concern is reflected in the safety record of air carriers jet
aircraft operations over the past 20 years. Figure 2.1 shows that the accident rate for all types of
accidents has declined to about 2.5 pet million departures.
The continuing concern for safety at Boeing has placed an emphasis on determining the cause of
accidents and evaluating the crashworthine_ of aircraft structure and systems. Because of this
_" emphasis, safety related design changes and intprovements, based on operational experience and
! accident data, are continually being evaluated and often incorporated in new design aircraft and
_ in-service aircraft.
t However, the initial conditions of an accident and the subsequent responses of the aircraft are
complex phenomena and it is difficult to quantify the level of at_uctural crashworthinesa of a
specific design or to compare one design to another. For design improvements, the crash
: environment is known only in general terms.
Current technology is based on the best available knowledge obtained frmn accident surveys, some
complete aircraft crash tests, saatleccopant teats, and from military and automotive programs
" " - 00000()01-TSA12
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aimed at specific problems, Each manufacturer of aircraft hns developed empirical engineering
practices that treat structural crashwurthiness. These practices while producing good produrts,
are extremely limited in application.
Some analytical tools have been developed for modeling the nonlinear response of occupants in
seats and of aircraft structures. Those tools have constraints due to lack of computing power and
have had limited validation and application. This in turn has limited the development of technical
approaches t_ crash modeling and simulation. Further, it is not established that these tools include
all the ip.chnelogy nece_ury to adequately treat the complete structural crushworthinese problem.
B q
With regard to facilities and methods for testing for crashworthiness, some facilities are currently
available or under development. Some test methods have been developed by the FAA, NA_A, and
the U.S. Army for seats, components, and general aviation aircraft and helicopters. FuU-seale
aircraft crash test methods are being extended by the FAA and NASA.
The Bo_ing study under this contract is limitedto commercial jet transport aircraft. This is the area of
Boo'rag Commercial Airplane Company ezportise and conforms to the company product Line. It also
reflects the structure of the world fleet. The world transport fleet as of 1980 consisted of 75.7% jet
aircraft, 15.7% turbopropsircraft_8%pistonenginedaircraftand 0.5% helicopters._t on orderare
divided 9 to 1 towards jet aircraft. This implies that the percentage of jet aircraft in the fleet will
increase during the time frame of the potential NASA/FAA research program.
While the recommendations for research arising in this study are directed towards technology for
commercial jet transports there is an applicability to the general and private aviation sectors as well.
Development of analytical methods, test techniques and facilities also have applicability to military
aircraft and the automotive industry.
REPORT ORGANIZATION
The main sections of the report are Accident Data Review and Scenario Identification, Role of
Structural Components in Crashworthiness, Current State of Creahworthine_ Technology, and
Conclusions and Recommendations. Accident Data Review and Scenario Identification discuss
sources and selection of accidents, various categories of the data, accident scenario development,
and ranges of impact conditions for the seanurins. The Role of Structural Components in
Craohworthiness treats the participation of structural components, accident severity and
survivability, interaction of compensate, problem areas for advanced materials in structural
components. The Current State of Crushworthinese Technology considers the U.S. Army's Aircraft
CrashSurvival Design Guide, occupant modeling end human impact tolerance, structural modeling
and test technology, auesses the technology and discusses research to improve the technology.
Conclusions and Recommendations presents areas for research and development to be included in
the NASA/FAA 10-year General Aviation and Commercial T_ansport Aircraft Crashworthinese.
4
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3.0 ACCIDENT DATA REVIEW AND SCF_IARIO IDENTIFICATION
A review and evaluation of accident data has been made for the yeem 1959--1979 which cover the
commercial jet transport worldwide operations for eirereft certified under Federal Aviatim_
Regulations (FAR), Part 25. The total accident base has been reviewed, and potentially suryiveble
accidenta have been selected for further analysis.
These accidents have been categorized with respect to airplane size, configuration, crash
environment, operational condition, cause of accident, injuries, structural damage, and fire
hazard.Thesecategoriesarediscussedand thelevelofengineeringdatainaccidentreportais
i " assessed.
Three basic crash scenarios have been developed from the sequence of eventa observed in the
accidents. These scenarios have been divided further into subsets to account for variations between
accidents within a scenario. The range of initial conditions for each subset has been established.
These scenarios may serve us a starting point for research on creshworthiness, but require further
refinement to reflect current accident experience.
BOEING ACCIDENT FILE AND STUDY DATA BASE
The Boeingfileofaircraftaccidentsandincidentsi limitedtoallknown commercialjetaircraft
occurrencesinvolvingworldwideaircarrieroperationsince1959.Forresearch,study,andanalysis
purposes, a selected group of these accidents form a "statistical data bank _of 583 occurrences that
include all operations from 1959 through 1979. Excluded from this statistical data bank are
.I_ occurrencesthatinvolvefactorsbeyondthecontrolof the airframemanufacturersuch as
sabotage, military action, military operations, turbulence injury, and evacuation injury (anlese
caused by a hardware deficiency).
Accident data have been obtained from various sources. FAA/CAB reports and NTSB reports of
U.S.aircarrieraccidents,have been usedextensively.While the earlyreports(circa1960)
contained,for the most part,spm_ detailson structuralfactorsand on the causeof
injury/fatalities,h later eportsaremuch more complete.Human FactorsFactualReportapreparedby theNTSB areparticularlyusefulwithrespectothesequenceofevents,causeof
injury/fatalities,performanceof cabininteriorequipmentand egressfactors.Containing
somewhat lessdataaretheInternationalCivilAviationOrganizationf theUnitedNations
(ICAO)releasedaccidentreportsofbothU.S.andforeignaircarrieroccurrences.Othersourcesof
accidentinformationincludetheBritishAirRegistrationBoard,AirlinePilotsAssociation,and
airline reporta, official accident reporta released by foreign governments, periodicals and
newspaper accounts, end the Boeing Company files. The Boeing data base is summarized in
figure 3.1.
The relationship between fatalities and hull loss is shown in figm_ 3.2. Here it may be _ocn that of
the 275 hull lo_as, 206 involved fatalities and the three fatal injury accidenta involved substantial
damage to the aircraft.
The percentage of accidents by oper_tianal phase and by operational time is shown in figure 3.3.
Considering those operational phases 'rakingplace near or on the ground, 79.3% of the accidents
occur in 18% of the operational time. Further, those accidents that occurduring climb, cruise, and
descentare generallynonaurvivableandoutsidetherangeofthinstudy.
5
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5B:| total accldug_ls° el all tylmH
147 law)lvod LJ.S.c_rrlo( dolnosllc operations
40 involved U.S. cRtriofhlternuUonulopeiiltlons
28 hwolvedU.S. carrier test _ad trainingop¢)rallons
42 ItwolvodU.S. carriur non schudulodand cargo operatinns
72 Jnvolvudforeign c(trriurdomestic operations
IL_ involvedforoiQncarrier international operations _.
43 involved foreign carrier test and Iraitling operations
43 involved foreign carrier i_oe-schodulod(_ndcargo oporalions
O! those oper_tiormlaccidents
275 resulted in hull loss
214 itlvolvod fatalities of pnssengols and/or crow
on board the commurcinl jut aircraft.
•Excludes: Notu: excludes 33 non-oporahonalhtlll losses
Turbulence (in|uw) and 15 sabotagu or militoryaction hull losses.
Emergency evacuation (inpuy)
Sabotage
Military actlon/mitltaryoperations
Figure 3. t-Accidents During Twenty Years of Jet Operations
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8TUDY DATA BANE i
A study date base was formed from the at_cidentdata bam_.ALleaetone of the following criteria must
exist fur consideration ill the stndy:
1. Airframe survivable volume maintained (prior to severe fire)
2. At least one occupant did not die from trauma
8. Potential for egress present\
4. Accident demonstrates structural or system performance
It should be noted that criterion (2) is significantly more severe than the FAR criterion (see app. D,
fig. 3.5) or N'I__Bdefinitions (see app. A) of a survivable accident. Criterion {2) does not mean that if
one survives all should survive, rather that one occupant was able to withstand this accident
eaviromne_t in his immediate vici,tity. This permits accidenta to be considered for researchdefinition
and direction that are beyond the scope of current design criteria.
Using the above criteria, about 400 accidents were selected from the total data base of 583. These
400 were then subject to nn in-depth review and muny were eliminated from further consideration
bcs,ause no injury occurred and/or the aircraft was structurally crashwurthy to that level of crash
environment. Other accidents were eliminated Ix,cause the injury was due to human behavior rather
than other factors. Following tliis preliminary review a list of atmreximately 200 "candidate
accidents" was selected for detailed review. These accidents were deemed to have the potential for
a reduction in injuries/fatalities if m_me increase in erashworthiness were provided, or that
demonstrated silolifieant crash performuure of the structure. For these 200 accidents, data forms
(see app. B) were completed to the extent of tile available data.
Detailed reviews of these 200 cases resulh,d ill additional eliminations and a final list of 153
accidents for this study (see fig. 2.i). These accidents are designated as "potentially survivable"
throughout the report. The selected list was checked against the injury and hell loss lists of the
Boeing data-base to ensure completeness. Appendix C gives a list of accidents for 1980 for future
i' consideration.
It should be noted that the inclusion of the le_ severe accidents might alter any statistics derived
from the data base. Consequently, care is required ill comparing the results of this study to studies
using other data bases. However, comparisons to other studies indicate that all of the known severe
Ill potentially survivable accidents involving commercial jet transports have been included in the study
data base.
__ The data bess does not represent the complete distribution of possible accidents in the statistical
sense. There are probably types of accidents that might happen in the future that are not
t represented. Tile atx,ideut data has4_does not represent a stationary random process. Certain typesof accidents that _a!curred uring the jet i troduction period are not seen ill the mature s ge. Thi
could have an important inlpact on the selection of scenarise for future design coltsideration.
Evidentx_of this maturity is seen ill figttre 2.1 by the marked decrease in the accident rate with time.
. Further, sure must be exercised ill predictions of futuro eccurrencee from the past.
--__i__ A sununary of the selected study data base is presented in table &l. As may be men, 87% of the
cases involve hull limeand 78% of the cases inwdve fstalitie_ or serious injury, while fire tg'curred
in 67% of the cases. 1i atalitit s due to fire wcre prescnt in 37% of th_ t ams fstalitic s dut to trauma
00000001-TSB05
Table 3. 1 -Data Base Summery
Cases- %
i Total accidents 153 10O.0
Foreign 91 59.5
U.S. and possessions 62 40.5
Hull loss 133 87
• Fatalities or serious Injury 119 78
Fire 103 67
Fire caused fatalities 57 37
Trauma caused fatalities 55 36
Drowning 10 6.5
Special 4 2.6
lit
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were present in 36% of the cases, and fatalities due to drowning were prese:_t in 6% of the cases.
The selected ease_ clearly represent serious accidents.
The 707 accident in Tahiti, in which there was one survivor, has not betm included in the data base
because the aircraft was not recovered and the sutTivor could not supply any details as to what
happened. Four special eases are included in the data base. The first special ease is the 707 in
London in 1968 where the aircraft caught fire on takeoff and made a successful landing but five
deaths occurred during evacuation due to fire. The second special case is the DC-8 at Toronto in
1970 where the aircraft was dmnaged during an attempted landing and exploded during the
suboequent attempted go-around killing the 108 occupunta. The third special ease is the DC-9 in
Boston in 1973 where the aircraft struck u seawall, broke up and burned, but une passenger walked
out of the fire hut died within 24 hours. '['hefourth special case is the 737 Madras accident on April
26, 1979, in which the detolmtion of an explosive device in the forward lavatory led to landing
conditions that resulted in an overrun.
The study data base is presented in table 3.2. Aceidante are listed by date (month, day, year),
aircrafttype,andlocationftheaccident.Hull oseisindicatedbyxwithablankindicatingsubstantial
damage.N tunberofoccupants,fatalities,andseriousinjuriesare_he shown.Flightphase(takeoff,
initialc imb,approach,landing,taxi)andthepresenceoffireareindicated.
Accidentshavebeenassessedasimpactsurvivable(YES)ifno deathswereattributedtotrauma.
Acddents have been assessed as partially impact survivable (PAR) if some deaths were attributed to
trauma but there were some deaths attributed directly to fire related causes or there were survivors.
Those accidents in which there were some survivors but the cause of fatalities was not determined
have been labelled as undefined (UD_.
CATEGORIZATION OF THE ACCIDENT DATA
PROBABLE CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS
The probable cause of the accidents is presented in figure 3.4. "Probable cause" is based on the
determination of the accident investigation body. For 13 accidents the cause is unknown. For 140
cases where cause has been determined, 78.6% of _he eases are attributed to the cockpit crew,
11.4% to the airplane, 5% to weather, 2.2% to the airport/air traffic controller, 1.4% to
miscellaneous0 0.7% to maintenunce, and 0.7% to sebetage.
The aircraft was the cause of the accident in 11.4% of the eases. Landing gear systems and support
structure were involved in seven ace;.dcnte. Failures involved brakes, wheels, tires, and structure.
Engine disintegration, thrust loss, and thrust reversers were involved in six accident_. Flight
iastrumentatian was involved in two accidents and ground spoilers and elevator trim tab were
involved in one accident each.
Front these data it may be cuncluded that about 89% of the accidents might have been avoided by
, improved pilot assistance and ground ccntnd. The most significant improvements in safety may be
obtained thrnugh awident avoidance. Such items as ground proximity warning, wind shear
detection, atttomsted landing and navigation systems, and advanced integrated systems for pilot
assistance offer the best hope for eliminating mtmt accidents in the "avoidable" category.
p
Improw'd grnmld control and n_'luction of hazards on atul around airports is another area for
improved safety, The avoidance of cnllisions between aircraft and with ground vehicles Jdmuld by
attainable. Reductian of hazards such as drsinage ditches, poles, trees, columns, outbuildit_gs, attd
birds front airports is a matter of concern. In additio,t the short/overrun areas for runways could be
improved to reduce the severity of a(x,identa in these areas.
II
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Table 3.2-StudyDataBaso
1019s,707oso,WASHINOTONX 84 oAPPFIREPARWATOR275,CMTASCUN_ONx so2 , AP, UDFo22°_DCMTB_,FNOSAIRES X _o o LoGEIREY_S07,.6,DC.DENVER XI22170 LO_FIREYES
011Qfi10CR JFK X 106 4 ? TO FIRE PAR
D6156_ 707 LISBON 103 0 2 LDGFIRE YES
12216] CMT ANKARA X 34 27 6 CLI FIRE UOF
092461 720 BOSTON 71 0 2 LOG YES WAT
092761CVL BRASSILA X ? ? ? LOG FIRE UOF
072761 707 HAMBURG X 41 0 I0 TO FIRE YES
060362 707 PARIS, ORLY X 132 130 2 TO FIRE UOF
082062 DC8 RIO DE JANIERO X 105 15 ? TO YES WAT
070363 CVL CORDOBA, ARGENTINA X 70 0 ? APP FIRE YES
031864 BAC WISLEY, ENG. 5 0 I LOG YES
040764 lO1JFK X 145 0 7 LOG YES WAT
112364 707 ROME X 73 48 20 TO FIRE YES
032264 CMT SINGAPORE X 86 0 0 LOG FIRE YES
050265 720 CAIRO X 127 121 6 APP FIRE UOF
070165 707 KANSAS CITY X 66 0 2 LOG YES
110865 727 CINCINNATI X 62 58 4 APP FIRE PAR
111165 727 SALT LAKE CITY X 91 43 35 LOG FIRE YES
0913u5 880 KANSAS CITY X 4 0 0 CLI FIRE YES
022765 880 IKI IS.. JAPAN X 6 0 ? LDG FIRE YES
070466 DCB AUCKLAND X S 2 I TO FIRE PAR
082666 880 TOKYO X 5 5 0 TO FIRE YES
030466 DC8 TOKYO X 7I 64 8 APP FIRE UOF
063066 TRI KUWAIT X 83 0 0 APP YES
122466 OC_ MEXICO CITY X 110 0 6 APP FIRE YES
021566 CVL NEW DELHI X 81 2 14 APP FIRE YES
110667 707 CINCINNATI X 36 1 2 TO FIRE PAR
117N67 RRO CINCINNATI X 82 70 I? APP FIRE PAR
030567 DCR MONROVIA X 90 51 ?3 APP FIRE UOF
06306? CVL HONG KONG X 80 17 S APP YES WAT
.,.. 09?967 CMT ROME X 66 0 0 LDG YES
II0567 880 HONG KONG X I37 I ? TO YES WAT
122768 De9 SIOUX CITY X 66 0 3 TO YES
032868 DC8 ATLANTIC CITY X 4 0 2 LOG FIRE YES
061368 701 CALCUTTA X 63 6 2 APP FIRE YES
_B_ 060368 121 JFK 102 0 4 LOG UDF032168 727 CHICAGO X 3 0 I TO FIRE YES
020768 707 VANCOUVER.8.C. X 61 I 0 LDG PAR
; " 071668 727 TAIPEI K 53 21 42 APP FIRE UOF
040868 707 LONDON X I27 5 ? CLI FIRE YES
042068 707 WINDHUEK X 128 123 5 CLI FIRE PAR
_C " 080268 De8 MILAN X 95 12 ? APPFIRE YES
011469 BAC MILAN X 33 0 0 TO YES ,
'_, 101669 0C8 STOCKTON,CA, X 5 0 0 LOG FIRE YES
010569 727 LONDON GATWICK X 65 50 14 APP FIRE PAR
-i 011369 0C8 LOS ANGELES X 45 15 17 APP YES WAT
092169 727 MEXICO CITY X 118 28 78 APP PAR WAT
091769 BAC MANILA X 47 45 2 APP FIRE PAR
.-....,2 .....
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Table 3.2-Study Data Base (ConUnued)
.,T ._
N_4fi9 RAN MOSE_LAKE X 5 3 ? CL] FIRE YES
N?II70 7N7 STOCKTNN,CA 6 0 1 LOG YES
O7197N 737 PHILADELPHIA X 62 O 1 TO YES
oqrIR70 DCq LOUISVILLE q4 0 0 LDG FIRE YES
122870 727 ST. THOMAS X 55 2 11 LOGFIRE YES
080870 990 ACAPULCO X 8 0 8 LOGFIRE YES
112770 DC8 ANCHORAGE X 229 47 47 TO FIRE YES
072770 DC8 NAHA, OKINAWA X 4 4 0 APP PARHAT
020970 CMTMUNICH X 23 0 0 TO FIRE YES
033170 CVL CASABLANCA X 82 61 21APP FIRE UDF
050270 0C9 ST. CROIX, V.Io X 63 25 25 LDG PAR WAT
070570 0C8 TORONTO X 108 108 0 LOGFIRE YES
091570 DC8 JFK X 156 0 11LDG FIRE YES
010570 990 STOCKHOLM X 10 5 4 CLI PAR
0719/0 BAC GERONA, SPAIN X 85 0 3 TO YES
IZ0770 BAC CONSTANA X 27 18 ? APP UDF
113070 707 TEL AVIV X 3 0 0 TO FIRE YES
012371 lOl BOMBAY X 5 0 0 TO FIRE YES
090671BAC HAMBURG X 121 22 ? CLI FIRE UDF
121571 707 URUNCHI, CHINA X 3 0 0 LDG YES
051872 DC9 FT. LAUDERDALE X 10 0 3 LDG FIRE YES
092472 DC8 BOMBAY X 120 0 0 LDG FIRE YES
120872 737 CHICAGO MIDWAY X 61 43 12 APP FIRE PAR
121572 747 MIAMI X 160 0 0 LDG YES
122072 0C9 CHICAGO O'HARE X 45 I0 9 TO FIRE YES
122q72 LIO MIAMI X 176 99 60 APP FIRE NO WAT
NlP172 Dcq ADANA X 5 1 ? APP FIRE UDF
_4177_ VCI ADDIS ARARA X 107 43 ? TO FIRE UDF
NRI_7? 7n7 JFK 186 0 0 TO FIRE YES
I12R72 DCR MOSCOW, USSR X 76 61 15 CLI FIRE UDF
12237?F28 OSLO X 45 40 ? APP FIRE UDF
122872 FSR BOLBAO, SPAIN X 4 0 4 LDG YES
030573 lOl DENVER 3 0 0 TO FIRE YES
073173 Dcg BOSTON, MASS. X 89 89 0 APP FIRE PAR
112773 DC9 CHATTANOOGA X 77 0 5 APP FIRE YES
112773 DC9 AKROn, OHIO X 26 0 16 LOG YES
012273 lOl KHANO, NIGERIA X 202 172 ? LDG FIRE YES
053173 731 NEW DELHI X 65 52 ? APP FIRE YES
060973 701 RIO DE JANEIRO X 4 2 0 AMP PAR WAI
IOZB13 737 GREENSBORO 96 0 0 LDG FIRE YES
061673 lO1 BUENOS AIRES 86 0 0 LDG FIRE YES
062373 DC8 JFK 128 0 8 LOG FIRE YES
121773 DOg GREENSBORO 91 0 0 TO FIRE YES
121773 DCI BOSTON X 151 0 3 LOG FIRE YES
121973 707 NEW DELHI X 109 0 3 LDG FIRE YES
122373 CVL MANAUS, BRAZIL X 57 0 I LDG YES
' 011674 707 LOS ANGELES X 63 0 3 LOGFIRE YES
011374 707 PAGOPAGO,AM. SAMOA X 10! 97 5 APP FIRE YES
091174 DC9 CHARLOTTE,N,C. X 82 71 |0 APP FIRE PAR
091174 727 PORTOALEGRE,BRAZIL 74 0 0 LOG YES
010174 F?8 TURIN, ITALY X 42 38 4 APP FIRE IlOF ]
13
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Table 3.2-Study Data Base (Concluded)
N10274 F?R I7MIR, TtlRKEY X 7? 65 7 CLI FIRE UOF
031_74 CVL TEHRAN, IRAN X 96 1S ? TAX FIRE YES
112074 747 NAIROBI, KENYA X 157 59 44 CLI FIRE PAR
020975 8AC LAKETAHOE X 44 0 0 TO YES
033175 737 CASPER, WYO. X 99 0 I LOG YES
062475 727 JFK X 124 112 12 APP FIRE PAR
080775 727 DENVER X 134 0 15 CLI YES
092475 F28 PALEMBANG X 62 25 ? LUG FIRE UDF
]i1275 727 RALEIGH, N.C, 139 0 I APP YES
111275 OCt JFK X 139 0 2 TO FIRE YES
111575 F28 NR. BUENOS AIRES X 66 0 0 APP YES
121675 747 ANCHORAGE 121 0 2 TAX YES
010276 0CI ISTANBUL X 373 0 I LUG FIRE YES
040575 727 KETCHIKAN X 57 I 32 LUG FIRE YES
042276 720 BARRANQUILLA, COL. X 4 0 I APP FIRE YES
042776 727 ST. THOMAS, V.I. X 88 37 19 LUG FIRE PAR
062376 0C9 PHILADELPHIA X 105 0 36 LUG YES
121676 880 MIAMI X 3 0 I TO YES
111676 DC9 DENVER X 85 0 2 TO FIRE YES
030477 0C8 NIAMEY, NIGER X 4 2 2 APP FIRE YES
031777 707 PRESTWICK X 4 0 0 TO FIRE YES
032777 747 TENERIFE X 396 334 62 TAX FIRE PAR
032717 747 TENERIFF X 246 246 0 TO FIRE YES
040471DC_ NEW HOP_, GA. X Dfi6? 27 APP FIRE PAR
NqP777 DCRKOALALIIMPUR x 7q 34 ? APP FIRE DDF
100777 DCR SHANNON X 259 0 1 TO FIRE YES
111Q77 727 MADFIRA X 164 I78 16 L08 FIRE PAR WAT
112177 RAC RARILOCHF,ARG. X 7q 45 34 APP UDF
171_77 CVL MADEIRA X 57 36 13 LOG YES WAT
04|877 DC8 TOKYO X 140 O 0 TO YES
111777 747 JFK 30 O LDG YES
021178 737 CRANBROOK,B.C. X 49 42 5 LOG FIRE PAR
030178 DCI LOS ANGELES X 197 2 31 TO FIRE YES
030378 DC8 SANTIAGO DE COMPO. X 222 0 fi2LOG YES
040278 137 SAO PAULO X 42 0 0 LOG FIRE YES
040478 13l CHARLROI,BELGIUM X 3 0 0 LDG FIRE YES
050878 727 PENSACOLA x 58 3 II APP YES WAT _i
05_578 880 MIAMI X 6 0 0 TO YES !]
06_578 DE9 TORONTO X TO/ 2 ? TO PAR )I
070978 6AC ROCHESTER 71 0 I LUG YES
103179 DCI MEXICO CITY X _7 70 17 LOG FIRE UOF (I
111578 DC8 COLUMBO_ SRI LANKA X _59 IDb ? APP FIRE UDF
121778 737 HYDERABAD, INDIA X 126 I 4 TO FIRE YES
12_378 DC9 PALERMO, ITALY X 129 I08 ? LOG UDF WAT
122978 0C8 PORTLAND, OREGON X 186 IO 23 APP PAR
032578 720 LOROON 82 0 ? LUG YES *
0?0979 OC9MIAMI X 50 1 CLI YES
O?Iglq 707 ST. LUCIA 170 0 0 APP YES
:_.. OlI47q 727 DOHA,DMAR X 64 45 15 APP FIRE PAR
04767a 7)7 MADRAS X 67 8 R tUG FIRE YES
10077qDCR ATHFNS X 154 14 0 LUG FIRE YES
14
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Selected Impact survivable accidents
_ all operation 1959-1979 world wide air carriersPercent of acci ents withknown causesProbable cause 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
) I i i I i I I I l
Cockpit crew 110
. Airplane 16
l:" " Weather 7 i 5.0%
Akport/Atc. 3 II 2.2%
Misc. 2 1.4%
Maint. 1 ,0.7%
Sabotage 1 10.7%
=b Total 140
Unknown t3
Total 153
/figure 3.4-Probable Cause of Accidents
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AIRCRAFT SIZE
Accident ca_es were categorised with respect to size as measured by gro_ weight. The 737, DC.9,
i Comet IV, BAC-111, _Yident, F28 and Caravelle form a short haul group up to 72.5 tonnes. The
720, 727,880, and 990 are included in tits 72.5 to 113 tennea short haul group. The 707 and the
i I}C.8 are in the 113 to 158 tonnea uarrow-body long haul group. Wide.bedy aircraft such as the i
L-1011, DC-IO,and the 747 are in the over 158-terms widwbedy long haul group.
Referring to figure 3.5, it may be seen that each size group is represented in the data base. Smaller
shorthaulaircraft o0natitutsapproxinmtely40%of the cases, largershort haul group appro_dmateJy20%
of the cases, narrow-body long haul group approximately 35% and wide-bedy long haul aircraft
approximately 5%.
Of purticulur inter_t is the effect of size on aircraft crash performance and etu'vivability. Considering
the effects of scale as in dynamic modeling, it might be expected that largeraircraft would fare better
than smaller ah_craftif the crash environment is not scaled up. Ftu_her, the individual occupant does
not scale up, but becomes relatively smaller in the larger aircraft with a corresponding improvement
in his survival prospects. For instance, fuselage structural elements such as frames and stringers are
stronger in an absolute sense and offer gre_ter energy absorbing capability for larger commercial jet
aircraft than forsmaller prepeUer-drivenaircraft.This feature provides an inherent crashworthine_ to
the jet as compared to the propeller aircraft.
A qualitative assesmnent of the accident data seems to indicate that relative size within the jet group
has only minor effects on the crash performance of con,merciul jet transports. In general, it takes a
larger tree, a larger house, and a deeper or wider ditch to do equivalent damage to a large aircraft.
Since no two accidents are identical, an accurate comparison of damage between a large and small
jet airframe cannot be made.
There is some indication that there may be some effect of size between some smaller propeller-
driven transport aircraft and the current jet fleet. Thrce accidents not included in the study data base
were reviewed that involve high wing propeLler-drivenaircraft of one generic type. In these accidents
the seat response was different from that observed in survivable jet aircraft accidents in that many
seatseparated.Further,therewereinstancesofseat"stacking"intheforwardfuselageandsea_
ejection a largescale.Thesepropeller-drivenaircraftwhilesmallerthanthejetaircraftwere
certifiedtotheFAR 9 g longitudinaldecelerationrequirement.But,becauseofdimensionalnd
structural Pxrangement differences these smaller aircraft present a higher impedance to _he seats
than do the larger jet aircraft. This may account for the different seat crash response as seer by the
/ two types of aircraft.
AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
Accident cases were _ategorized with respect to configuration. Emphasis was placed on differences
between aircraft types and service usoe. The aircraft fuselage internal configuration was classified
according to type of service, i.e. passenger or nonpassenger. Also in the internal fuselage
configuration is the presence of body fuel cells and body fuel lines. The external configuration
differences are related to fuselage width, engine placement, landing gear, and fuel cells.
Referring to figure 3.5, it may be seen that approximately 20% involve nonpassenger service. ,.
Noupassenger service was further divided into cargo, training, and positioning flights.
Regarding cargo service, a review of the accident data shows some cases where cargo shift during
the accident increased the hazard to the flight crew. A notable instance is the Miami 880 accident on
December 16, 1976 where cattle pens broke Ioese during an overrun and blocked the
ctx'kpit door.
16
00000001-TSB'I2
Percent of total (153 accidents)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
I - i • _-.i. .... I, I i I I |
1, NC slzu - grossweight
up to 72.5
72,5 to 113
, 113totb8 I '1 - - II
t 58 and over
_ 2, A/C configuration _ __ _
Type service - pass. I I - - -
-Non-pass,
Cargo Train Position
Engine Loc,
-Wing pod ...
Aft Body IIIII
Wing and A, Body BI
Fuselage width
-Wide body l
-Narrow body i Hz ....... Ill -
Types of injudes Uncertain
Fatal- Trauma I I I II I
-Fire/smoke II - -
-Orowning _ Uncertain
Serious -Trauma -- ' - '" ' • '
-Fire/smok_ " •
4. Structural damage
Engine separation ...... I I I
Gear collapse/sap. I ............J | m m
Wingbox break II ........
Fuselage break
Water impact
ditchingbreak-up in
Door/hatch
floor damage
Fig_e 3. 5-Accident Data Categories
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Percent of total (153 accidents)
lo _o _o 40 so 60 70 so go _oo..... JL, L _ I I --- • - J _=
5, Fire Hazard No fire
Fuel spill - lk, rupt. I[111 I
Fuel spill - Eng. sep. III ....
- Tk vent No fire
-Body fuel line
Lwr body - N. gear coll. Iml
Frictioncaused m -
6. Crash environment
Rough terrain
Smooth soft terrain -- =-
Smooth hard terrain ram=
Obstruction- columnar
Obstruction- impaling BI
Obstruction- buildings
Obstruction- ditches, I iiroads - banks
Water at T.O. and.ldgs. BI i
Water - ditching or
landing attitude
Figure 3,5 - Accident Data Categories (Concluded)
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Training accidents most frequently involve engine-out takeoff attempts. These accidents involve
extreme yaw and roll angles with ground strikes of wings, engines or aft fuselage. Some accidents
involve touch-and-go landing practice.
The principalvariationin structuralconfigurationis in placementof engiase. Approximately60% of the
accide_ts involve aircraftwith wing mounted enginse and 37% involve aft mounted engines, while 3%
involve wing and aft body mounted engines. The aft mounted engines only separated from the
aircraft due to high acceleration loading, while the wing/pylon mounted engines separated beth from
high accelerations and from contact with external objects. The Comet IV has engines moun_ed
internally in the_wings which contained the engines in a crash.
Engine placement was observed to affect the fire hazard. A_ecciated with the aft body location is the
breaking of engine fuel lines and also of body fuel lines. The wing pylon mounted location had in
addition to fuel line breaks, the rupturing of wing fuel tanks due to pylonJangine separation. Fires
occurred in engines internally mounted in the wing.
The wide-bodylong haul aircraft have main body landing gear in addition to the wing mounted gear.
Here the crash response was to transfer high impact loads to the fuselage structure.
With regard to fuel celia, the Comet IV has.wing pod tanks. These tanks have separated due to high
accelerations and have contacted external objects. The associated fire hazard was
tank rupture.
TYPES OF INJURIES
The data be_secontains 119 accidents or 67%-involving fatalities and/or serious injury. For this
study the NTSB definitions (see app. A) have been extended further to identify the cause of the
fatality/injury. Tratuna is taken to mean that the fatality/injury is caused by mechanical forces
such as inertia forces resulting from high accelerations or- from impact with the surrounding
structure. Fire/smoke is esalgned to those fatalitieslinjurise that result from burns, inhalation of
hot gases, smoke or noxious fumes. In some eases, passengers are presumed to have received
trauma injuries that prevented or slowed down their egress and as a result they died of smoke or
flames. For those accidents where the aircraft stopped in water, fatalities due to drowning are
identified. No attempt has been made to identify injuries (chemical burns) due t_contact with.raw
fuel although some instances have occurred in beth land and water accidents.
Referringto flgu_ 3.5, it may be seen that approximately 35% of the acddents involve fatalities due to
trauma,37% involve fu_smoke, and 6% involve drowning. With respect to the serious injuries, 60%
involve trauma, and 30% involve fire/smoke. It should be noted that some accidents may involve
combinations of the above causes of injury.
OPERATIONAL PHASE
Five operational phasce were used for grouping the accidents. These are takeoff, climb, approach,
landing, and tazi. Referring to figure 3.5, it may be seen that takeoff involved 22.5%, climb
involved 7.9%, approach invclved 30.5%, landing involved 37.1% and taxi involved 2.0% of the
accident cases.
The groupings by operational phase are given in table 3.3 with a brief description of the accident.
From these data, the complexity of the accidents may be observed. While frequently there are
common factors between accidents, when the details are considcred each accident is a
separate event.
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!STRUC_._URAL DAMAGE
The accident data base contains 133 cases involving hull loss and 20 caeca involving aubetantial
datnage. There arc 103 cases in which fire was pwsent. In itpproximlltely 90% of these cases the
aircraft was a hull loss.
Referring to figure _;.5, it may be seen that engine separation occurred in 55%, landing gear
collapse or separation occurred in 65%, wing bex breaks occurred in 45%, fuselage breaks occurred
in 48%, and water ditching impact breakup occurred in 3% of the accidents. The separation of an
engine and the breaking of a wing box imply fuel spills. In some instances a fuselage break in an
aircraft with aft mounted engines also cansed a fuel spill. Water ditching impact breakup is
conmdered separately from fuselage breaks becauec in general the forcesinvolved are different.
FIRE HAZARD
Fire was present in 103 accidents. In 95 of those cases the aircraft was a hull loss and in the others
the aircraft suffered substantial damage. In addition, there were 22 accidents in which a fuel spill
occurred but for which there was no fire. Some of these involved situations where the aircraft came
to rest in water or where the climatic conditions, such as low temperature, precluded the
vaporization of fuel or where terrain drained the fuel away from the aircraft, except for these
circumstances, those cases might also involve fire casualties or fnrtbor aircraft damage.
Containment of fuel, spread/scatter of fuel, and ignition of fuel constitute major areas of study for
in_proving survivability in jet transport accidente. Ignition sources are usually present in aircraft
crashes. Landing gear failure usually pr_k'iut'ea showers of sparks due to friction of structure rubbing
the ground. Hot sections of engines also provide an ignition source. Electrical arcing may occur
when the electrical compartment is penetrated or when electric wiring is severed as in the instance
of engine/pylon separation.
CRASH ENVIRONMENT
In crashes, aircraft encounter a variety of hazards. These hazards consititute a hostile environment.
In an attempt to classify this environment hazards have been divided into three general categories:
terrain,water,andobstructions.
Terrainmay befurtherseparatedintohazardsrelatingtosurfacebearingcapacity,contoursand
groundplaneforcontactby theaircraft.The characteristicsofwateraredepthand seastate.
Obstructionsaredividedintofourgroups,basedroughlyon themannerinwhichaircraftreceives
crashloads.Thesegroupsareeolvmnsr,impaling,frontal,and other.
The hostileenvironmentisshown infigure3.6.Examplesoftypesofhazardsthathavebeen
encounteredinaccidentsinthedatabaseareshowninparenthesis.Insinlpleaccidents,onehazard
may be encountt, red. More complex accidenk_ may involve several hazards encountered in various
sequences.
COMMENTS ON ACCIDENT DATA
Some comments on the content of t_l|ginct'ring data relevant to structural crsshworthincsa available
in accident reporte are in order. In general, the conWnt of engineering data has increased over the
:_. years as the awareness of crsshworthiness increased. However, date content has te,_ded to lag
behind the technology.
25
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I Terrain I I Obstructions 1
_" ,I I
(Hil_s,elevated (Mud) (Trees) (Stumps) (Building)
land/gradual slope) ,,-
(Ditches) (Sand) (Poles) (Posts) (Fences)
(Embankments -+) (Soft earth) (Towers) (Wails)
(Cliffs) (Soft pavement) (Fence posts) (Snow banks)
(Boulders) (Rock) (Equipment)
(Concrete slabs) (Other/VC)
I
[O,oondcontao,_[ Wet.I iOtharJother than gear )
(Fuselage) (Depth) (Wire utility)
(Wing) (See =ate) (Runway lights)
(Engine) (Drains)
Figure 3.6-Types of Hostile Environment
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STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
The accident data base contains 133 cases involving hull 1o_ and 20 eases involving substantial
damage. There arc 103 cases in which fire was present. In approximately 90% of these cases the
aircraft-was a hull lo_,
Referring to figure 3,5, it may be seen that engine separation occurred in 55%, landing gear
collapse or separation occurred in 65%, wing box breaks occurred in 45%, fuselage breaks occurred
• in 48%, and water ditching impact breakup occurred in 3% of the accidents, The separation of an
engine and the breaking of a wing box imply fuel spills. In some instances a fuselage break in an
aircraft with aft mounted engines also caused-a fuel spill. Water ditching impact breakup is
considered separately from fuselage breaks because in general the forces involved are different.
i. FIRE HAZARD
Fire was present in 103 accidents. In 95 of these eases the aircraft was a hull loss and in the others
the aircraft suffered substantial damage. In addition, there were 22 accidents in which a fuel spill
occurred but for which there was no fire. Some of these irwolved situations where the aircraft came
to rest in water or where the climatic conditions, _uch as low temperature, precluded the
vaporization of fuel or where terrain drained the fu_l away from the aircraft, except for these
circum___.ances,those cases might also involve fire casualties or further aircraft damage.
Containment of fuel, spread/scatter of fuel, and ignition of fuel constitute major areas of study for
improving survivability in jet transport acciden_q. Ignition sources are usually present in aircraft
crashes. Landing gear failure usually producesshowe_ nf sparks due to friction of structure rubbing
the ground, Hot sections of engines also provide an ignition source. Electrical arcing may occur
when the electrical compartment is penetrated or when electric wiring is severed as in the instance
of engine/pylon separation.
CRASH ENVIRONMENT
In crashes, aircraft encounter s variety of hazards. These hazards consititute a hostile environment.
In an attempt to classify this environment hazards have been divided into three general categories:
terrain, water, and obstructions. _t
Terrain may be further separated into hazards relating to surface bearing capacity, contours and
ground plane for contact by the ah'craft. The characteristics of water are depth end sea state.
Obstructions are divided into four groups, based roughly on the manner in which aircraft receives
crash loads. These groups are columnar, impaling, frontal, and other.
The hostile environment is shown in figure 3.6. Examples of types of hazards that have been
encountered in accidents in the data base are shown in parenthesis. In simple accidents, one hazard
, may be encountered. More complex arcidente may involve several hazards encountered in various
sequences.
COMMENTS ON ACCIDENT DATA
Some comments on the content of engineering data relevant to structural erashworthine_s available
in accident repert8 are in order. In general, the content of engineering data has increased over the
years as the awarene_ of creshworthiness increased. However. data content has tended to lag
behind the technology.
25
00000001-TSC09
1I Hostlla onvlronmant ]
I m
I Terra,. I I ObstructJ°nslII I l "
(Hills. elevated (Mud) (Trees) (Stumps) (Building)
land/gradual slope) "
(Oitches) (Band) (Poles) (Posts) (Fences)
(Embankments ±) (Soft earth) (Towers) (Walls)
(Cliffs) (Soft pavement) (Fence posts) (Snow banks)
(Boulders) (Rock) (Equipment)
(Concrete slabs) (Other A/C)
I_,oundconteo,I wa,o,J
I other than gear
(Fuselage) (Depth) (Wire utility)
(Wing) (Sea state) (Runway lights)
(Engine) (Drains)
Figure 3.6 -Types of Hostile Environment
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NTSB reports with accident dockets contain much valm_bledata. Unfortunstely, due to an executive
order, accidents over five years old, are being deleted from their urehivos, Further, investigators are.
losving government service through retirement, transfer, etc, making it difficult to recover data on
older accidents. The NTSB should declare accidents having technical value as "classics" and
preserve these dockets indefinitely.
One observation on accident reports is that it is difficult to simply differentiate accident severity
between cases from the text, It inoften necessary to delve through the structures and human fac-
tors reports in the dockets to make this distinction. Use of the severity index developed in the part
of section 4.0 rifled, Accident Severity and Survivability, of this report would help to resolve this
|: difficulty. This index could be extended to cover fire hazard.
With due regardfor the availability of data at the scene of the accident, it is felt that participation of
structural subsystems reported may be influenced by the anticipations-of the investigator. For
instance, where fuselage breaks have occurred it may be usual for ceiling panels, sidewalls and
overhead storage to be disrupted, Therefore, these items may not be mentioned in the reports.
Sources and sizes of fuel spills could be better reported.
I)
With the advent of better simulation techniques more accurate data on-impact conditions, surface
conditions, slide out distances, hazard definition, etc., will be useful in upgrading crashworthinesa
technology. Continued emphasis on the definition of injury mechanisms is needed.
Many foreign accident reports are quite thorough in the coverage of accidents while others simply
m -- report the burost details. Morecooperation and assistance through ICAO or directly with the foreign
agencies might upgrade these reports.
Finally, the availability of a team of crashworthy specialists drawn from NASA and the FAA to assist
the investigating authorities may prove useful. The NTSB, FAA, and NASA should consider this
option.
CRASH SCENARIOS
Scenarios to identify a general sequence of crash evants or conditions that produce the failure
mechanisms of the aircraft structure and the injury mechanisms for the aircraft occupant have been
developed. Scenarios for the complete aircraft are necessary where there is significant interaction
between constituent elements of the aircraft, where the sequence of damage is important to the
crash response, and to establish initial conditions for the study of isolated components.
The underlying philosophy for scenario development was, first, the scenarios must produce the
failure mechanisms of the structure and the injury mechanisms for the occupants. Second, the
scenarios should encompass available accident experience. Third, the scenarios should assist in the
identification of crash technology requirements and allow study of the crash phenomena,
• SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
The initial phase in the development of crash scenarios consisted of review and study of historical
accident data to identify and define broad categories of oceuriance relative to structural break-up
and injury factors. Structural failure mechanisms were identified and at_ listed in table 3.4. Types of
injuries were identified and arc listed in table 3.5. The data extraction form is given in
I-" appendix B.
After an analysis of the structural and injury mechanisms, three basic scenarios evolved. These are
"Air toSurface", "Surface to Surface", and 'Tlight Into Obstructions".
_a:_ 27
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Table 3,4-Failure Meehanlsms
• Fuselage • WingCrush (axial & vert) Breaks
Bending breaks Wingbox destruction
: Local deformations DistortionTangential damage
ti : • Engines/pylons• Gear Separation
Separation
Collapse • Seats
Separation
e..Hatch/doorlfloor Distortion
Distortion Rupture
Destruction
Separation
• Interiors
• Belts/harness Galley/dividersSeparation - spillage
Rupture Compartmentseparation - spillage
Ejection Panel dislodgement
Table3.5-1njuryTypes !I
• Trauma e-Fire/smoke/noxiousgases
Head Fracture, concussion Burns
Neck Fracture Vascular damage
Chest Crush. rib fracture AsphyxlaUon
Spine Fracture
Limbs Fracture, ampuls(ion
|"
• Drowning w
2M
00000001-TSC12
BASIC SCENARIO -- AIR TO SURFACE
This scenario cmmidcre these accidents in which the aircraft impact_ a level am'face from the air, The
accident is chsractsrized by high sink rat_. The crash vadablse are shown in tsb|e 3.6.
Aircraft configurationmay have indi._idnallanding gear up or down. Aircraft weight variables are the
fuselage weight distribution and the fuel load_distrlbution.
Aid.raft initial conditions are three components of linear and angular velocity, and three components
relating the aircraft orientation relative to the _rface. Aerodynamic ]rod8may besignificant for those
cases where the forward velocity is greater than VS Cstall).
Surface loads are due to the resistance of the surface. For land, this may vary from Bolt mud to
runway hardness, while for water, loads are influenced by sea state and are in accordance with the
laws of hvd_l_S_n'face load characteristics may vary as the aircraft progresses through the
accident.
Following initial impact, subsequent hazards may beencountered. For simplification, obstructions
arc separated into three types; columns representing tzcos, poles, and towers that resist motion in
the x and y direction and are local; the ditch or hianp representing vertical terrain changes of the
form Ao (1- cos XL) and may be local or apply Co broad sections of the a/rcreft, and the step
function which forms a vertical boundary represeni.ing walls, buildings, vehicles, and other
obstructions.
These obstructions may be symmetrically or asymetrically located and may be applied to landing
gear, engines, wings, and fuselage separately or in combination.
BASIC SCENARIO -- SURFACE TO SURFACE
This scenario considsre those accidents in which the aircraft on the ground encounters
obstructions. The accident is characterized by horizontal motion into the hazard. As such it treats
cases of hitting vehicles, buildings, soft earth, ditches or humps, entering water, and sliding
contact with the surface. Accident variables are similar to those described for the Air to Surface
scenario with values appropriate to the accident conditions.
BASIC SCENARIO -- FLIGHT INTO OBSTRUCTION
This scenario considers those accidents in which the aircraft flies into obstructions. The accident is
characterized by high kinetic energy and by the location and direction of the impact loads. Further
these accidents tend to be complex, encountering a sequence of obstructionS..
SCENARIO SUBSETS
The basic scenarios are divided further into subsets. The Air to Surface set has 4 sabast_ as follows:
$10: no further definition (2)
Sll: impact on other than gear (13)
$12: impact on gear (31)
$13: impact in water (7)
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Table3.6-Crash Variables
A/C configuret!on
Individualgear: Up/down
Weight dist.: Fuselage
Fuel
A/C Initialconditions: XDOT, YDOT, ZDOT Coord system .
PHt, THETA, PSI aligned with inertial
PHIDOT, THEDOT, PSIDOT referenceframe
Aerodynamicloads: Lift distribution
Surface loads: (Earth/water):
Spring rate (may be distributedin space)
Frictioncoefficient
Slope of surface
Subsequenthazards (not always encountered)
Columns
Ditchor hump Ao (t -cos XL)
F =-Zo ((5)
Step function (5 = 1 F = -Zo
6=0 F=0
Hazards may be Symmetricor aseymmetric
Appliedto gear, engine, wing, fuselage
separatelyor in combination
i .
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The Surface to Surface sct has 5 subsets as follows:
$20: hard ground or on runway (2)
821: soft surface (13)
$22: low obstruction (35)
823: high obstruction (9)
:. 824: slide/roll into water (2)
The flight into obstructions set has 4 subsets aa follows:
831: wing low (8l
_32: impact column (16)
833: impact solid wall (3)
I $34: impact high obstruction (3)
|
The accidents have been grouped by basic scenario and by subset in table 3,7. A fourth category
($4) contains nine accidents, For these accidents there was insufficient information in the files about
the accident for scenario classification or the accident was of a peculiar nature such as the DC-8 in
Shannon or the 707 in London. However, the consequences of these accidents warrant their
retention in the data base.
In some instances, it was difficult to place an accident in one basic scenario rather than another. This
is due in part to the complexity of some of the eases and in part to the paucity of the available
accident descriptions. Effort should be made to sharpen the distinction between the existing sots
and to clarify the subsets from future accidents. In addition some prevision should be made for
inclusion of a fuel spill factor in the subsets,
1
Finally, classifications have been based on history. Types of new accidents coming into the date
base should have a significantly different distribution from those of the first 20 years, This |
distribution might be expected to be strongly affected by improvements in accident avoidance _t
techniques and be reduction of hazardson and aroundairports. Development of fire suppressing fuel t
additives could not only alter the distribution of accidents among scenarios but could change the
significance of structural component participation in accidents. If a less severe impact survivability !criterion were applied to the data base, some subsets might be eliminated and the distribution ofaccidents by subset might be modified. Consequently, the scenarios should he reviewed at intervals
to ensure their continuing applicability. Further, the scenarios should reflect current behavior rather
than that drawn from the complete history.
CATEGORIZATION OF CRASH IMPACT CONDITIONS FOR CRASH SCENARIOS
An assessment of the accidents with respect to the initial conditions has been made. It should be
noted that accidents in the data base are potentially impact survivable and that inherent structural
, capability of the airframe already provides a high level of safety. Consequently, for many accident
types the areas of interest for impact research lie at the extreme limits of observed conditions or
beyond. For other accidents the severity of the accidents was more a function of hazards
encountered and somewhat independent of the normal initial conditions.
Crashes on approach usually occurbecause the aircraft is not where the pilot thinks it is, Forward
_:: speed of the aircraft is between the speed for flap deployment (VF) and stall (Vs). The rate of
descent is between 0 and 2400 ft/min. If defensive action (flare) is taken, say to avoid ground
contact, even a slight climb may be schieved. However, for research purposes, the lower limit of
zero may suffice. The angle of the aircraft relative to the ground is depenr]ent on the slope of the
31
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Table 3.?-Crash Scenarios (Concluded)
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g_und and the attitude of the aircraft. An aircraft attitude of .5" wan observed in tile 727 Cincinnati
accident where a 9" ground slope was encountered. The upper limit is the angle at stall speed as in
the 737 accident at the Chicag_Midway airport. The aircraft greas weight is, weight at takeoff less
weight of fuel burned.
For landiag accidents, forward speed may be above the prescribed landing speed or at atoll speed,
htstaneee of higher speeds generally resulted in overruns, Forward speed at onset of overruns ie
uaually l_ that= the prescribed landJag speed due to pilot deee_orationmeaaurea.Angle of
incidence is between 2.5 = nose down to the nose up stall angle, Rate of descent is between 0 and
- 2400 ft/min.
The forward speed in taxi accidents is less than 60 kts. Takeoff accidents involve forward speeds of
up to rotation speed (VR) for_beth overrun, veer-off of runway, and contact with obstructions on
the runway. Aircraft gross weight ranges up to maximum takeoff gross weight. Aircraft attitude is
essentially wings lecel and zero ia_ideave.
Accidents for initial climb involve lose or reduction in power and/or wing stall. Forward speed range is
from V-R to VF. These accidents may invnive impacts where the a/reraft is tai/.down or wing low, or
-_ large angles of yaw and roll or a combination of the above. Rate of descent might be expected to be
in the range of that for a hard landing, i.e,, 0 to 2400 ft/min.
It should be noted that the accident data reportsdo not contain sufficient identification of conditions
at the onset of the crash to be more precise. Techniques are being developed by NASA Ames that
_t couldbetter define thsse initial conditions where data from the Flight Data Recorder and from the Air
_t- Traffic Controller radar is used. However, t_ date no program to establish these values exists.
Further, effects of last second evasive actions by the flight crew and influence of terrain features on
: "effective _ impact conditions must be included for I_ur_ses of simulating the crash. Flight__crew
-_ actions may be obtained front further development of the Ames technology.
Value limits of initial eonditioas observed for each subset Scenario are shown in table 3.8. These
I_ values may be used to give appro_ximate rangas of crash initial conditiona for the scenarios
for roseorch_
mat
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4.0 ROLE OF STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS IN CRASHWORTHINESS
In this seetion the structural conlponents that significanfly participate in or influence the crash
dynamic behavior are studied. Aircraft structural co,npenents that participate and their role in
crashes are identified from the accidentatata-Thls.participation is summarized.
A matrix relating the participation of structural systems to the scenarios defined in section 3 is
presented and asse_ed. An accident structural damage severity index is presented. This index is a
function of major component participation. The-relationship between the scenario and the
structural damage severity index is a_sossed.
Interactions of the structural components ae observed from the accident data have been identified
and discussed. Problem areas for current structural components are discussed and assessed.
Finally, crashworthiness implications of the application of advanced materials in these structural
components are considered.
PARTICIPATION OF STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS
IDENTIFICATION OF STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS
The accident date base was reviewed to identify structural components that participate in the aircraft
crashdynamicresponse.Reenltaofthisreviewareshown intable4.1.Thistableidentifiesthe
componentcrashfunction,cCsshdynamics,interactionwithothercomponents,andresultsofthis
interaction.
The components are the landing gear, pylon/engine, wing box structure, fuselage, fuel distribution
system, floor structure, seata/restraint systems, cabin interior, and entry and escape doors. The
landing gear includes nose gear, wing mounted main landing gear, and wide-body fuselage
mounted gear. Pylon/engine include wing pod mounted engines and aft body engines. Wing box
structure is concerned basically with fuel tankage and primary load carrying members. Fuselage
includes lower fuselage, (bottom of fuselage to the cabin floor structure) and upper fuselage (floor
structure to crown). Cabin interiors include overhead storage, galleys, closets, dividers, lavatories,
ceiling panels, sidewalls, etc.
COMPONENT PARTICIPATION
Participation is summarized.in table 4.2. The major diagonal gives the total participation of any
component while the off<liagonal values shows coparticipatien of other components. In addition to
the components, hull lee_es and accidents involving fire are included.
From those date, general component participation and interaction of components may be obtained.
However, in order to obtain the significance of the interaction and role of components in crashes a
more detailed assessment is required (see part of section 4.0 rifled. Interaction of Structural
Coml_mente).
MATRIX CATEGORIZATION
Table 4.3 presents a matrix relating critical structural components, fatalities, and accident severity to
the crash scenarin6. Fatalities are divided into groups by cause: fire related, trauma, drowning, and
unknown (UINK).Per_ntilos relate to the number of occupants participating. The known frequency
of participation of structttralcomponents identified is shown foreach majorscenario and for salmete.
Included in this table are the number of accidents, hull lessee, and fires. Finally, the frequency of
occurrence for each accident severity defined in table 4.3 is shown.
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On the bnsis of percent of fatal/t/m, flight into obstructions ($3) ia the most lethal scenario, followed
by air to surface ($1), unclassified (S4), and surface to surface ($2), This order tends to agree with
the total energy to be dissipated in the crash. The frequency of fire, while not independent of the
total eaergy, furtherincrcase_ the lethality of the scenario. In fact, the majorfactor in fatalities is fire.
Considering total fatalities, the ranking of the basic sceneries is air to surface (S1), flight into
obstructions (83), surface to surface (82), and unclassified ($4). On the basis of numbers of
accidents, the ranking becomes surface to m,fface ($2), air to surface (S1), flight into obstructions
(83), end unelsesifled ($4).
No single scenario appears to be "the major type for lethality", rather each must be studied to fully
t_derstand the crash response of aircraft. As starting points, it appears that air to surface-impact
on gear (812), surface to surface--low obstruction ($22), and flight into obstruction--impact
column ($32) are likely candidates.
To obtain improved-crashworthiness each structural component must perform its crash function.
For instance, when the strength capability of landing gear is exceeded, the gear should separate
without tearing fuel tanks or dmnaging fuel or hydraulic lines. Landing gear should perform in
each scenario over the range of accident variables. In like manner each system should be studied.
This should l_rovide ea envelops of capabilities for the aircraft.
ACCIDENT SEVERITY AND SURVIVABILITY
Accidents have been assessed on the basis of amount of damage to the aircraft and effect of this
damage on survivability. Accidents in the data base were assessed into si_ categories of accident
severity shown in table 4.4. In general, the degree of structural damage and the energy to be dis-
sipated increasesa thecategoryincreases.
Categories1 through3 involveaccidentsin whichtheoccupantprotectiveshellisgenerally
maintainedbutfuelspillfactorincreaseswithcategory.At category4,thefuselagebreakis
introducedbutthefuelsystemisintact.Threeclassesoffuselagebreakareusedtodistinguishthe
severityoftheaccident.A classI breakhasthefuselagebrokenwithfuselages ctionse sentially
remainingtogether.Theopeningallowsfuel/fireentrybutistoosmallforoccupantegress.Inclass2
breaks,thefuselageseparatessufficientlyoallowoccupantegressand fuel/f_reentry,butthe
section maintain a proximity to one another. Class 3 breaks have fuselage sections separate and
come to rest at some distance from each other.
Category 4 accidents are severe accidents involving either severe lower fuselage crush or class I or
2 breaks, or beth. However, in category 4 there are no major fuel spills. Categories 5 and 6 involve
increasingly severe destruction of the aircraft with serious breaks in fuel tankage.
The 153 accidents in the data base have been grouped by category and are summarized in table 4.5
and figure 4.1. From data in table 4.5 and figure 4.1 some general observations may be made. First,
with regard to overallsurvivability, fire presents the greatest hazard. Known fire fatalities outnumber
known trauma fatalities by 2.84 to 1.0. Fire hazard is most severe for accidents having major fuel
spills due to rupturing of fuel tankage (categories 3, 5, and 6).
Trauma fatalities occur meetly in cetegorice 5 and 6 which involve severe fuselage breaks. The
_. single instance in category 2 resulted from a local lose of survivable volume and five instances in
category 3 resulted from severs lower fuselage crush.
Deep water impact accidents represent less than 10%of the study data base but have a high fatality
43
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Table 4,4-Categories of Acclclont Seventy
1, Minor impact damage - includas engine/pylondamage or separation, minorlower fuselage damage,
and minorfuel spillage.
2. Moderate impactdamage - includes higher degrees of damage of category f and Includesgear
separation or collapse.
3. Severe impactdamage but no fuselage break - includes major fuel spillage due to wing lower surface
tear and wing box damage.
4. Severe impact damage - includes severe lower fuselage crush and/or class I or class 2 fuselage
breaks, may have gear collapse, but no tank rupture.
5, Extreme impact damage - includesclass 1 or class 2 fuselage breaks with wing separation or breaks,
may have gear and/or engine separation, and fuel spillage.
6. Aircraft destruction - includesclass 3 fuselage breaks or destructionwith tank rupture, gear and/or
engine separation.
Fuselagebreaks: Class 1 - sections break butremain together
Class 2 ° sections break and open
Class 3 - seclions break and move off
i"
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rate. Little structural or detailed information is available on several accidents in which a large
percentage of tile occupaata I_rished. Water impact usually re_nlta ill severe damage to the lower
fuselage, often accompanied by class 2 breaks in fife fuselage and separation of wings, engines,
and landing gear. In some cows many occupanta drowned after evacuating the aircraft. In some
asses the high fatality rate wtu_due to inappmpl_ate action of the cabin crews after the itircraft came
_' to rest.
"_ Lnst, as might have been anticipated, the overall survivability generally decreasea as the major
structuraldmnago to the aircraft increaese. For categories 5 and 6, known fatalities due to fire and to
_. . trauma appear in almost equal numbers. While these categories also have the largest percentages of
undefined fatalities, it is not expseted that the resulta would be changed if a fttll definition of fatalities
were av ilable.
Category 1 accidents experienced only minor structural damage. There were three hull losses and
_. 53 fatalities due to fire. Two soc_denta involve fires, caused by sspflrgtiOnrOf all engine, that
resulted in a catastrophic explcaion of the wing tanks. In beth instances, fatalities occurred when
tanks exploded while the aircraft were being evacuated. Another accident involved a fire due to
.. penetration of the wing tank by debris thrown up from landing gear. In this instance the aircraft
was successfuUy evacuated but was destroyed by fire.
!._ Category2 accidents involve only one fatality. In this case the trauma fatality occurred as the aircraft
penetrated the airport tenumai. The purser wee killed when the hnU wee ruptured by e building
column. This accident ie an anomaly. There are 12 hull losses, 2 of which were due to slowly
spreading fire. Two accidents involved engine separation and fuel line fires while another accideltt
was a friction fire due to nese gear co_lapse.
Category 3 accidents involve at least 722 fire related fatalities and 5 trauma fatalities. There are
three accidents involving 179 occupanta and 130 fatalities that are undefined. The DC-8Toronto
accident was placed in this category because of the major fuel spill due to tank rupture as the
engine/pylon separated. The 108 fatalities are treated antics related because the wing fuel tank
explodedin the air while attempting a go-around.The five trauma fatalities weie in the KI,MTener_fe
accident;and were in the lower fuselage and were ejected. Drownings accounted for 18 fatalities, at
least 15 of which occurred after evacuation.
Category 4 involves 225 fatalities of which 55 are from fires not due to tank rupture, 165 due to
drowning, and 6 to trauma. One of these was the 727 Salt [_akeCity accident in which fire resulted
from a hard landing that caused a ruptured fuel line.
In meet a_cidenta involving drowning, few details are available except for the DC-9 St. Cruix
accident. In this case the drownings are thought to occur after'evacuation and trauma fatalities were
•due to seat separation due to floor distortion and to oc_upanta who did not use the seat belts.
Category 5 involves 934 fatalities of which 45% areof undetermined canses. Of the known causes of
fatality, 335 are related to fire and 210 are related to trauma. The 747 Pan Am Tencrife accident
accounts for 36% of the fatalities, with 14,_deaths of undetarefined cause. In this accident trauma
fatalities were due to the destruction of the upper aft fuselage by the KLM747 and the entry of the
KI,Menginepodinto that section of the ai_raft. Further,burning fuel front the Pan Am ruptured wing
wee sprayed into the area trapping most of these not killed by trauma. The four known trauma
fatalities in the 727 Cincinnati accident were due to complete destruction of the ceckpit area. The
10 trauma fatalities in the LK;-8Portland accident were due to intrusion of a la_e tree into the
forward fuselage.
•17
00000001-TSE03
Category 6 inw_lves 1547 fatalities of which 59% were of undetermined causes. Of the klxowncauses
of fatality, 189 ,irerelated to fire and 190 are related to trauma, in four accidents, truly file fate of file
flight deck crew is defined although there are indications of cause with terms as "many"or "most".
The enormity of many accidents and shortage of pathological skills preclude accurate postmortem
determination of cause.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCF,NARIO AND ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORIES
Combining the structural damage severity category with the scenarios shows sceueaio developnmnt
should include accidents having severity categories of 3 through 5. Category 6 seeidentb represent
consumption of all the aircraft's protective structure. However, provisions made for less severe
accidents would tend to improve the crashwurthinese in some areas even in category 6 accidents.
Consequently, research efforts should be directed towards better defining the crash scenarios to
represent this severity range. The improved definition includes initial conditions, aircraft motions,
hazards encountered, and crash response of the systems. Methods of simulation should be
developec'-'_at permit study of the parameters that affect the crash-response so that these might be
subjected to a more thorough engineering treatment.
INTERACTION OF STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS ANILAIRCRAET..S_STEMS
Most aubstsntial damage or hull loss accidents that are impact survivable will involve damage,
destruction, or loss of one or more structural components and alrcraf_ systems. During the
sequence of events as the destruction occurs and the aircraft come _ a stop, the lives of persona
onbeard are being jeopardised. In the 153 accidents reviewed in this study, it was determined that
the most critical event in the sequence that caused most fatalities was the releasing and ignition of
fuel which then developed into severe fires. For those persona not injured by impact, the
probability of survival was determined by time (measured in minutes and seconds) and by the
impedimenta in the escape route. In order to define approaches to improve the crashworthiness of
transport aircraft it is necessary that the involvement of the atrnctural components, systems, and
subsystems be determined and the sequeo.ca of events and interaction of their involvement in a
variety of accidents be well understood.
Discussion of the major hazards, the domhtant structuralcomponents, and the interaction as relating
to survivability is provided in the following sections.
WING BOX -- INTEGRAL FUEL SYSTEM
Severe fuel fires, that are the primary cause of most fatalities, result from unwanted release or
spillage of tank fuel. In this study it was found that 107 accidents involved tank fuel spillage and 85
of these had fires of varying so.verity.Spillage directly fromthe integral tank nsnslly occurs from six
types of events: wing box fracture or break, lower wing akin tear or rupture, penetration of the tank
by an object, tearing open the wing box during separation of main landing gear or engine pylon, fuel
tank ullage explosion, and flow from wing tip vents. In a given accident two or more of these types of
spillage sometimes occurs, These types are shown in figure 4.2.
Fuel spillage due to wing break occurrences have been a:_essed with regard to incidence of fire and
fire related fatalities, The area of the spill has been assayed where 'q,urgc" is 30 meters or larger in
diameter, "medium° is 10 to 30 meters in diameter, and "small" is unoer 10 meters. Fire intensity
has been assessed with respect to cansequences of fire as large, medium, or small. Interaction of
fire with fuselage in arms of fuselage entry and of effect on evacuation also have been assessed,
Fire eet_.Tto the fuselage has been gaged as entry through breaks or as burn-threugh. In addition,
the effect of fire on the posterash evacuation has b_,n assessed, ltere, large effects implies some
fire related fatalities, while small implies some hindrance.
4_
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Regarding the interaction of landing gear and pylon in wing break, the asso_mant relates to
maintenance of the wing ground clearance and to transmiMion of loads to the wing structure (only
for wing pod mounted engines).
WING BOX BREAK/FRACTURE
In 67 accidents, fuel spillage occurred when the wing box fractured due to exce_ive forces or
loads. There are also nine other accidents in which it is believed that wing fracture occurred but
insufficient detail is available to define other factors.
Most fractures occur due to high vertical loads or due to impact with large objects such as trees, ,.
buildings, or embankments. In some cases the landing gear and engines may also collapse or
i:. separate st the time wing fracture occurs, however the gear and engine generally have little
influence on the severity of the accident except possibly by providing an ignition source for the
• pilled tank fuel.
Some wing fractures occur early iu the accident sequence and the fuselage continues to slide or-
move, possibly away from the initial large fuel spill location. Fuel is nsunily scattered over a large
area. In other casm the wing fracture oocurs at about the time and point where the aircraft comes to
rest and the fuel spill is adjacent, under, or around the fuselage. If fuel ignition occurs, an almost
instantaneous severe fuel fire develops; this constitutes the "most hazardous scenario." Damage to
other structural components can influence passenger/crew survivability in this situation. Fuselage
breaks and fuselage lower surface ruptures can provide immediate access for flame and smoke to
the passenger compartment. Damage to the cabin interior such as collapsed overhead storage,
galley debris, ruptured floor, and jammed/blocked exits can impede evacuation. The interactions of
these structural components and the impact that each has on survivability in the wing break/severe
fn'e occurrence, is different for each occurrence, no two are the same. From this study it is
concluded that research should be accomplished in the area of wing box and integral tank design
philosophyand in the development of wing structure that will minimize wing tank fracture when wing
box breakage or separation occurs.
Results of these assessments are shown in figure 4.3. Some general observations may be made.
First, wing breaks result in a high percentage of fires (deep water impact being an understandable
exception).Second, wing bresk aocidents have a high fire related lethality. Third, if fire is present it is
highly probable that fire will enter the fuselage either through a fuselage opening such as a door,
break,orby a burn-through.Fourth,thepresenceoffireliesa seriouseffecton thepostcrash
evacuation.Breaksduetoimpactindeepwaterhavenotexperiencedf'n_salthoughazardofRreis
present.Breaksduetodraggingthewinga_e groundappeartoresultinalowerpercentage
of fatal accidents than other types of breaks.
Wing breaks due to impacting trees/poles and like obstructions are particularly severe types of
breaks with regard to size of the spill and resulting fire and incidence of fire related fatalities. For
21 accidents, large spills occurred in at least 16 with fires occurring in at 1,-ast 15. Fire related
fatalities did not occur in only seven accidents. It may also be seen that fire entry through fuselage ,
breaks occurred in almost 60% of the accidents while entry by burn-through occurred in about
10% of the accidents. Fire was a factor in evacuation in about 30% of the accidents. For this type
ofbreak,iI_teractionwithlandingearand withengine/pylonseparationappearsquitesmallas
mightbeexpected.
Similarassessmentsmay bemade forothercausesofwingbreakwithsimilurresults.An exception
istheeffectofgearseparationa d engine/pylenseparationforthegrounddragbreak.Herethe
50
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Figure 4.3-Wing Break Assessment
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_---: Figure 4.3 - Wing Break Assessment (Continued)
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Figure 4.3-Wing Break Assessment (Concluded)
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crash role of gear and wing/pylon mounted engines in maintaining ground clearance of the wing d_a
appear to be a significant factor. If a gear more tolerant to Separation or collapse were available,
some improvement in erashworthiness might be achieved.
WING LOWER SURFACE TEAR/RUPTURE
4"- In this study, tear or rupture of the wing lower surface is known to have occurred in eight aeeidenta
and probably occurred in 19 others. These generally occur when the wing is subjected to
scrubbing/sliding on the runway, on rough terrains, or over various objects. Records indicate that 13
. involved contact with rough terrain, 7 involved sliding over fences and walls, 4 involved sliding on
level ground, 1 involved settling on a separated engine, and 1 involved impact with another aircraft.
In 26 of these accidents the aircraft was destroyed and 40% had fire related fatalities.
The hazardevolving from these wing tank tear/rupturce is related to the size of the tank opening, the
rote at which fuel is released, the temperature, and if the fuel was ignited. Many of these
occurrences involve severe fires, however-they tend to be localized in the wing area end thereby
make it possible for persons onbeard to evacuate from beth ends of the fuselage away from the fire.
The interactions and impact that other structural components have on these wing lower surface tears
i' isthesameaswithwingbreakoccurrences,An increaseinthehazardoccurswithtime(possibly30
secondsto5 minutes);fireimpactingon thewingoftencausestankexplosionsthatspreadthefuel
b- furtherandintensifythefire.Researchshouldbedirectedintheareaofcontainingthefuelwithinthe
tankoratleastrestrictingtheflowoffuelthroughtheruptureorholeinthewingskin,
Aseesamentoftheseaccidentsi showninfigu:e4.4,As may beseen,lowersurfacetearresultsin
large fuel spillage with the fire being severe. In about 60% of the spills, fire enters the fuselage by
burning through the skin, while fire entry through fuselage breaks occurs in 15% and by other
3r_ routesinabout10%.]_e-hasaffectedevacuationin40% ofthecases.
i With regardto the interaction of landing gear collapse or separation, gear has been a major factor in
50% of the spills and had a lesser effect in about 30% of the spills. Wing mounted engine/pylon
separation or collapse during lower surface tear failed to maintain ground clearance in 96% of the
cases.
Wing Box Tear
: Tearing away sections or parts of the wing box fuel tank and subsequently releasing large quantities
of fuel during separations of main landing gear or of engine pylon is an infrequent occurrence, being
reported in seven accidents. However, when it does happen, a severe fuel fire generally occurs.Design philosophy for main landing gear and engine pylon attachment to the wing box should be
reviewed to ensure these unite are fused for a clean overload separation that does not fracture the
integral fuel tank. Assesement of wing box tear is shown in figure 4.5.
Tank Ullage Explosions
_"_'_'' Wing box fuel tank ullage explosions have been reported in 17 accidents and probably occurred in 65
--._ others. In most of these, a severe fire already existed and generally the size or intensity of the fire
_ increase. In most cases it is not known how many, if any, additional fatalities resulted from the tank
explosions but it appears from available data that evacuation was usually affected. The initial fire in
=_ _. I three accidents occurred at the engine pylon wing interface after engine separation, two of theSe
i.:: explosions occurring in flight. Research should be directed to_ards development of devices,
i systemsorproceduresthatwilleliminateorreducetheprobabilityofullageexplosions.However,
neliabilityof hefueldeliverys stem ustnotbecompromisedorreducedtoachievetheelimination
of ullage explosions. Aseesament of tank ullage explosions is shown in figure 4.6.
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Wing Tank Vents
The wing tusk vent aystom has been involved in uno sevens fire accident. In this case, a 707 in
Rome, an engine fire spread to fuel dripping from the adjacent wing tank vent at the wing tip,
progressed through the vent system and caused a tank ullage explosion. Any studies involving fuel
tank design should include the tank vent system and flame suppression,
Tank Puncture
There are three accidents in which tanks have been punctured by foreign objects, Two of these
accidents occurredduring aircraft operation and resulted in fires that destroyed the aircraft but for
{- which there were no fatalities. One of these involved puncture by debris from a disintegrating engine
and the other involved parts from a.disintegratlng wheel. The third incident occurred after the
accident when the tank was punctured during rescue operations hut there was no fire.
Leakage
There are four accidents in which fuel spillage resulted from leaking tanks. Only one accident
experienced fire which destroyed the aircraft, but there were no fatalities. While fl_-hazard is
present these accidents have not been lethal,
Body Lines
Rupture of body fuel lines is o hazard associated with aircraft configurations having aft mounted
engines or auxiliary power unit. If fuel tank shut.off velves areactivated immediately after acrash, the
amount of fuel spilled due to hody line rupture is only a minor contributor to the accident _everity.
However, when the lines are not shut off, the resulting fire has been catastrophic.
The "classic" case of this was the 727 Salt Lake City accident on November 11, 1965, in which a
separated landing gear penetrated the lower fuselage and ruptured a body fuel line. Forty.three
occupunt_ died from fire related causes. As a result of this accident, body lines were strengthened
and rerouted to avoid this type of rupture. The only other instance in which body lines are thought to
be a major contributor to the severity of an accident is the DC-90_are on December 20, 1972,
where the aft fuselage of a DC-9 struck the vertical tail of an 880 during takeoff and probably
ruptured a body fuel line. Ten persons perished from fire related causes in this accident.
Aseessment of body fuel line rupture is given in figure 4.7. As may be seen, there are 10 accidents
with 4 probable instances of rupture. Fire was present in each instance with fire related fatalities in
nine accidents. Fuel line rupture fires are deemed to have been a factor in evacuation in possibly six
of the cases. Fuselage breaks were present in eight of the cases with.fire entering the fuselage
: thxough the breaks in six cases. Fire came through the floor in three cases with one uncertain.
SEATS
Seats interface with the occupant and with the s_cture to which they are attached. In assessing
these interactions, the relation of the seats and the structure is treated first, and the relatson of the
seat to occupsnt is treated second.
Three basic types of seats are of concern: crew seats, flight attendant jump seats, and the
_ passenger double and triple I_nch seats. Crew seats are single seats that are mechanically
adjustable to facilitate operatir., of the aircraft and attach to the cockpit floor structure. A
combination shoulder and lap _.It restrain the occupant. Flight attendanW jump esats may be
single or double units attached to a bulkhead end mechanically folded or retracted when not in use.
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'i_..eseseats support vertical loads, with the rest_ahlt harness transmitting side and lougitudinai
hinds to the structure. Pa_enger seats are attached to floor tracks and in some designs to the
fuselage sides. Floor tracks arc attached to the floor structure or to pallets attached tn the floor
structure, Tile passenger is restrained by means of a lap belt.
For the interaction of seats with structure, no distinction is made for types of seats, but two
interactions are of cancers with the structure -- the effect of a fuselage break and the distortion of
the floor. In a fuselage break, scats may be ejected through the break, or may simply separate from
atbroken floor track. In floor distortion, seats may separate from the track, or may be elevated.
The potentially most lethal of those interactions is ejection through the fuselage break. Survival of
the occupant is a matter of chance, depending on many factors such as velocity of ejection, nature
of intpact area, and the orientation of the occupant at impact. Further, the ejected occupant may
be in an area that is exposed to fire or is overrun by the advancing aircraft.
Seats located in the vicinity of a fuselage break may be subject to high acceleration pulses due to
the redistribution of the stored strain energy as the structure breaks. This frequently results in the
separation of the seats due to rupture of seat tracks, seat track attachmante or seat structure.
Separated seats may then shift position and cause injury or hinder the egress of the occupant.
Seat dislocation from floor distortion may be due to separation or to elevation of the seat.
Separation may force the occupant to contact interior objects and may hinder egress. Floor
elevation may block egress routes such as over-wing escape hatches, may hinder the occupant in
exiting from the seat, or may force contact with the cabin interior. For eraahwurthinese, it is
I desirabletokeepseatsattached,inplace,and tomaintaina survivablevolumefortheoccupant.
There are 48 accidents with identified interactions and another 21 accidents to which probable
interactions were assigned. Assee-sment of these accidents is shown in figure 4.8. Fuselage break
has resulted in 15 certain accidante with one or more occupant ejected through the break, and
probably at least two more. Separation of some scats at the break with the scats remaining in the
aircraft has occurred in 30 accidents with probable occurrence in at least 13 other cases. Seat
[ separation due to floor or fuselage side distortion has occurred in 19 accidents with probably 5 other
eases. Elevation of the seat without sevaration has occurred in 14 accidents with probably 4 other
accidents.
The discussion of scat/restraint performance in survivable crashes is presented in two parts, The
first part includes those accidents in which injuries that might be related to seat strength
performance and in which aeat,lreatraintperformance are cited by the accident investigation team.
The second part includes serious accidents in which the seat/restraint performance was not cited
and in which no injuries that might be related to seat strength occurred.
Only 31 such aceidante could be fomld in which seat performance was mentioned in NTSB reports.
A detailed review of these accidents indicatca seats certified to current FAR seat strength criteria
provide protection to the occupant commensurate with the crash loads. The aircraft strength and
occupant injury tolerance capability appear to be in proper bahmee.
A separate independent study of this matter conducted withi'_ the FAA is contained in reference 1.
, The currentstudydrew uponNTSB accidentreportsand specialstudies,N'PSBHuman Factors
_ Factual Reports, NTSB Public Hearing Dockets, and the manufacturers accident files for each
i accident The separst_ I,AA study also treats NTSB data aml includes 1_AA Civil Air Medi_ai hmtitute
(CAMI)data but does not include the manufacturers files.
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For engi,_ecring purpceea it is necessary to relate _eat perfurmance and injury. To do this it was
neceasury to review the Human Factors Factual Reports and, in some instances, survivor testimony.
The NTSB statistical category, "Serious Injury"(Seeapp. A), used in NTSB Accident Reports does
not necessarily identify actual physical injury nor relate injury mechanism to injury. Accident victims
who are hospitalized for 48 hours for medical obeervatian, legal considerations, or other reasons are
, llsted as serious injurieoeven if there is no treatment. An immediate imprevement in erashworthiness
statistics could be obtained simply by using a more accurate definition of serious injury. To rely on
these injury statistics may lead to exagger_g_d conditions and produce erroneous conclusions.
Reference 1 identifies 27 ground impact accidents including 7 propeller-driven aircraft and 20 jet
transport aircraft, A comparison of those study accidents with this study shows that 18 of 20 jet
transport accident_ are included in the present study. The two accidents omitted are the DC-8JFK
accident on September 15, 1970, in which the seats performed adequately and no occupant was
actually seriously injured, and the 707 Page Pagn accident on January 30, 1974 in which no seat
performance was cited. The additional accidents in the present study include accidents prior to
1970, two Canadian accidents, and the 747 Japan Airlines accident in Anchorage on December 16,
1975,
In these accident reviews, investigators did not identify a single trauma fatality caused by lack of
seat strength or seat attachment structure strength. It is recognized that such identification is
difficult because of incomplete knowledge of local crash dynamics, fatal injury mechanisms, and
survivor testimony as to his experience. Also, postcrash fire frequently consumes necessary
evidence. There are limited, though subjective, indications w_ht_rean increase in attachment
strength may have provided some benefit. For instance, one passenger in the 727 St. Thomas
accident was ejected in his seat through a fuselage break and died of trauma injuries. This seat was
located in the aircraft in the region of fuselage destruction and there is no assurance that any
increase in seat strength requirements would have provided any benefit.
While it can be observed that injuries were sustained in deforming the seats, no sequence of events
has been identified where increased seat strength would have reduced occupant injury.
Consequently, the cases presented in table 4.6 involve serious injury and/or seat/restraint system
crash performance for accident survivors. Twenty-six accidents involve a hull loss, 19 involve fire,
22 involve at least one fuselage break, 14 involve severe floor distortion, and 4 involve water impact.
Thirteen accidents are only partially impact survivable since survivable volume for at least one
occupant was lost. For seat/reatraint system strength performance, injuries to the head, spine,
chest, and pelvis are of concern, although injuries of these types may arise from a variety of other
causes. These are shown for the flight deck crew and passengers, while spine end pelvis injuries are
shown for flight attendants.
Table 4.6 also shows seat performance for seat-to-floor attachments, seat legs, seat pan, and
restraints for flight deck crew and passenger seats. The number for attachments and seat legs are
llJ for seat units. Flight attendants' jump seat structures, mechanisms, and harnesses are also
_i identified.
Some general observations may be made in reviewing tltese accidents. First, there is evidence of
spinal injury for flight deckcrew, flight attendants, and pa_engers where no seat crash performance
"_- was cited by the NTSB. In addition, there were spinal injuries to occupants where seat crash
peformancc was cited. If the injury tolerance of these people is exceeded by the crash forces
transmitted by seat8 designed to current strength requirements, inexeasing the seat strength criteria
would do nothing to intprove their protection. Second there are instances where seat performance
_ was cited in which no serious injury was incurred suggesting that increasing seat strength might
_ transmit sufficient load to produce serious injury, s negative benefit.
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Seat detachment (separation) ia generally associated with loss of structural integrity due to
destruction of the fuselage shell, fuselage breaks, and to extreme distortion of the structure.
Detachment may occur if all the seat legs or attachment fittings rupture or if the seat tracks rupture.
This indicates that a more compliant seat]floor substructure to accommodate distortion might be
more beneficial than an increase in seat strength criteria.
For commercial jet transport aircraft, there is little evidence of seat separation with subsequent
"stacking" in the forward section of the aircraft. Two excaptione to this are the DC.9 St Croix
accident where three double seats stacked due to the impact of some passengers who did not use
their lap belts; and the 737 Midway accident where two triple seats (rows 14 and 15 A, B, and C)
stacked due to severe structural damage to fuselage in that area. The more severe injuries occur in
the vicinity of fuselage breaks and areas of extreme fuselage distort.ion. This might be expected
since these are locations of very high loadings and areas where structure has lost its ability to protect
the occupants.
Passenger Seats
In those accidents involving high longitudinal loading such as the 727 Cincinnati, 737 Midway,
L-101L.Miami, DC-9 Boston, DC-9 Charlotte, 727 JFK, 727 St. Thomas, DC-9 New Hope, 737
Cranbrook, and the DC-8 in Portland, extreme destruction of the fuselage was experienced.
Passenger seat separation was observed in the areas of destruction. An increase in seat strength
criteria would not have reduced the injuries in these accidenta.
Examination of those accidents involving extreme vertical impact velocities such as the DC-9 St.
Croix, DC-8 JFK, DC-9 Akron, 727 Denver, DC-9 Philadelphia, and the DC-9 Toronto accidents
indicates an increased number of spinal fractures as compared to the total data set. In the Toronto
accident, the aircraft went over a 51-ft cliff at 46 KIAS, equivalent to falling from the top of a five-
story building, having a resultant deceleration of 25 g. At Akron, the aircraft flew over a 38-ft,
embankment at 86 mpli impacting on a roadway. The Philadelphia, Denver, JFK, and St. Croix
accidents had hard impacts combined with high forward speeds.
These accidents indicate that the current passenger seat vertical strength criteria are closely
matched to the threshold of injury for the passenger population. Further seat deformations observed
in some of these extreme accidents used much of the available stroke indicating that the limit of
energy absorption within the injury load threshold is being approached. However, further research
on the energy absorption aspect of crashworthy seats should be done.
The DC-8 Anchorage accident was an overrun during an aborted takeoff in which the aircraft
encountered a deep ditch and hit a building and an antenna tower. The aircraft lost engines, landing
gear, wings were separated and broken and the fuselage broke open. Many of the occupants left
their seats and were standing in the aisles before the aircraft came to rest. Twenty-one spinal injuries
occurred. One flight attendant and approximately five passengers are known to have sustained
spinal injuries due to impact Icadings. These five passengers were in seats that ejected from the
aircraft when the fuselage broke. The remainder also may have occurred during impact or during
evacuation, but there is no implication that increased seat strength would have provided more
protection.
It may be seen that only four accidents are of concern in accident performance of the flight deck
seats. In the DC-8 Portland accident, the right side of the cockpit experienced loss of survivable
volume due to impacting a large diameter tree (of the cockpit occupants, only the Captain survived).
The First and Second Officer's _eate separated while the Captain's seat was attached but was loose
and had some seat pan deformation.
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Ill the DC-9 Philadelphia accident whore the aircraft experienced a 10 g vertical deceleration, the
Captain and First Officer seats experieuced seat pan deformation, In applying loads to deform these
seat pans both occupants experienced spinal injury.
In the 707 Kansas City accident one flight deck seat experienced seat leg doforu_ation and the
officer received a spinal injury. However, in this instm_ee, it was noted that the bax_esace wore not
used by the the occupants.
There are six other accidents in which spinal injuriss occurredto flight deck crew but for which there
was no seat performance cited. From this it may be concluded that seats are already stronger than
• , . • , • i npilots; and that further increasing the strength cntsna for these scats would prowde no benefit a d
might cause more severe injuries. It appears that some increase in energy absorption and load
limiting might prove beneficial.
There areeight accidents in which t'lightattendants suffered spinal injurieswhile seated. In the DC_
Anchorage accident, one injury occurred when the seat retrsotod.from under the attendant during
upwardacceleration causing the attendant to fall to the floor. The remaining injuries occurred with
the flight attendants in the seat. Two flight attendants had spinal and pelvic injuries in the high
longitudinal deceleration 727 JFK accident on June 24,1975, even though there was no damage to
the seat/restraint system. Most of these citations involve instances of seat collapse or partial
collapse due to rupture of a hinge, seat attachment fitting, or of the supporting mechanism. The
injuries sustained did not cause less of mobility in most cases.
There are instances where seat deformation contributed to harness problems, in that the flight
attendant submarined after the seat pan deformed. The 727 Denver accident on August 1, 1975 is
a case in point. The flight attendant suffered a back injury in this process. Also "some"spinal and
pelvic injuries were experienced in the L-1011 Mianfi accident. Most of the remainder of spinal
injuries occurredin hard vertical impact accidents with seat pan or mechanism citations. Also there
are instances of seat deformation in which there were r,o injuries.
A review of accidents involving flight attendant seats indicates that increasing seat strength
would not reduce the number of serious injuries. However, every effort should be made to include
the results of TARC Project 216-10 study into flight attendant restraint design. Various
government agencies such as the Army, Air Force, and the Department of Transportation have
identified some levels of injury tolerance. See part of section 5.0 rifled, Human Impact Tolerance
for a more detailed discussion.
LANDING GEAR
There are 96 accidents in which one or more of the landing gear separated or collapsed. In addition
there are 15 accidents in which the gear was stowed or retracted. The effect of gear separation or
collapse will be considered, followed by the effect of gear in stowed positions. Some comparison of
mlt- the two effects will be made.
Referring to table 4.2, the total occurrences show that for 95 cases of gear involvement (1 accident
--m. involves debris from the gear damaging the aircraft) there were 80 hull losses, 64 fires, 71 tank
ruptures, 46 wing mounted engines/pods separated (lI ease6 of engine separation involve aft
• mounted engines), 62 fuselage breaks or crush, 38 door hatch involvements, 33 floor distortions, ,
33 cases of debris, and 26 seat citations.
;- In order to assess the role of landing gear and the interaction with other structural systems the
- : areidents were reviewed. Direct effects of gear separation are: separation of wing pod nmunted
p-.
engines; rupture of fuel tanks by failing to maintain ground clearance and by the separating gear
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ltearing a wing box; and damage to the lower fuselage by crushing, friction, and by breaks.
Secondary effects are fire due to fuel spillage front rupturedfuel lines and tanks and to friction, floor
distortians, door/hatch problems, scat separation, and debrie due to the dintertion and breaks of the
fuselage as a result of ground contact.
Figure 4.9 shows the aseessment of gear separation. In 67% of the accidents all gear separated or
collapsed, while in 22%only main gear separated or collapsed, and in 9%only nose gear separated or
collapsed and in 2% nose gear and one main gear separated or collapsed,
Gear separation or collapse was involved in tank rupture in 17 eases of lower surface tear, 12 cases
of wing drag breaks, 14 cases of wing box tear, and 4 eases of tank leakage. This fuel spillage
resulted in 42 fire_.Thus gear separation or collapse is a factor in 64% of the fires that occuxred when
gearparticipated in the accident. Using small, medium, and large as the degree of involvement, the
gear was a large factor in 26 of the 42 fires, a medium factor in 4 of the fires, and a small factor in
12. With respect to fatalities, there were 28 accidents-adth-firexelated fatalities and 24 accidents
with trauma deaths.
Lower fuselage crush occurred in 53 accidents with gear separation being a large factor in 37
cases. Lower fuselage crush has a secondary effect on door/hatch jamming, on separation of seats,
and on cabin interior debris. Gear separation was a large factor in 9 cases of fuselage break.
For 15 accidents in which the gear was known to be retracting or in stowed position, there are only 5
cases where having gear extended may have prevented the crash. These cases mostly involve
extensive slide-out, but occurred during aborted takeoffs or flight activities for which the gear is
normully retracted.
From the above discussion it may be concluded that development of gear more tolerant to conditions
that cause separation would result in some increase in crashworthinese. Further, when separation
does occur, the wing box should not tear open.
CABIN INTERIORS
Cabin interiors ere cited in approximately one-third of the accidents in the data base. Cabin interior
equipment includes overhead storage compartments, ceiling panels and lights, sidewalls, clsse
partitions, galleys, and closehs.Comparing cabin interior citations with the accident severity category
(see table 4.4) some peculiarities may be obse_'ed. For instance, it might be expected that
accidents in categories 3 to 6 would have a higher percentage of citations than is actually reported.
This is particularly applicable to accident categories 5 and 6.
The disparity might be attributed to the expectations of the investigator, If the damage is such that
overhead compartments, ceiling panels, etc. might be expected to separate and clutter the scene,
. the occurrencemay not be reported. Further, if the devastation is such that participation of the cabin
interiors as compared to other factors might be considered secondary in survivability of the
occupant, the participation may be unreported. While the absolute level of participation may equal
that of a less severe accident, the relative contribution may be significantly less. Finally, post-impact
fire may destroy visual evidence and survivors may not report conditions,
Consequently, the 45 accidents where citations have been made should serve as an indication of
possible crash behavior of interior equipment, The 23 accidents where probable participation has
been asse_ed may not include all incidents. In some accidents where at least one part of the
interior participated, other parts have been deemed probable.
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Overhead storage comparUnents have been assessed with regard to separation, contents spillage,
evacuation blockage, and injury to occupants. Ceiling panels, sidewall liners, and class portitiozm
have been assessed for separation. This separation usually has some effect on egret. Galleys have
been aase_=d for contents spillage as well as egress blockage. These units are of particular concern
since they affect availability of the setwiee doors as an egress route. These assessments ere shown
in figure 4.10. Cabin interiors have been a major factor in evacuation in 12 known accidents and
probably in 14 accidents. Overhead storage has caused injuries in five known accidents and
probably caused injury in three additional accidents.
i
, Figure 4.11 chows interaction between other structural systems and the cabin interior system.
Crush of the lower fuselage is deemed to have occurred in 52 of the 68 accidents. Fuselage breaks
are deemed to have occurred in 32 of the 68 accidents. Landing gear separation or collapse
occurred in 48 accidents and the gear was retracted in 6 other cases. Floor distortion is deemed to
have occurred in 26 accidents. All of these interactions participate in severely loading the
structural supports for the cabin interior-equipment. Fire was present in 41 of the accidents.
FUSELAGE-BREAK ACCIDENTS (Excluding Fuselage Lower Surface Rupture)
Of the 153 impact survivable accidents used in this Survivability Study, 64 are kaown to have -
experienced one or more breaks in the fuselage and 7 others probably also had breaks. Forty-si_of
the 64 were fatal accidents. Available data indicates that 39.5% of the persons onboard in the 64
accidents were fatalities. The other 82 accidents in this study did not experience fuselage breaks
and 27 of these were fatal accidents of the persons onboard-in the 82 accidents, 20.6% were
fatalities. These data are plotted as follows:
Fatalities
F_" Percentoftotalonboard
10 20 30 40 50 60
i"
Fuselagebreak
accidents
_l_ Total 64
Fatal 46
B- Nofuselagebreak
i-_ .. accidents
I1 Total 82
Fatal 27
_ =. Of the 64 accidents experiencing fuselage breaks, 6 involved the aircraft touching down in deep
water and 58 involved the aircraft touching down (impacting) on ground or in swampy areas with
shallow water. Data on these accidents are plotted as follows:
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Fatalitins
Percentof totalonboard
10 20 30 40 50 60I I , I ,, i I
Accidentsin
deepwatef
Total 06 .......... J
Fatal 06 I
Accidentson
ground
tTotal 58 I
Fatal 39 I
Deep Water Entry Accidents
Six water entry accidents in which the fuselage broke into several pieces had fatalities (36.8% of
those persons onboard were fatalities), In five of these accidents one section of the fuselage sank
rapidly - some of the passengers and crew probably were ejected or fell into the sea without benefit
of survival gear and others were trapped inside. The other sections floated briefly, allowing
evacuations into rafts or floating slides. In other accidents the fuselage sections floated briefly,
however 84% of those anboard drowned. Survivor reports indicated that in at least two accidents,
interior and carry-on debris blocked evacuation routes and in two other accidents some exit doors
were jammed. In another, the passenger compartment floor was displaced upward restricting
evacuation.
There were also four accidents involving deep water entry in which the fuselage did not break, and
25.9% of _ose onbeard were fatalities, most believed due to drowning,
However, in these accidents the aircraft floated at least 5 minutes and in most cases 10 to 20
minutes, thus allowing adequate time to escape. In three of the four accidents it was established that
the onboard rafts and float slides were not used.
It can therefore be concluded that in deep water entry accidents in which the fuselage does not
break, the survivor-rate should be very high with proper crew response/aetious using available
equipment, Designing the fuselage to resist breaks or separations is desirable.
Ground Slide Accidents
Fifty-eight ground slide accidents experienced fuselage breaks due to main landing gear
separation/collapse, excessively hard touchdown or hard fiat/impact after takeoff, touchdown in
;_'- areas of txeegbuildinglobjects or on rocky/cough terrain, or combinations of these conditions.
Gear Separations -- 8.6%-- In 5 accidents, landing gear collapse or separation is believed to have
contributed to the fuselage breaking;that is, if gearhad not failed the fuselage may not have broken.
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Themearc generally cases of the aircraft veering off ths runway onto rcasenabiy smooth terrain or
touching down on smooth terrain told then having one or both main landing gear separate due to
impact with n slightly rm_i roador small ditch. Those five accidents rv_ulted in a clean break in the
fuselage, wide enough for a persen to be ejected, fall out, or step out. Approximately 11%of those
onbeard in the five accidents were fatalities. Fatalities occurred in three of these accidents and in
each case a severs fuel fire developed. The other two had no fatalities and no fire.
Hard Touchdown -- 8.6%4 In five accidents, the aircraft experienced a hard touchdown in a
landing attitude or stalled after takeoff resulting in level attitude impact with sufficient vertical
load to cause the fuselage to break. Two of these accidents resulted in slight breaks/fractures that
would not result in ejection of persons or provide a mea_ of exit/evacuation; there were no
fatalities and no severe fuel fire. The oth_r three accidents resulted in fuselage breaks that were
wide enough to allow ejection of persons or provide a means of crawling/stepping out during
evacuation. Of the 45 parsons onboard in three accideuta 64% were fatalities; all three experienced
severe fuel fires. There is a high probability of flame and smoke entering open ends of the fuselage
sections.
Aircraft forward speed was believed to be reasonably low in three of the accidents since the aircraft
were in a staihd condition at impact. In the other two accidents the aircraft touched down slightly
short of the runway at a high rate of descent, with forward speed probably 10 to 15 knots less than
planned.
Rough Ground -- 8.2% -- In 48 accidents, the aircraft experienced fuselage breaks after touching
down-on terrain where impact occurred with trees, poles, gtflleys, ditches, embankments, raised
roads, etc. or where impact occurred with one wing low on a reasonably smooth am'face (on airport,
marsh, dry lakebed, etc).
Data on these accidents are tabulated in the followi _ chart.
Onboardfatalities
Severe_FuelFire
Percentof total
25 50 75
I I I
Slightbreak
Averagespeed
- 57k
Clean-br.eak _ J
Averagespeed
- 83k
Fuselagetorn -- '-7
Averagespeed
-_ - 136k
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Tbe aceid_nta are divided into three grouim whieli are diwu_d as follows:
1. Twelve nceidenta invalved a slight break(a) or fracture in which fuselage sections did not
separate far enough for a person to be ejected or for a peraon to crawl or step out during
evacuation (cla,- 1). These accidents generally occur on or near the airport and as a result of
landing overruns, takeoff abort, or veering off the rustway. Impact which caused the fuselage
break usually occurred after comddcrable brake action plus decelecatiolxs off the runway.
Only two of the accidenta (16.0%) involved a severe fuel fire, and only 6.3% of the persons
onbeard in these 12 accidents were fatalities.
2. Twenty accidents involved a clean, wide break in which the fuselage section remained
basically intact hut separated far enough for a person to be ejected or to crawl/step out (class
2). About 75% of these accidents involved severe fuel fires end 29.4% of the persons onbeard
in these 20 accidents were fatalities. Approximately half of these accidents involved aircraft
speed at or near impact of 100 knot_ or more.
3. Sixteen accidents involved cmtsiderable destruction of the fuselage sections and in most cases
the sections slid or traveled many feet after separation (class 3). During this movement
persons were often thrown/ejected from the remains of the fuselage section. In some cases
ejected persons were killed from trauma, al_d in other cases the ejected persons survived
because they were thrown out of a fire or burn area. About 93.8% of these accidents involved
severe fuel fires and 77.8% of those onboard in these 16 accidents were fatalities. In most
cases the aircraft speed at impact was well over 100 knots -- two of the_ had an impact
speed of 188 and 271 knots, yet some persons survived. Many accidents in this group can be
considered to be only msrginslly survivable.
It can be concluded that the probability of fatalities in accidents resulting in fuselage breaks
during ground slides is closely related to aircraft speed at the time of impact that breaks the
fuselage. The group of aecidcqts resulting in only slight breaks (class 1) had an average aircroft
impact speed of 57 knots and 6.3% of those on board were fatalities. The group resulting in a clean
(but open) break (class 2) had an average speed of 88 knots and-29.4% were fatalities. The group
resulting in a torn fuselage (class 3) had an average speed of 136 knots and 77.8% were fatslities.
The greater the spee,J, the greater the fuselage damage and the greater probability of fuel tank
rupture causing severe fire. However, even in the worst cases, rome persons onboard survived.
De*dgnchanges that would result in a stronger fnselage that is more resistant to fragmentations
should provide a substantial increase in survivability for those onboard.
FUSELAGE LOWER SURFACE RUPTURE (Excluding Fuselage Break Accidents)
Of the 1B3 impact survivable accidents in this study, 57 aircraft ere known to have experienced
congi_iersbledamage to the lower fuselage and little or no damage to the upper fuselage (above the
floor line). Seventeen of these 57 were fatal accidents, with 17.5% of the persons oubeard being
fatalities. In addition to the accidents noted above, there are seven accidents that probeb_.y
experienced fuselage lower surface damage: three of them, were fatal accident_ with 45.8% of the
persens unheard being fatalities.
Lower surface damage accidents are divided into three groups for study porpowe: ext_nsive
rupture, minor or moderate damage, and those involving water entry. Statistical data on these
accidents are tabulated on figure 4.12. The three groups are diseuseed as follows:
1. Twenty,eight accidents experienced extensive d_mage and rupture of the fuselage lower
surface. Eleven of these were fatal accidents with 27.7% of the total onbeard the 28 accidents
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being filtalitics. A sew, re ficu occurred in 15 of the accidente and 9 of these were tile flltal
accidcnts. Six otlwr accidents involved a minor or moderate fire with no fatalities.
2. Twenty-five accidents experienced nloderate or minor damage of tbc fusclage lower surfiwe.
(If these only tbrcc were fatal accidents, with 1.5% of those onboard the 25 accidents being
fa talil its.
Six of these accidents involw+d a severe fuel fire, four involved a moderate or nfinur fire, and six
had no fire retxwted. Of the three fatal accidents, two had severe fires and one a moderate fire.
Six accidents iuwdved nose gear collapsing aft into the lower fuselage. One resulted in a
severe fire (friction ignited) which destroyed the aircraft and one resulted in a moderate fire
{friction ignited) which resulted in substantial damage. In anntber case of friction firc, the aft
fu_lage broke and was dragged on the runway.
In design, the prevention of friction fires is treated by separation of flammable materials from
the proxinfity of friction sparks or heated structure. In operation, rapid action by the airport fire
fighting team has reduced the effect of the friction fire.
3. Four accidents involved water entry: that is, touchdown in deep water or rolling into deep water
at high speed such that the lower surface of the fuselage was torn or ruptured but the fuselage
did not break. Three of these four accidents resulted in extensive lower surface damage and
the aircraft sank rapidly. All three were fatal accidents with 18,1% of persons onbeard being
fatalities. One ace{den', resulted in moderate damage to the lower surface as the aircraft roiled
into water and came to rest on its gear with the water level at or slightly above tbe cabin floor.
There were no falnlities. These accidents were also discussed before, in this section, nnder
beading '*Deep Water Entry Accidents."
Lower fuselage tear or rupture generally occur when landing gear fails to support the aircraft. Thus.
scrubbing on rough surfaces (sometimes even on the runway) rips open the thin skins and body
frames. At the same time, wing box fuel tanks are also subject to rupture and fuel spillage. In 37 of
53 ground slide accidents the wing box was probably ruptured and, of these, fire occurred in 32 --
25 were severe fires and 12 were minor or moderate fires,
It can be concluded that the probability of fatalities in accidents resulting in lower fuselage tear or
rupture during ground slide is closely related to the occurrence of severe fuel fire. Flame and smoke
from fuel burning on the ground below and around the fuselage have, in many cases, rapidly entered
the passenger area via openings in the lower fuselage. If openings had not been present, the
precious minute or two required for skin burn-through would probably be adequate for evacuating
most or all persons via escape routes away frum burn areas. Of the 12 fatal accidents during ground
slide, 11 had severe fire and one had a moderate fire.
FUSELAGE FLOOR DISPLACEMENT
Displacement and rupture of the passenger floor Ires resulted in passenger and crew injuries, and
has restricted umvement of sun'ivors to exits. In SOmecases the upward movement of the floor has
resulted in the jamming of door_;or door frames and in other eases doors could not be opened due to
floor dcbias bhwking the door. G,meraily, floor surface displacement is a result of the structural floor
heams being torn, ruptured, an¢_displaced upwards by _.he impact forces of cargo, cargo containers,
separated hmding gear or ground objects. The exception to this is floor displacement by the
hydraulic actmn of water when the aircraft touches down in water or rails into water at bigb speed -
in these cases the floor beam may not be displaced upward.
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Of the 163 accidents in this study, 36 are known or reported to have experienced paseenger or
crow area floor displacameut or rupture and probably in 4 other accidents, Statistical data en these
occurrences are tshulated in figure 4,13, For study purposes, these 36 accidents are divided into
three groups: 15 that did not i,lvolve a fuselage break, 17 that did involve a fuselage break, end 4
that involved the aircraft touching down or overrunning into water, These groups ur_ disc.ssc,d as
follows:
1. Of the 15 arcideuts which did not have fuselage breaks. 8 involved displacement upwards of
the cabin floor as a result of the uose gear foldinglcnllalming aft into the lower forward fuselage
cargo compartment or electronic compartment. Displaced cargo or electronic equipment
forced the floor up and probably tore or bent the floor beam. In four of these accidents the
cockpit door was jenzmed, and in two the entrance door was jammed or blocked. None of these
were fatal accidents, however, one resulted in a friction-ignited fire at the nose gear fires which
spread and destroyed the aircraft.
Seven other accidentsinvolved a ground slide in which the fuselage lower surface was torn or
crushed upward-such that floor and floor beams were displaced upwards in localized areas, In
one of these a main la_ding gear aeasmbly rolled/tumbled under the fuselage and caused much
of the damage. In three accidents, an entrance door was jammed or blocked by the floor.
Passenger seat elevations occurred in seven accidents which contributed to passenger
injuries. In three accidents passenger seat separations occurred. Accident reports in these
eases did not mention seat separation or floor displacement as interferring with
passenger egress.
2, Seventeen accidents which had fuselage breaks al_ had areas where the floor was displaced
upwards. These accident8 tend to be more severe than those without fuselage breaks. If
fuselage separation is complete and wide enough for human end Beat ejection, the impact of
passenger floor elevation or rupture is probably slightly minimized. In 13 accidents passenger
seat separation was reported, in 9 accidents seat elevation was reported, but in only 4
accidents was passanger egress reported to have been impeded. It is not lulown how much
impact the elevated or broken floor bad on passenger egress, Passenger entry door jam was
reported in five accidents and crew door jam in two accidents, Cause of these door jams in
most cases could not be established with any t.ertainty but was probably due to either floor
elevation/rupture or due to fuselage break if tl_e break was adjacent to the door,
3. Crewlpassenger floor elevation and rupture occurred in four accidents which involved the
aircraft touching down in deep water or rolling into water at high speed, In these cases the
lower fuselage surface was torn open and the lower (cargo) area filled with water. Hydraulic
actien/pressure forced the floor panel upward, causing seat separation in two accidents end
seat elevation in three accidents, Exit doors were found to be blocked in two accidents.
In one accident, the forward closet dislodged. It shifted forward in such a way that the forward
entrance door was partially blocked and delayed opening of the door. Also a section of floor
came up and provided an opening in which two of the crew fell into the lower forward
compartment.
In another accident, nose gear separated and tumbled aft, forcing up and rupturing the lower
fuselage. Floor besm$ and floor panels were elevated causing passenger seats to tilt
_: backwards and block emergency exits on both sides of the fuselage.
--__ Available accident data provides evidence that displat_.ment, elevation, or dislodging of the
=._- passenger/cockpit floor system in localized areas has resulted in passenger and crew injuries and
_. " _ , " .. . . 00000001-TSG05
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has, in varying degrees, interferred with or delayed the evacuation of passenger and craw.
However, accident reports generally provide very little detailed information on this type of damage
unless it is related to the cause of the accident. Studies of these areas must rely on brief statements
and accident photographs which seldom "zeroin"on the desired areas. It is concluded from rewewe
of available data that a floor system more resistant to tear/rupture/separation, though still flexible,
may reduce some of the debris and factors which are believed to impede evacuation of the aircraft.
ENGINE/PYLON SEPARATION-OR-COLLAPSE
Separation of an engine from the pylon or separation of the pylon from the wing or body often occurs
in accidents involving touchdown, short/hard touchdown, overruns, or veering off the runway. When
one or both main landing gear collapse during these types of oeeurrencea, the probability of engine
pod damage or separation is increased. Generally, loss of the engine (forward or reverse thrust) is of
minor significance but ruptm.ingof the engine fuel feed line (releasing fuel) and tearing of electrical
leads (causing arcing) can be a hazard because of the potential for a £L_eoccurring at the fuel feed
line break point. The significance of.this pylon break fire hazard increases if the wing fuel tanks are
ruptured and large qtumtities of fuel are released on the ground. It is believed that the engine and the
pylon break fires have been the ignition source for many of the fuel tank £_res.Accident reports
seldom-eanfirm or deny this, since it is not generally possible to establish from evidence at the
accident site what actually provided the ignition source. In some occurrences, friction sparks from
wing or fuselage sliding on terrain may have caused ignition of released tank fuel only seconds or --.
microseconds before an engine pylon fire occurred, There is no known way to establish the actual
sequence of the events. However, from a review of accident data, there appears to be a relationship
between wing tank ruptures, severe fuel fires, and pylon break fires that indicates pylon break fires
probably provided the source of ignition for released fuel in many accidents.
Of the 153 accidents in this crashworthiness study, 94 involved aircraft with engines on wing pods
and 59 involved aircraft with engine pods on the aft fuselage. These two groups of aircraft are
reviewed separately.
Wing Pod Engined Airoraft Accidents
Of the 94 accidents (including known and probable occurenesa) involving wing pod engined aircraft,
67 (71%)involved rupturing of the wing box fuel tank and 68 (72%) involved collapseor separation of
the engine pylon to the extent that the engine fuel feed line was torn or ruptured. The occurrence of
these two types of damage are shown in figure 4.14.
Fuel fires originating at the fracture of the.engine fuel feed line in the pylon are reported to have
occurred in 12 accidents and probably occurred in 33 accidents. No fires were reported at this
fracture point in 23 accidents.
The proximity of the wing pod engine to the wing box fuel tanks has resulted in correlations between
engine separation, fuel tank rupture, and a severe fuel fire. Approximately 71% of the aeei _ents
involved ruptm_ of the fuel tank and releasing fuel on the ground and, of these, 91% were considered
large fuel spills such that the spill area probably wee near or adjacent to the engine pylon location.
The study shows that 82% of the large fuel spills resulted in severe fires and, in 78% of these, a
ruptured engine pylon fuel line fire probably also occurred.
In numerous accidents, separated engine pods have rolled or tumbled under the wing or fuselage as
the aircraft slides to e stop. However, accident reporte seldom indicate that the pod ruptured the
wing box fuel tank in this movement. In most cases, investigators are probably unable to determine
what objects actually caused tank rupture.
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bAft Body Engined Aircraft Aecidnntu
Of the 59 accidents involving aft bodyengined aircraft, 38 (64%) involved rupturing of the wing box
t fuel tanks aud 21 (:36%)invulvod collapse or separation of tile to tile extent that theengine pyloneugine fuel feed llne was torn or ruptured. Phe occurrences of these two types of damag_ are shown
_. in figure 4.15. Of the 21 occurrences involving engine/pylon collapse or separation, 7 resulted from
' a very hard touchdown, 7 due to impact with grouud objects, and 7 due to high vertical loads as the
_. aircraft slid over rough ground or impacted water. No engine pod separations were known to be .........
caused by pod ground contact during aircraft slide on the lower fuselage.
Fuel fires originating at the fracture of the engine fuel feed line in the pylon are reported to have
occurred in two accidents and probably occurred in five accidents. Reports indicate that no fire
occurred at this fracture poiut in 14 accidents.
Severe wing tank fuel fires occurred in 26 accidents but, of these, engine/strut fuel line fires were
reported in I and probably occurred in 5. This indicates that wing tank fuel, in 77% of these cases,
was ignited by something other than by an engine fuel feed line fire. In the other 23%(six cases) the
reports do not indicate or show evidence that the engine fuel feed line fire provided the ignition
source for the wing tank fuel fire. In most accidents, the-investigaters are probably unable to
determine the actual source of the spilled tank fuel ignition.
Engine Fuel Feed Line Fire Hazards
In the 153 accidents used in this study, loss or collapse of an engine or pylon generally creates a
potential hazard only if a fire occurs at the point of fuel feed line rupture and, if in flight, the fire is
sustained for possibly 30 seconds or more. In wing pod mounted engine aircraft, the hazard is
ignition of spilled wing tank fuel or overheating of wing fuel tanks to the point of explosions or skin
burn-through. If tank fuel is not ignited, the engine strut fire itself generally has little impact on
passenger evacuation or survivability.
In aft body engined aircraft, the hazard is burn-through of the aft body shirm and a fuel line fire
burning vital controls and systems within the aft body. These fires, being remote from the wing
box fuel tanks, are a po'_ntiai source of ignition of tank fuel only if the-tank fuel is spilled in the
area under or around the aft engines.
Conclusions:
I. Engine fuel line fires caused by engine separation or coLlapse are a hazard of
underdetermined dimensions, particularly in wing pod engined aircraft accidents. The source
of ignition of spilled tank fuel is seldom reported and probably, in most cases, cannot be
actually determined. Nevertheless, research should be accomplished in the area of
minimizing the flow or volume of fuel released from a fractured engine fuel feed line and
eliminating the sources of ignition of this fuel.
2. Wing box fuel tanks have, on rare occasions, been tern open when engine pylon separates
from wing structure. Study should be accomplished to develop structure fuse points to assure
a clean strut separation. This could include clean fuel line separations and electrical lead
separations without arcing.
i
I_ 3. Engine pylon separation or collal_ee often follows separation or collapse of one or more mainlanding gear. It is not possible to determine from accident reports how many engine pylons
would not have separated or collapsed if the main landing gear had not collapsed. It appears,
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however, to be of a anffieiant number to justify research in landing gear design philosophy
and development of landing gear is more tolerant of travel over rough, soft terrain off
the runway.
CABIN DOOR OR EXIT JAMMING OR BLOCKAGE
Of the 153 impact survivable accidents studied, reports for only 47 accidents cited occurrences of
entry door, galley door, cockpit door, or emergency exits jamming or being blocked by cabin
equipment, debris, or outside objects, It is believed that door or exit related evacuation problems
also occurred in many other accidents.
Fuselage breaks often provide a handy and expeditious means for some of the passengers and crew
to evacuate the aircraft. In tOof the 47 accidents, where door/exit problems were cited, the reports
also indicated that some paseengers and crew departed via breaks and holes in the fuselage. In
most cases these people could have also departed through available doors or exits. However, ina
few cases the fuselage break was probably the only means of escape.
in many accidents which involved severe fuel fires, some doors or exits could have been readily
opened but were not used because of fire in that particular area outside the fuselage.
Available factual date relating to the 47 accidents citing door/exit problen-- are tabulated in figure
4.16. These date indicate that most occurrences (57%) involve doors at the front of the fuselage
and only 16% at mid-bedy and 27% at the aft fuselage. This ratio is expected since in ground slide
r:cidents the forward fuselage is the first to impact objects such as buildings, trees, poles, etc.
These data also indicate that forward fuselage doors involved jamming in 64% of the cases and
blockage in 36% of the cases. Doors in the aft fuselage had approximately the same ratio. Mid-body
_" exits, however, had this ratio reversed with blockage being 64% of the cases and jamming only
36% of the cases. It is probable that wing box structure provides protection from jamming of the
mid-body overwing exits.
Considering all doors/exits, jamming is reported in 59% of the cases and blockage in 41% of
the cases.
Jamming is generally caused by door frame distortions, however, accident reports seldom
provide much detail on how or what caused the problem. Floor-lift due to upward forces from
the cargo area often cause total or partial jamming of doors, The same upward forces may
also cause door frame distortion. In a few eases evacuation slides are involved in door
B jamming.
Blockage is generally caused by collapsing of overhead storage compartments and release of
the contents. This debris usually results in complete inability to open the door or exit.
D Spillage of galley contents occurs frequently, which tends to cause a delay in opening the
door. In a few cases displacement of a galley or coat storage compartment has caused door
_ blockage, particularly at the forward fuselage locations.
:_ The number of fat_tlltica that were a direct result of door jamming or blockage can seldom be
determined or even estimated from available data. Of the 47 accidents in which door/exit problems
:_ were cited, only 24 involved fatalitee (2187 t_,_.l onboard of which 753 or 34.4% were fatalities).
_:_ . Of the 24 accidents with fatalities, 9 had 2 or more doors or exits jammed or blocked and 41.9% of
'= those onbeard were fatalities, In the other 15 accidents only t door or exit was jammed or blocked
and 27.1% of those onbeard were fstelitica.
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From this study of door and exit problems during emergency evacuations, it can be concluded that
_urvivehility might be increased if floors and structure in the area of eaeb entry and galley door be
designed to eliminate jamming of doors, and if overhead storage compartments he dcsigued to
resist collapse and reduce door blockage.
WATER ENTRY
Accidents in which aircraft impact water or come to rest in deep water involve special hazards. In
scenario type 813, 46.3% of the occupants drowned. There are 16 water aecidente in the data base
of which water was an important factor in 11 cases. These 11 eases arc reviewed.
Water eases that are excluded are the 707 COo accident, L-1011 Everglades accident, 727
Maderia accident, 727 Mexico City accident, and the 707 Rio de Janerio accident. These accidents
rseultedin trauma fatalities for the most part,and water was only incidental to the accident outcome.
Water entry accidents of concern appear to have some common factors. First, they usually occur at --
night. Second, there is usually a relatively rapid lose of flotation resulting in a portion or all of the
aircraft sinking. Third, while there has been confusion, most occupants have been able to evacuate
the aircraft. Finally, many of the drowning fatalities occur after the occupants have left
the aircraft.
Assessment of the water entry accidents is shown in figure 4.17. The accidents are divided into two
groups:high energy impact and slide/roll into the water. There are eight high energy accidents. For
the CaravelleMaderia accident all that is known is that the aircraft touched down at sea, the fuselage
is presumed to have broken, and the numbers of fatalities and injuries. Consequently, it is classified
unknown. The DC-9 Palermo accident has a little data and is classified known, but is borderline.
There are three cases where the aircraft rolled or slid into the water. For all of these accidents the
fuselage.experienced either lower surface crush or had one or more breaks.
In all the high energy impacts there was a loss of flotation attributed primarily to _'''selage damage.
While tank rupture resulted in some loss of buoyancy, the majoreffect of tank rupt;_-._ was to expose
occupants to fuel (chemical burns) and to make everything slippery.
The floor system was known to be disrupted in six of eight accidents. Disruption was due in part to
the hydrodynamic forces of water entering the fuse]l!ge throufh the underside or ti_rough b;_eaksin
the fuselage.
A part of this disruption resulted in displacement and elevation of floor beams with subsequent
separation of seats, and also contributed to problems in the evacuation of the aircraft. In addition,
doors were jammed and debris from cabin interior systems was present. In the 727 Pensacola
accident, water destroyed the lower fuselage, ruptured the body fuel lines, and separated an engine.
Accidents where aircraft skidded or rolled into water experienced similar damage as the high energy
impact, but to a lesser degree. However, close proximity of land, substantially reduced drowning.
The 15 drownings in the DC-8 Rio de Jansrio accident were attributed to disorientation of the
occupants after they evacuated the aircraft and to improper use of flotation devices.
After the DC-9St. Croix accident, a special study (ref, 2) was made by the NTSB on water ditching.
Here, even though it was known that ditching was inevitable, 23 occupants drowned. There were
problems with life rafts, life vests, and seat belts. Other problems with this equipment were
encountered in the DC-8 Lea Angeles accident. It is felt that incidence of drowning could be
substantially reducedby better location of life rafts. For instance, placement of rafts above the exits
with external access might provide better accessibility.
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Improved crashworthinsce might also be obtained by inereasing the resistance of the fuselage to
breaks and by increasing tho resistance of the lower fuselage to water penetration,
ADVANCED MATERIALS
The application of advanced materials such as improved metal alloys and composites to structure
that has a significant crash function is now considered. As seen from the above diseussion, the
conventional commercial aluminum jet transport aircraft designed to FAR 25 have demonstrated__
generally good structural crashworthy characteristics.
Consequently, those materials having fracture, impact and ductility properties similar to aluminum
might be expected to be applicable on a direct substitution basis without affecting erashworthinece.
Where the propertiesare dissimilar, such as for com_uestiuns are raised on how to maintain
an adequate level of crashworthinese.
There is little data available on the crash behavior of eompceite sizueturce. The U.S. Army has active
programs directed towards the application of composites in heiicoptare as part of the ACAP and in
sponsored research. In addition there are military research programs on ballistic damage to
composite structure.Results of thcee programs will provide valuableinformation. While these results
may not be directly applicable to the commercial jet transport, they may suggest approaches to
research that may be fruitful.
Use and planned use of advanced composites in both military and commercial aircraft is in a rapidly
expanding mode. Use of graphite/epoxy as a viable material for aerospace structures became a
serious consideration in the mid-1960s with the development of Thornel graphite fibers by Union
Carbide.Inithlly, treeof the material was hamperedby high cost and lack of technical data. Currently,
both of these factors have been alleviated so that extensive use of the material is both feasible and
advantageous. The impetus is the typically 20 to 30 percent reduction in structural weight that can
be realized with accompanying increases in fuel economy or aircraft performance.
The application of composites on military aircraft is moving rapidly. The F.18 has wing skins and tail
structuresof graphite. The entire-wing st_lcture of the AV-8B Harrieris graphite, as are the forward
fuselage and tail. i_1
Planned use of graphite on future commercial transport aircraft is also aggreceive. The Lear Fan
aircraft is all composite structure and the Falcon 10 will have a graphite/epoxy wing box structure.
The 757 and 767 aircraft will have control surfaces of graphite. These include the spoilers, ailerons,
elevators, and rudders. Main landing geardoors will be a combination of graphite and Kevlar. There
are also nations plans for other downstream uses of graphite on the 757. These include use of
graphite for selected floor beams and forhorizontal and vertical empennage inspar structures. Use of
graphite for such part_ as the main landing gear beam and flaps is also under study.
Graphite composites are used on the 757 and 767 aircraft for some components. Meat applications
are for secondary structure. Application in control surfaces follows Boeing's successful program
with NASA, which tested and certified graphite/epoxy elevators for the 727. A similar program is
underway for the 737 horizontal stabilizer. Graphite 737 stabiliser components have been
successfully ground and flight tested and certification is expected in the near future.
In considering the various aircraft parts which will be fabricated from composites, it must be
i_ emphasized that these will be designed and tested to meet the requirements of FAR 25. As an
example, floor beams will be analyzed and tested to ensure their being able to withstand the
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stipulated 9 g wat for, _n. Simihu'ly, trash laad requirenwnf_ will |_ inelud_ul izxthe design of other
collll)oneli|.q. 'I'll*,landing gear I_tqlln ia designed st that it will brm_k away in event of gear collapw
: _) it will not pu,cture willg fuel soil,.
Tilt, questio, lNx'omes then. how will the structure react if the design era,h loads are exceeded and
importoutly, ill the eveut of a fire. Relative to this w m rece *t s_udy to detcrmiue if graphihl
composites, if subjected to a ratastrophie fire _ituation. might rele_e_ filsmont_ that wouhl ruuso
wideapn_ad elc_,trieal _nwt_ and eaue¢ failure of proximity electrical equipment, for example failure
of power mdmtations. In thi, ra_,. NASA canclmhsl after oxten,ivc study, that risks involved with
ear, apace use of fil_'l" car|_)n fii_,rs were nlinisnal. The I_ffeutial Io_ rate was esliluat(_l at all
iusignificant $1000 per year Oe . ,1).
Auotller ilulxwtant conside,1'at.ionia thc Olt,ehaoimu for e,ergy di_ipation in a crash. This ia to a grt,ut
(.XtOllt dependent on the structural eonfignration. Moat effectively, dissipation is hy deformation
such us bueklhlg or material chmgation, The ability of structure to dt_forzn, however, depends
stxongly on file construction Inst,,rials. Relative energy absorbing eharaeteristics of materials are
generally ndieat_d by the area uuder their load deflection or strt,ss/struin curve. Metals benefit front
their relative high elongation capability or ductility. Fibers ill cnmposite strueture by nature remain
elastie to failure and have low elongation capability, thus their energy ah.sorbiug capability can he
expected lo I_, low. Difference, I_,tween tilt, two inat_rials is demonstrated in fignre .1.1[4.
Another nteanittg'ful eompari.,_mthat .,'sureadily lit, made iselougation to failure, Graphite hunioates
typically fail at approxim tte y t).8 to t.O percent strain while 202.1.T3 ahmlinum typically stl'ah'.s h)
10 to 12 percent.
_ome upparvnt duetility can he gained hy stres.'_ing in she u' or hy testing axitdly with the t'il_.,l'S
oriented nff-axis, soy tit ± 45 ° It) tlw test axis. The shear ea_, is denlouatrated by a curve for a Kevlar
fabric huninate in figure .|.[.q. Some gaizl in effi, ctive ductility may 1_, obtained lly off-axis
rt,nlfilrcetnent in tnultidirt,:tional lalninates, however, II e gt i i is st spat ted to Ix sm 111.Set n' tgly,
when fi[_t'_ inlinc with the load fail. load shonld be transferred it) off-axis fiht, r, with greater st rain
calmbility to abawb additional energy.
However. when the iuline fil_,cs fail. the effect, unlike u ductile case. a very dyns Ilic and it is unlikely
aignifieunt energy is sb,,_wlwd. This inatantaucous energy reh,ase is delnonstrat_t,d hy noting the
there-piece failure of a graphite innlt.idircctiouu t,htntinatt_ teusion sl_eeilnen iu figure 4,20. Ill ao.w
caa, s. Sllecilntqls may fail iu .I to 5 pieces as a rt,mdt of initial failure indured silock waves.
A more effective nwtllod of imlwnving energy absorbing characteristics is to add reinfnreenu.ut
filx_r_with higher strain capability, l,._tauq)lceart to tree glass or Kevlar fiher_, rhe t fret tivity of using
hybrid techniques to inqwovt, impact properties hsa I_,t,n denlnnstrated by urn, of an i,mtrumcnted
Chsrpy, h st This is dt sc,riht d in n, fen,nt',t 4. While tilt, ronvent innal Charpy lest is nuly conrerned l Jwith total energy, the illaLrunleittcd teat diffen, ittiate, Ix, twren tin, initiution anti prnpagation phase
_._give a dut t I ty index, This is illustrated iu figure 4.21. I!
The ilnprovenlent in energy ut_wption rharaeteriat.ies of the graphite hy two levels of Kevlsr fiber
* t • •additions iBhnli, uted hy tilt tohd tut ray snd dut tility indt x figtm s ill tahh 4,7. Tin ilnlWuVt iiit ut ia
aig.ifieant.
-- Other areas of eonrt, rn rehtttve to conlptmites anti er/ishworthhn,t,.s art, as follows:
I, _'uel co thtin W It in wet wings
tit4
w ,
00000002-TSA03
150-
j _ Typical stress-straincurve for 0i90° GRIf: fabric
i j.-
, - too- /I /
50-
0,
0 2 4 6 8 10
"_" *Area under the stress.strain curve % Elongationor strain(inches:inch)
Figure 4. IS-Comparison of Apparent Energy Absorbing Characteristics* of Graphite
'-_ Epoxy Laminate and Aluminum
20 I I
Ii
,_ lllJL JlalllJll
|l[| i 5 I ] RIRIRH _
" , ........... 0/90 direction
,ml .:rTN_|HfH_` i
! ; HI|in | i |KIHII, t
__ ;; [;__,;;.,,,]: ._v/.- I
tO "- ......... :
350o F cure
5 _- Laminate
VI ;.; .09_, ]
0.01 0.02 0.03 0,04 0,05 0,00 0.07 0.08 0.09 0,1
Strain, (In./in.)
Figure 4. 19-Shear Stress.Strain for Kev/ar-49/5208 Style 181 Fabric at l.t. T,, Dry
in
00000002-TSA04
ORIGINALPAGE
BLACKAND Wttl]-r PHOTOGR.A,P_
!1(|
k_, I ' * .... I I |
00000002-TSA05
Initiation
phase \ _L E _ J Fvdt
I.L I _ E '_ J'EI + EP
"_ I _ _ProgegationDhase
_ Ep
Time
Figure 4.21. - Scherr;_tic Representation of Load History in an Impact Test
Table 4. ;'-Impact Properties of Unidirectional Composite Materials
as Determined from Instrumented Charpy Test
Apparent Total Energy Per Unit Area
Reinforcing Flexure ft.lb/in a (Jim2) Ductility
Fibers Strength Index
kss(MN:mz) Dial Oscilloscope
HMS-grephito t25 (860) 3.8 (8 X 103) 3.8 (8 X t03) 0.0
20%kevlar 49 t70 (t 170) 34,3 (7.2 X 104) 30.5 (6.4 X t0 '=) 6
80% HMS-graphite
41% kevlar 49 t41 (,970) 46.7 (9.8 X 104) 42.9 (9 X 104) 4
59% HMS.graph=le
, The firstvalue was based on the onset of nonlinearity.The number in parenthesis was based on maximum stress.
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2. Smoke toxicity for interior cabin
3. Burn.through rates for ftmalage applications
Fuel containment characteristics might be expected to ha inferior to the metal wing. This is primarily
due to the material being unable to plastically deform and still remain intact. Tear resistance of the
material is high however, and failures tend to be of a dalaminar nature. Thus, penetration damage
may not be as severe. Also because of a lower density, structural inertia loads will be lower.
: Smoke toxicity is not currently considered to be a problem. Risks ere consistent with occurrence of
:_ other similar material now in the internal fuselage area.
D Burn-through rates for composites are expected to be lower than for conventional aluminum. The
graphite/epoxy will melt and the fiber char while the aluminum will melt. The much lower thermal
conductivity of the composite (3 BTUI*F, hr, ft, ft 2, as compared to 80 for aluminum) will give it a
decided advantage in deterring threugh-the-thicknese heat transfer.
In order to asses8 the crash performance of _mposite structural components, it is necessary that-- -
the performance of current metal components be known quantitatively. Differences in crash
response modes and the performance of the crash function may then be compared for each
component. With improved analysis and test methods, design provision may be made for occupant
protection.
Crash performance of advanced material components must be assessed in the context of the
complete airframe. Implied reduction in energy absorption seen in coupon tests may be offset by
design innovation in the structure, by use of parasitic crushable energy absorbers in key locations
_ such as seats and lower frames, or may not even exist. The entire concept of occupant protection
may need to be revised. Optimization studies of occupant protection strategies should be made.
E Research is needed to evaluate these advanced concepts.|
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5.0 CURRENT STATE OF CRASHWORTHINESS TECHNOLOGY
An overview of the current state of crashworthinsse technology is presented in this section. The
U.S. Army'e Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide (ref. 5), which provides a crashworthineee
_' technical base for light aircraft and helicopters in military applications, is revicwed for
applicability to commercial jet transport aircraft.
Analytical methods for modeling the occupant response to a crash environment are reviewed and
assessed. Human impact tolerance is reviewed and problems of relating impact injury to
engineering quantities are discussed. In addition, the applicability of gQnaral]y recognized
tolerance limits to the population of aircraft occupants is considered,
The status of analytical methods for treating nonlinearities in inelastic structural behavior and
large deflection geometry is reviewed. A review of crash tests of complete aircraft and of
experimental tasting of structural components has been made. A survey of impact teat facilities is
presentod and problems of testing complete commercial jet transport aircraft and structural
components is discussed.
An assessment of current crashworthinee8 technology as applied to commercial transport aircraft
is made. Requirements to improve crashworthines8 engineering are presented and research to
develop the necessary technology is discussed.
REVIEW OF U.S. ARMY CRASH SURVIVAL DESIGN GUIDE
The guidelines proposed in the new U.S. Army's Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide have been
examined to identify areas relevant to commercial airplaneS.
The Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide contains a summary of material that provides a
background on crashworthinese in general. Specific application of the guidelines to commercial
aircraft has been asseseed. Appendix D presents a detailed synthesis of principles, practices and
comments based on abstracting the.Guide and incorporating other experiences, opinions and data.
The new U.S. Army's Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide defines a number of goals that the U.S.
Army desires to _chieve in order to improve protection in Army aircraft. Evolution of these goals
into clear-cut design criteria is a continuing proce_; this third update of the Guide incorporates
feedback from interim experience, points out the likely need for design trode-offs more clearly
than the previous editions, and as clearly points out compromises will likely remain after all
possible trade-offs are complete. Two factors emerged from investigation of the Guide that bear
comment_ the autonomous role the Army ha_ in exploring new concepts, including freedom to
waive requirements; and the distinctions in vehicles and corresponding impact conditions from
Army aircraft to large commercial aircraft.
First the autonomous role of the Army and the aircraft they fly gives them many options in
exploring protective provieioue. They have small vehicles (less than 20-passenger maximum
capacity and more typically lees than 5) with relatively cle_cut implications md ramifications for
any changes that might be considered.
Additionally, as specification engineer, purchaser, and user, the Army is in a position to review
trsde-offs and waive goals, guidelines, and criteria when warranted. Under current regulatory
procedures, this is not peseible in the commercial environment; requirements, once established,
may not be waived. This helps to clarify why goals, guidelines, and criteria are not clearly
distinguished in the Army'e Guide; such waiver authority makes it possible to emphasize
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"lnaximnm possible protection" and explore now concepts, Autononlous phmning, purchasing, and
truer roles also make it more feasible to explore and appraise ideas that can not he easily
dctennined or demonstrated by analysis or may be ntcrproted differently by i ld vidt a[ reviewers
(e,g., "provide as much protection as possible').
Other industry sogment_ have a different circumstsnce; by design ne_'e_ity, objectives are based
un nfinimum atweptable requirements for adequate protection under given circumstances,
Objectives are jnstificd as actnany heing proven and beneficial, the waiver authority used in the
Army does not exist in the commercial environment.
Secondly, there is considerable difference in likely impact characteristics between the small, rigid
body aircraft used by the Army and the large, flexible body aircraft used commercially. Army
goals are based on systems which will suffer a larger range of impact attitudes and higher impact
loads. For example, spin-in and rotor, thrashing causes large lateral forces _md upside down "'
impacts that are sssontiaUy unheard of in large fixed-wing aircraft. Additionally, there is a
marked difference in itdlerent energy absorbing features between the two airplane types. For
example, the small airplane has a much smaller subfloor volume, fewer structural members, and a
correspondingly more rigid structural area to absorb energy than exists for the large cross section
of the flexible-body aircraft. Some of the resulting implications are inferred in the Guide. They
point out, for exeanple, that cargo tiedown criteria from the Atany Guide are much larger than Air
Force practices° but ackuowledge that there is no statistical reason to change ?;r Force criteria.
The above describes some of the reasons to question direct transfer of guidelines or specifications
from the Army Guide to commercial systems. Although many of the principles apply, are relevant,
and are practiced, criterion bases are clearly different. Relevant criteria have been abstracted and
collated from the Guide, and the resulting interpretation and commentary is presented in
appendix D. The new Guide npdates previous guidelines and goals based on Army's experience and
their recognition of broader research and development activities over the last 10 years. In addition
to data in the Guide, new information continues to he developed and earlier information continues
to be clarified. Some such information is added to Guide information in appendix D (e.g., for
tolerance and restraints).
The review of the Guide suggests some reseat'eh topics and tools that arc warranted, can be worked
usefully, and will improve the technology for impact protection. Army goals to improve
survivability for impacts of smaU aircraft include four major areas: (1) system design for structural
integrity, energy abserptian, and post-impact provisions; (2)design principles for impart
protection via aircraft 8eats, restraints, litters, and padding; (3) medeling and testing methods for
appraising impact loads, load paths and their effects; and (4)hunmn impact tolerance
attd protection.
System dssign considerations in the Army continue to emphasize energy absorption and postcrnsh
protection. Newly under consideration are possible ways to avoid reductiun of and intrusion into
occupiable volume caused by intpact loading.
_nergy absorptiml at the structural level remains a difficult concept to design and control.
Absorbing provisions include gear, wings, fuselage, seats, litters, and restraints. Dynamic
interactiooa at the system level are so cmnplicated that final resolutien of qut,stions by the Army is
still by test -- fall-seule drop tests are practiced, However, several computer models |)residing full
system simulation have bcen under development for several y_,arsand are approaching stages
_._. where they should be challenged by attempts at real calibration and applicatkm.
- Postcresh survival continues to receive very heavy emphasis in connnereiai systems. A major
_'r
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govontment/indastry progrum ls being carried out that has multiple objectives, including: to
improve control of fire, develop new materials with in,proved characteristics, and develop a more
heat resistant escape slide.
Evidence is s_irting to emerge easgesti_*g feasibility for some concepts, but limitations remain to
is be resolved. Four examples are: (1) fuel inarting actuation by impact acceleration, may w,_rk on
• impact, but may also actuate at altitude in turbulence acceleration,, (2) heat resistant slides are
" being developed, but some may not be etowablo withoui, r._im" changes and others may have a
short storage life; (3) some design features for control of fuel line disturbances are proving
t . effective; (4) computer simulations of some processes are being explored, for example, simulationof fire propagation to imprc,;c ._deretanding of and ability to centre! fires, end simulation of
• evacuation performance to provide an in,proved engineering tool. These are in the early
exploration stages and should be continued.
i Design principles emphasizing energy absorption concepts for scats, litters and restraint systems,
are evolving at a more rapid pace, Load limiters are being considered as peak load alleviators to
help maintain some degree of system integrity. They provide increased assurance the seat
• occupant will r main in place, ,ld will not be subject d to loads exceeding hie impact tolerance.
i M ' J ......
odeling spprosc,_es s_mulsting energy absorption characteristics at the seat-restraint level are
demonstrating feasibility as a design tool (see Occupant Modeling Methods, following). They could
be used to explore and develoR effective energy absorbing seat-restraint concepts, and _,ffera cost-
and time-effective approach to resolving energy absorption questions for the new composite
materials technology. But stronger does not automatically mean safer, and a rigid 20 g seat will not
necessarily provide the protection of • ductile seat that starts yielding at lesser loads, Composites do
not feature the same ductilities as metals, and consequently possess different energy absorbing
characteristics. Accordingly, use of composites may require alternative desigl_ concepts (e.g.,
different seat leg design) in order _ h,,nefit from the design advantages of composites without losing
the energy absorption features ot T_,, t,_rlier metal seating systems.
Modeling coupledwith testing couldbecome e memtiagful combination for developing and evaluating
system design concepts. Some existing mod_,_..:'_rstructure, seat, restraint, and occupants could
be calibrated to real world ol_ct'v,t_oil.:, integrated into a single system concept and used for
advanced concept evaluations, for identifying specific data and test needs, and for predicting the
outcome of major system tests. An overview of the models that could be used for this purpose is
presented in table 5.1.
The desirable approach would be in two phases. First, experience with the various models is now
sufficient, and it should be feasible to develop a detailed specification to define and develop a series
of modules to permit exploration and development of individual elements that could be combined to
estimate the performance of the occupant, restraint, seat, and structure. Second, it is necessary to
develop and demonstrate calibrated three-dimensiona_ performance against real test data, and
define ground rules for appropriate use of 2-D and 3-D models. Some models, such as
PROMETHEUSIH.ere two-dimensional but can demonstrate a high degree of accuracy in predicting
to a test situation. Some added features may be needed to complete 2-D applications potential (e.g.,
in simulating an energy absorbing, deforming seat). From this result, and auociated knowledge it will
be easy to identify and develop 3.D refinements. The 3-D capability would complete occupant
development needs and also help to discriminate when 2-D and 3-D models might be appropriate.
Human impact tolerance date continues to be in dire need, Data, indices, and estimates of tolerances
are limited in beth accuracyand scope of applicability. Obviously, tolerance limit data are not readily
acquired. However, new data below the tolerance hazards continues to be generated and will be
needed to reduce or eliminate the current constraints on data (see Human Impact Tolerance, and
app. D).
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t Table 5. i-Plan for Developing Needed Models
Devoloplcalibrate Prudicf te
Needed Apprmso Develop specification Models/modules New lusts
' . Model/module Potentially Synlhesize elements Reline synthesized
Purpose Usablemodels" From known models Model(s)
r
PROMETHEUS III
Occupant SOM-LA
Simulation CALSPAN OCCUI Laboratorydata Planned
ATB (articulated Armydrop tests 1984
total body) NASA tests NASA-FAA
Restraint PROMETHEUS Ill DC-7 test Drone
Simulation SOM.LA RESTR 1 Constellation Test
AT8 Test
FAA tests
PROMETHEUS III
Seat SOM-LA
Simulation DYCAST SET '1
KRASH
ADINA
DYCAST
Structure/ KRASH
Fuselage ADINA STRUK 1
ACTION
"Improvementsin existing models taughtbe accomphshed by including small packages such as the FEAP 74
structuralcontact model
,qt{
tp.
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More definitive research is needed for effective use of human tolerance data. Itere, too, since
tel_rance limit research is impractical, models may be useful to explore tolerance in controlh;d
testa to establish exposures in accidents and thus to update the d_t_ base using results from real
accidents.
OCCUPANT MODELING METHODS
Numerous dynamic models of the haman body have been developed for crash impact analysis to
predict the response of the occupant, reetruiflt and/ur seat systems. One., two-, and three-
dimensional models have been developed. More broadly described in this present report are:
1. Dynamic Response Index (DRI) (ref. 6)
2. Seat Occupant Model: Light Aircraft (SOM-LA)(rof. 7)
3. PROMETHEUS (now PROMETHEUS HI, ref. 8), two-dimansionul, restraint performance
integrated with body dynamics and other outputs similar to SOM-LA
OCCUPANT MODELING SUMMARY
Three occupant_simulation computer programs are evaluated in the following diseus_ions for their
ability to produce useful engmesring data regarding relative safety of a restrained occupant a 1-D
model (DRI), a 2-D model (PROMETHEUS111)and a 3-D model (SOM-LA).
The one-dimensional model (DILl) is usable only for seat ejection evaluation and is of no use for
evaluating the safety of commercial aircraft. The two-dimensional model (PROMETHEUS HI)is
suitable for producing sophisticated engineering trade-off data and is being used for this purpose, II
subject to the limitations imposed by the 2-D nature of the simulation. The 3-D model (SOM.LA) ]
needs modeling improvements before being usable for engineering purposes. Needed Iimprovements are technicallydifficult and fall into the realmof applied research. Although SOM-LAis
not currently adequate for evaluation of restraint system performance, it provides e rough t
approximationof the gross motion of the occupant for purposes of approximating the dynamic loads
oa the structure. The possibility of merging these programs with a large finite-element computer
program such as DYCAST will bealso considered and a procedure for accomplishinv_the merging
will be proposed. I
PROGRAM CALIBRATION 1
Computer modeling of nonlinear transient structural dynamics is e relatively new technology, and
standards defining a "good" structural dynamics computer program are still evolving. (Occupant-
simulation is e special type of structural dynamics). As a consequence, each new structural
dynamics computer program must individually earn acceptance in the engineering community
before its calculations will be utilized by designers. I
' There are two aspects to acceptance:
1. The program must produce believable resuita. That is, predicted dynamics should appear !!
reasonable and credible to the designer, and the designer should be confident that the
program models the main dynamic effects. To enhance believability, the program output
should contain, in readable form, information which assists the desigfier to understand the
_'.1. dynamic events (such as time histories of system forces). Graphic aide are also helpful.
2. Program accuracy must be demonstrated. That is, demonstration of capability to reasonably
predict an actual test. Achievement of predictive accuracy is usually a very difficult and time
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consuming process for occupant simulation codes because of the nonlinear nature of tile
problem and the difficulty in obtaining measured values for input dynamic parameters.
One approach was applied in evolving a calibrated level of performance for PROMI_iIEUS II.
Instrumentation data from _veral sled tests were obtained from CAMI and physical data for the
anthropomorphic dummies were obtained (limb weights, measurements, and spring constraints).
These were cystematically refined by sensitivity testing so that properti¢0 could be estimo_d
where measured data could not be found.
Oneof the CAMItests was then simulated by PROMETHEUS. When the initial simulation did not
provide satisfactory correlation with test data, the problem was attacked from two directions.
First, it was evident that the restraint system model in PROMETHEUSwa_.inadequate, so a more
sephlsticated mathematical model of the lap belt and shoulder harness was developed andadded to
PROMETHEUS. For example, the lap belt was refined to permit the slipping associated with
submarining, the shoulder harness was refined, and chest/shoulder flexibility was added to
appropriately incorporate haraes_dbody interactions and slipping of the harness on the shoulder.
The second approach, which was attempted concurrently with the first, was to parametrically vary
the mechanical properties of the simulated occupant (such as neck stiffness and damping) in
PROMETHEUS simulations and note the resulting trends. Parametric variations helped provide a
"feel" for-the occupant dynamics and served as sensitivity studies to identify the important
dynamic parameters. Some dynamic effects were observed which were not influenced by the
parametric variations. Additional modifications were made to the mathematical modeling in
PROMETHEUS and parametric evaluations completed to approximate these effects. Additional
cycles of modeling improvements/parametric variations continued until correlation with actual
test data was achieved. The resulting modeling changes to PROMETHEUS were quite extensive;
so much so that the correlated model was renamed PROMETHEUS HI. Figure 5.1 summarizes
parametric variations and modeling changes required to achieve calibration. After calibration, an
independent test case was simulated with PROMETHEUS, producing good agreement with actual
test results involving a real Part 572 dummy in sled te_ting. Figure 5.2 indicates the correlation
finally achieved.
REVIEW OF OCCUPANT.SIMULATION COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Three occupant.simulation models are reviewed below. These are a one-dimensianal model (the
spring-mass model associated with the Dynamic Response Index), a two-dimensional model
(PROMETHEUS 1I]), and a 3-D model (Seat-Occupant Model: Light Aircraft).
The models are examined from two viewpoints: first, as a tool for engineering design of a
seat/restraint system; and second as a possible candidate for integration into a large structural
dyr,c_,ncs simulation computer program, in order to model the complete system (aireraft, seat and
occupant) in a single simulation.
ONE-DIMENSIONAL MODEL--DRI
A one degree of freedom dynamic-reepanse model of a human occupant has been proposed (ref. 6).
The model consist8 of a simple linear spring and damper and a point mess. The spring is sized by
the compressive stiffness of the lumbm' vertebrae and the damper is sized by human vibration
tests.
The DRI is an injury scale aeseeiated with this model. The DRI for a deceleration pulse is the ratio
of the peak compressive spring force w__ichoccurs when the model is excited by the pulse to the
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weight of the paint muse. To associate telerance levels with tile I)RI, the DRI was cah,ulated for
i:_ t_xietitlg ejeetiou _at designs. Computed I_R[ values wcr_ plotted _gaiuat tits |n_rfentagtt of
ejections ill which spinal injury occurred; the eurvt_thus obUdncd rcpre_nts an apprexinnttinn of
injury prnhability as a function of I)RI.
;-_ lluth the simple _'cul,mt model on which the I)RI is ha_'d and thn I)R! itself are very limit,,d in
applicatinn. The simple model could only be used for cases ill which tile loading is purely vortical,
__ that is, + Gz such Its in ejection seats, It is obviously not applicable to model a restrained occupant
_i under forward loads, ill this case, the main effect is the combined stiffness of the restraint system
and the occupant's pelvis/chest. Even for Gz acceleration, the model is difficult to use since
potetltially signifit_nt effects are neglected, such as the effect of seat pan stiffness.
The DRI is based on a model which does not adhere closely to the actual dynamics of an ejcction.--
___ Seat pan et'ffnese is not considered nor is distribution of body mass along the spree nor the weightof the oceupant. Thus the DRI can be expected to produce u_eful data only in crashes which are
_l_ similar to a seat ejection--that is purely +G z acceleration, seat pal_-_tiffuees similur to the
!,
stiffness of a fighter pilot's seat and the oceuptmt tightly restrained.
The U.S. Army's Aircraft Crash Survival Design .fluids says of the DRI:
"Although the Dynamic Response hldex (DR1) ... is tile only model correlated extensively for
ejection seat spinsl injury prediction, it has serious shortcomings for use in accident analysis.
It assumes the occupant to be well restraiucd and erect, so that the loading is primarily
compressive, with insignificant bending. Although such conditions may be assumed for
ejection wats, they are less probable for helicopter crashes, in which an occupant may be
Issuing to either side for better visibility at the time of impact. Further, the DRI was
correlated for ejection pulses ef much longer duration than typical crash pulses.
"A more det41iledmodel of the spinal column would yield more realistic results, but injury
criteria for the more compleK respouses htwe yet to be develop_,d. Consequently, the DRI is
not recommended as the criterion for use in designing crashworthy s,ats."
REVIEW OF PRi_TAtEUS HI AND SOM-LA
The followiug discussion reviews and compares the 2-D program PROMETHEUS Ill (ref. 8) and the
3-D Seat-Occupant Model: Light Aircraft (SOM-LA)(ref. 7).
PROMETHEUS Ill was developed at Boeing in a series of applications for different purposes,
starting from tile Dynamic Science prngram SIMULA, The focus of PROMETHEUS llI, has been
on accurate modeling of the occupant and restraint system. PROMETHEUS IIl has since been used
er,tensively to develop data for assisthlg in engineering desigu decisions. SOM-LA development
was sponsored by the FAA through a series of contracts with various companies and universities.
Emphasis in SOM.I,A development has been on the detaih,d seat model. An improved version of
SOM-LA, termed MSOM,LA was completed undur nunlber IYt'FA03.80-C-00098. The occupant
model has been upgraded in MSOM-LA.
DEVELOPMENT OF BASIS OF EVALUATION
s
Oeculmnt-sinmlatiou using PROMI,,'TIIEUSHI computer program has been developed mtd
demonstrated sufficiently to be ust_l ia the engineering design process. This expcriem*e is drawn
t! upon to establish criterill for continued evaluation nf occupant-smlulatiau cumpnter programs.
i_ lotO0000002-TSB02
l)esiguquestionsforwhich Ulsimulationsprovide__i,.ineeriugiwereqai
varied the (_)ununu doamnim_tor heing relative occal)mR _fety, l)ue in part to lhe limilationa of 'I
existing human tolerance data, it is rare!y po_iblo to predict with certainty whether injury would "I
have occurred in a given ('rash on the basis of a computer simulatim_. Similar questions may also he It
unanswered in dummy tests. In most cases, computer simulation is the only practical method for
obtaining design data for specific questions, and on a timely basis. To he umLblefor desigo, an
occupant-slain/alien computer program requires two major attributes.
First it must he able to model a general structure (not just a seat), and he able to model contact
between the occupant and any part of the structure. (For example, impact of an occupant with the
seat ahead).
The second feature is that the program must provide data which may be used for estimating
comparative injury petentiul. This means that:
1. The program must have been calibrated by,.px_e_test data (preferably from live human
touts),
2. Time histories of forces acting on individual body segmente of the occupant model should be,
printed and/or charted.
3. Time histories of torques acting in joints of the occupant (e.g,, the elbow) should be printed
and/or charted.
4. 'lime varying internal loads acting on flexible body segments (such as the hanbar spine)
should be printed and/or charted.
Of course, the standard software features relating to ,,ass of program use are also deairsble--that
is. ease of input, automatic data checking° legibility _,foutput, and availability of graphic aids.
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF PROMETHEUS IH AND 8OM-LA
:!
Figures 5.3, 5,4 and 5.5 constitute eheckliat_ of features needed for engineering design usage of
occupant-simulation computer programs. Checklist items were obtained pragmatically from
experience in using PROMETHELISIII to develop design data. The amount of use of PROMETHEUS
111justified incorporation of moat checklist items into this program; consequently the lists serve
mainly to indicate desirable improvements in SOM.LA. The main improvement in MSOM-LAis an
improved seat. capable of modeling energy absorption. The oceupeut model has also been improved
by the incorporation of a flexible segment representing the Imnbar spine, t i
t_
The major "deficiency" in PROMETIIEU8 HI is that it has only been possible to perform limited.
exploratory calibration against live human test data and for similar reasons linfited exl)h)ration of I
seat model dynamics. Added calibration of this type is desirable. A benefit of 2-D modeling is that
mechanisms within the 2-D PROMETHEUS IH model are easier for the analyst to comprehend i!
than those within a 3.1) model, giving au advantage for initial use of a 2-1) model in calibration i!
efforts. Other than development, which may he required to achieve such ealibratiau, further model
' evolution must consider limitations intriusic to the 2-D nature of the model and distinguish the
) eunditions for using a 2-D or a 3.D model. Of course, current unccrtsiutiea in the level of In,man '
tolerance to transient loads an, a constraint that must he observed for either 2-D or 3D models.
'p
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Foatmo F_ronlolhotls III SOM.L A M_()M-LA
(N()h_ t)
I Occupant
5ugntont massos, Iongth. I.D 1.0 1,1)
nloftl_ls, c.,q.'s.
Mt_chan*cal propurllos 1.13 D D
of IOItttt_
.. II Rostramt system
Mt_chanical propurhos of (,0 ! I
"= lap bolt
Mochanical propo=tlos I,D I I
ot har_qos5
III $_,d
Goomot_y I,D I I
Construction I,D D I
Mechanical Properties I.D I t
IV Crash Pulse I,O I I
%,
Vl Inloractive (convorsalional) X - -
input Ioature
= i i
I Input, D Dotault (i.o., supplied by program)
Note 1: It is assumL, d that Iho MSOM-LA inptlt is essentially the same as the SOM-LA input.
: Figure 5.3-Corrrparison of Program Input Features
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Feature Prometheus III SOM-LA MSOM-t.A
_=: (Nolo t)
I Occupant
Segment carlesion position, X X X
voloc=ty,acceloralion
Sogf_ontangular position, X
!" velocity, acceleration
Forceson segments X - -
Joinl torques X -
. Spinal loads X
II Restraint system
Lap bolt load X X X
Harness load X X X
BoltSlip X
III Seal
Cushionforces X X X
Reactions X X X
Nodal forces X
Element forces X
IV Crash pulse X X X
V Printerplots
Acceleration traces x x x
(vs time)
Snapshotsof v=ctimiseat X
Locus el segment c.g.'s as - X X
Funct;onsof time
Note: It is assumed that the outputfeatures of SOM-LA and MSOM-LA are essentially the same.
Figure b. 4-Comparison of Program Output Features
I It.|
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Feature Prometheus ill SOM-LA MSOM-LA
I Occupant
Spinal articulation 5 links 4 links 5 links
Flexible lumbar link X X
Flexible cervical link X X X
Automatic initial position X X X
Generation
Compressible chest, pelvis, X
II Restraintsystem
Realisticfriction X
Free to slide on victim X
Webbing stretch X X X
III Seat
Finite element model X X
Bar elements X X X
Beam elements X X X
Plate elements - X X
No. of elements in typical 6" 60 60
seat model 1Cushion X X XEergy absorption X X'" X°"
Aircratt interiormodeled X
IV Crash pulse
Translationcomponents X X X
Rotationalcomponents X X
V Calibrationagainst
experiment
Anthropomorphicdummy X ......
Live human "°" -
X Capabilityavailable t
tGrowth available
** Accordingto the SOM°LA developer, Dr. David Laananen, this feature does not work in SOM-LA bt_tdoes in
MSOM-LA.
*'° Preliminarycalibrationaccomplished.
Figure 5.5-Comparison of Basic Modefing Features
,e,
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S()M.LAcould benefit from both hanmn data calibration and model improvement (frem tile standpoint
of usefulness for engineering design). There are two major modaling deficiencies - the restraint
system model and the difficulty of modeling nonstan&lrd seats and structure. Both reprcsont difficult
modeling problems ill a 3-D environment, and methods developed to simulate these features ill the
2-D PRt)METIIEUS IIl computer program can not be readily generalized to three dimensions.
SOM-LA has a very primitive restraint systeln model. Restraining belts are pinned to the body, so
realistic modeling of a restrained occupant is impossible, SOM-LA also has limited flexibility in the
- type of restraint system which may be modeled. Nonstandard configurations, such as restraint
system with crotch or thigh straps could not be simulated. In addition, harness friction is ,L
implemented incorrectly(friction is crudelyand incorrectly simulated by reducing tension in the strap• segment running from lap belt to shoulder by 12%). Another se io s def ct is that chest
compressibility (which effects shoulder harness loads) is not modeled.
Accordingly,thissimplerestraintsystemmodelisinadequateforengineeringdesignuseforevaluatingrestraintsystemperformance.Itintroducesuncertaintyintopredictedbodyloadsand
a_elerations, since dynamic performance of the restraint system is one of the primary sources and
conduitsoftransmissionfcrushloadstotheoccupant.
The secondmajorSOM-LA deficiencyisthelimitedsimulationfstructuralconfigurations.Itis
_ possible that more generality is available in MSOM-LA.In addition, it is desirable that MSOM-LA be
capableof simulating contact between the occupant and an arbitrary structure (e.g., the back of the
!___ seat ahead). This finite-element "contact problem" is difficult and is the subject of ctlrrent research
(e.g., ref. 9).
_- In addition to these research improvements, several improvement8 would enhance usability of the
code:
1. Calculate and display time histories of loads acting on the occupant (e.g., spinal loads,
_gment forces, joint torques).
2. Improve the algorithm for comlBJio_t.ionof joint torque.
3. Add printer plot "snapshots"of seat and occupant for credibility and for appraising occupant
lecation at selected times (two views) for comparison with slow motion movies.
INCORPORATION OF SOM-LA INTO LARGE CRASH DYNAMICS CODE
It may become necessary to predict dynamic interactions of occupant and floor structure. Simple
predictions may be possible with SOM-IJ_. Action has been started within the government to
combine the 3-D SOM.LA with a large finite-element computer program (e.g., the 3-D DYCAST) in
order to model an aircraft crash in a single _aulation to more properly couple the dynamics of
occupants and aircraft structure. To accomplish this, it is suggested that the occupsnklrestraint
model be extracted from the SOM-LA occupedtt/rcatraint/seat model and packaged as a super-
element. The occupant SUlk*r-elementwould then be inserted into the large finite-elenwnt programs
as a module. Although, as noted, improvements in the SOM.LA restraint system model are needed to
model occupant dynamics accurately. The existing SOM.I,A occupant/restraint system model would
pmbahly be adequate for the porix_seaof calculating the gross dynamics of the seat system.
The finitt'-element code would be utilized to model the seat -- that is, the SOM-LAseat model would
' _ not be used. (This presumes the development of s general contact mt_|el to simulate forces acting
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between the seat and occupant.) The contact model would be used to simulate, scat cushions. This
concept has three adva,ltages:
1. Sinmlation of multiple occupants becomes possible (e.g., a "triple" seat).
2. Synchronization of the numerical integration schemes (i.e., the procedures for solving the
equations of motion as function of time) in SOM-LA and the finite-element program is not
required. The integration scheme of the finite-element program is utilized for both occupant(s)
and structure.
3. The capability of the finite-element computer can be employed to model general seat designs.
It would be possible to use the large finite-element program to model the occupant. The advantage of
the super-element is that occupant modeling requires features that arenot needed in general finite
! element modeling of structures, such as limits on angular motion of limbs at joints. Moreover,
occupant modeling is specialized, and correct mechanical parameters describing the occupant are
not widely known (in some cases supportivedata _ not known at all and parameters must be
inferredby parametric sensitivity testing). Thus it wo,,d be difficult fora nonspecialist to construct an
accurate model.
Additional effort would be required to make the occupant super-element work; provision for
transmitting input data to the super-elementand obtsirdng printout of detailed occupanttime histories
is required. In addition, graphics output from the finite-element program (if graphics post processing
is available) must be adjusted to draw the oecup_t(s) in addition to the structure.
The same procedure could be used to lift the 2-D occupant model from PROMETHEUS HI if a 2-D
crash simulation were employed, However. there is little benefit to be obtained from using such a
model in an overturning or cartwheeling light ait_raft where violeut interactions of all three dimensions
of motion would be occurring.
HUMAN IMPACT TOLERANCE
In simulating the crash of a vehicle with human occupants, either by actual test or computation,
the capability of estimating the degree of injury sustained by the occupant is highly desirable.
Various scales have been proposed for this purpose and these are evaluated below. At present,
skeletal fracture tolerances provide the best means for predicting injury (including head injury).
Human injury is a complicated biological process; causative physical mechanisms are often not
well understood, and consequently, traditional engineering methods are difficult to apply.
Physiological changes are also known to occtW in response to crash loading (e.g., change in pulse
rate), further complicating analysis.
To fulfill the researcher's need to quantify injury, a number of injury scales have been devised.
These scales are based on clinical data or physical measurement, such as, head acceleration history.
These scales are generally intended to estimate physiological trauma rather than skeletal damage.
The better known of these scales will be described.
A note of caution is appropriate at this point; currently existing injury scales represent some form
of empirical correlation between injury and measured quantifies. Correlation is not directly based
on the mechanism which actually causes injury; rather, statistical correlation with parameters
considered likely to be implicated is established. Use of an injury scale outside the conditions for
which correlation was established is risky. Moreover, there is always uncertainty in the accuracy of
the basic data since injury data cannot be developed from experiments with live people, but must
be inferred from cadaver or animal tests.
Its7
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Diffvrences between individuals further complicate matters, Despite tbeso limitation, injury scales
provide a method for assessing injury in a crash simulation. Such scales provide a rational
(although pessilily inaccurate) means for comparing eimulatiml results.
In contrast to physiological damage to organs, prediction of skeletal injuries is amenable to
ordinary engineering methods. Mechanical properties of bone have been determined ,.
experimentally. Standard engineering analysis techniques might be employed to determine the
extent of bone damage in a particular situation. Although there are differences in bone strength
and size between individuals, and live human bone cannot be tested, extensive theoretical
knowledge of structural dynamics permits much greater confidence in the accuracy of such
computations than in the accuracy of injury indices.
Bone damage is only part of injuries, and not necessarily the most serious part, Concussion, for
example, can occur without accompanying skull fracture. Moreover, the accuracy of engineering
aualysie of the skeleton depend upon accurate computation of forces acting on the skeleton, such
as restraint system and contact forces. Contact forces are particularly difficult to obtain, since the
contacting portion of the human body generally has irregular geometry and the mechanical
properties of the bone, flesh and contacted structure all interact to determine the dynamically
varying force acting on the skeleton. Occupant-simulation models discussed herein (e.g.,
PROMETHEUS III, SOM-LA)do not model the skeleton in sufficient detail to accurately predict
bone fracture. However, structural loads are calculated in these programs (e.g., lumbar axial load),
and these provide a rough measure of the likelihood of skeletal damage. Chapen (ref. 10) gives an
excellent summary of experimentally determined fracture loads.
Injury scales can be grouped into three classes: (1) scales based on clinical evaluation of actual
injuries, (2) "whole-bedy" scales, and (3) scales developed to predict a particular type of injury.
The first group of scales is intended to quantify clinical diagnosis of the injuries sustained by a
particular person. This provides a yardstick for comparing the severity of injuries occurring in
different accidents even though the injln'y mechanisms may be quite different. Such scales are
necessarily subjective; their main use is in accident investigation. A well known scale of this type is
the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS), as defined in reference 11. Obviously, scales based on clinical
diagnosis are of very limited use to the modeler.
Whole-body tolerance sealos are based on empirical observations, sometimes including the results
of animal tests, These scales attempt to assess "survivability" based on a gross description of the
impact deceleration pulse using parameters such as peak deceleration, duration of deceleration and
onset rate. A difficulty in using published whole.body scales is that authors often do not
distinguish between peak deceleration and average deceleration (which may of course, be quite
different). These scales refer to the crash load delivered to the seat, and do not directly consider
occupant/restraint system response. Separate scales are available for different loading conditions
(e.g., Gx, -Gx, Gz),but no provision is made for combined loading (such as simultaneous -Gx and Gz
deceleration). Whole-bedy scales might be useful in early preliminary aircraft design; they are of
no use in detailed occupant models such as PROMETHEUS HI or SOM-LA.
Injury sealce in the third group arc intended to estimate damage of a particular type. DRI is an
example of this type of scale. The DRI is intended to predict injury to the lumbar spine during
vertical (G_ accelertian.
CONCUSSION SCALE8
,_. Several widely publicized scales in the third group with potential for use with occupant models are j
I
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designed to predict eaneuasion. The mechanism causing concussion is not well nnderstend,
although there has been extensive investigation. It is known that eoncuasien can result from either
linear acceleration (e.g., from head impact) or else from rotational aecelerutien (i,e., whiplash). To
date, most investigations have focused on either linear or rotational arcclcration. Combincd
effects have also been investigated, hut data is scarce.
CONCUSSION CAUSED BY TRANSLATIONAL ACCELERATION
:',_ A widely used n_easure of human toleranc_ to linesr acceleration isthe Wayne State Curve (WSC)| (fig. 5.6 and ref. 12). The WSC predicts that acceleration pulse magnitude is more important thanpulse duration in causing eoncuasion.
The following description of derivation of the WSCis paraphrasedfrom Hedgson, et al. (ref. 13). The
basic experimental work on which the WSC depends was a study of concussion on mongrel dogs
(rofs. 14 and 15). Deceleration pulses of systematically varied and durationmagnitude were applied
to the brains of 72 dogs, and a concussion tolerance era're for the species was then obtained. It was
postulated that the same curve shape would be valid for humans. Cadaver skull fracture date was
employed to determine the shape of the human curve for pulses leas than 10 ms in duration (clinical
experience indicates that concuasion normally accompanies skull fracture). The long pulse end of
the WSC (duration greater than 100 ms) was estimated from acceleration sled rides of Stapp and
other volunteers (ref. 16). The intermediate range of the curve was estimated from cadaver drop
tests onto automobile dash panels.
It should be noted that data on which the WSC is based utilize a_ingle acceleration pulse; multiple
blows are not used and influence of puh_ shape is not considered. Moreover, the shape of curve is
not well supported by experimental evidence for pulse durations greater than 10 ms.
Newman (ref. 12) reports, regarding the Wayne State Curve, "The validity and usefulneas of this
tolerance curve have been questioned on a number of grounds including:
1. "The ordiuate's effective acceleration was poorly defined. Patrick, et al. (ref. 17)*0 had
stated: "rhe ordinate is Effective Acceleration which is based on a modified triangular pulse
in which the effective acceleration is somewhat greater than half the peak value. Therefore,
triangJJlar or einusoidal pulses of equal area and higher peak magnitude are in accord with
the experimental evidence from which the Tolerance Curve is derived.' Later (ref. 18) it was
stated: 'Effective acceleration is computed by dividing the area under the acceleration time
record by the time. A judicious analysis of the geometrical shape of the curve is important.
For instance, high amplitude spikes of short duration (less than 1 millisecond) should be
disregarded.' More recently, (ref. 19) effective acceleration has been equated exactly to the
time averaged acceleration over the duration of the pulse."
2. "rhe head impact data is not applicable to blows other than tho_e to which the experimental
animals and cadavem were subject. To quote Gurdjian, et al, (ref, 20); 'It should be pointed
out, however, that care should be taken in using a tolerance curve of this nature, It is entirely
possible that a curve of the same shape, but having different values for the acceleration
magnitude, could very well be shifted up or down depending upon the point of impact and the
blow direction.' Stalnaker, et al., (refs. 21 and 22) have confirmed that there are significant
, differences in the response of human and monkey heads to lateral and longitudinal impacts."
3. "Bt_'ausetheWSC was basedon measuredaccelerationtimehistoriesofa pointon thehead
essentiallyoppositetheforeheadblowlocation;skullvibrationmay havehad a significant
effect on the apparent head acceleration. Hedgson and Patrick considered this question in
* Reference numbers have been converted to correspond to the numbering sequence of this
document.
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Figure 5.6-Wayne State University Cerebral Concussion Tolerance Curve
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1968 (ref. 23) and it is now customary to use two biaxial sccelerometers mounted to the aide
of the head (ref. 13). As suggested by Mertz (ref. 24), asemuing rigid-bedy nn_ehunics, the
aceeleration of the center of gravity of the head can then be determined.
4. "The WSC has never been col'iliad for living human beings, although recent indirect efforts
through accident simulation (ref. 25) have been attempted."
Several injury indices have been suggested based on the Wayne State Curve. These are the tlead
. Severity index (ref. 26), the Head Injury Criterion (refs. 12 and 27) and the J tolerance (ref. 28). All
three tolerances agree roughly with the Wayne State Curve for short duration frontal head
impacts (i.e., 10 me duration, half sine wave shape). The criteria give different results for multiple
pulsee or irregular pulses, and the relative merits are hotly debated. However, little clinical
evidence is available to indicate whether any of the scales (or indeed the Wayne State Curve) is
valid for these conditions.
The widely used Swearingen diagram of acceleration tolerance of the facial bones (figure 5.7 and
ref. 29) actually represents fracture data under dynamic loading. The acceleration tolerances given
should be multiplied by the head weight to obtain fracture tolerance. Thus the fracture tolerance
of 30 G given for the nose means that the nose will fracture when the nose is struck with sufficient
force to impact 30 G acceleration to the whole head, which wo'.fldbe a force of 300 Iba., aseuming a
tan pound head weight. It does not mean that whenever the head is accelerated to 30-G-(e.g.,
through whiplash) that nose fracture occurs.
CONCUSSION CAUSED BY ROTATIONAL ACCELERATION
Concussion can be induced by head acceleration pressure in contrast to impact loads, a tentative
estimation of human tolerance to rotational acceleration was made by Omaya, et el. (ref. 30). A
tolerance curve was experimentally determined for rhesus monkeys, and the human tolerance
curve was inferred from monkey curves by scaling the acceleration axis by r-2/3, where r is the ratio
of the weight of the rhesus monkey brain weight to the human brain weight (fig. 5.8). Omaya, et al.
stated that additional experimental confirmation is required before use of the curve is justified. As
far as can be determined, no confirmation data has been published to date. Thus figure 5.8 must
remain tentative.
STRUCTURAL MODELING COMPUTER PROGRAMS
INTRODUCTION AND RECOMMENDATION
Impact dynamics of a real crash involving complicated structural design are too complex for
manual analysis, however, modeling methods offer an eventual capability that could provide a
simulation of all dynamic interactions.
Simulation may be by analytical models, scale models, computer models, and full-scala teats in
order to provide both observation of celr,plex interactions and a rational basis for the sequencing
of events, loads, and modes of failure.
Numerous computer simulation models, in particular, are being developed for use in eimulation
evaiuatione. Some are being developed for euppert of preliminary design studies, others for more
sophisticated uses. The four main classes of models that are used include:
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1. Genersli_d spring mass model0
2. Frmnc3.yp,: models
3. Ilybrid models
4. Finite.element models
Spring-mass models and frame models use a very simple model of the structure to estimate crash
behavior. Frame models differ from spring-mass models in that beam elements are employed in
modeling, in addition to springs and point maeses. Hybrid models use static test data in
conjancti_n with a spring-roses model or frame model to predict dynamic behavior of a structure.
Finite.element approach uses more formal approximation approaches for more discrete definition-
of structural representation and properties. Finite-element models tend toward increasing
complexity and computational cost. However, none of the modeling procedures is totally free of 1
testing requirements and analytical judgment. The reason is the extremely complex procees for
vehicle etructuredeformation under crash loading, which involves:
1. Transient, dynamic behavior
2. Complicated framework and shell assemblies --
3. Large deflections and rotations
4. Extensive plastic deformations
A number of computer programs have been developed to simulate nonlinear dynamic response of
structures. These programs are categorized as '_ybrid"'and "purely mathematical finite-element
models." Brief descriptions of some of these programs are given, and three of the programs
(KRASH, DYCAST and ADINA) are evaluated in more depth. It is concluded that none of the
programs has all needed features.
HYBRID VS. PURELY MATHEMATICAL
Workersinvestigatingthebehaviorof structuresincrashsituationsoftencategorizeanalysis
methodsas"hybrid"or"purelymathematical."A definitionofthesetermsisgiveninWinter.etel.
(ref.31).
_Hybri:.-- A combinedexperimentaland mathematicalmethod,such as the lumped
mass/springmethod,inwhich thestructureisdividedintoa number ofrelativelyarge
sectionsor assembliesthatare usuallyidealizedas beam/springswhose deformation
characteristicsarefoundfromstaticdeformationtestsorseparatengineeringanalyses.
Structuralmassislumpedwithnonstructuralmassesatthebeam ends,endtheequationsof
motionofthemasspointsaresolvednumerically.
"Purelymathematical--Asinthefinite-elementmethod,inwhichstructureisdividedintoits
individualnaturalcomponents(beams,stringer,skinpanels,etc.)whicharethensubdivided
intoappropriatestructuralunitecalledelsrqents.The deformationcharacteristicsofeach
componentarecalculatedtheoreticallyfromitsmaterialstress/straincurveanditschanging
shapeand pcsitioni thestructure.The structuralmassisplacedatnodesateachelement
_, boundary and is therefore distributed throughout the structure. The equations of motion of
the elemente are then solved numerically."
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Hybrid t4_chniqn,,permite use of simplar, leas expensive structural models. A hybrid model is
" Imrticularly useful when many simulutt one of the same structure are to be made. Occupant mtwlels
i in occupant crash sinmlation (e.g. PROMETHEUS Ill, SOM.LA, Articulated Total Body (ATB)) are
al,nost always hybrid models--for extunplo, tile lumbar spine is rcpresented as a single beam
._ rather thun an assemblage of vcrtchrae, discs, and ligamente.
_ In fact, purely mathematical methods require considerable engineering judgement, even art, to use
_. successfully; the distinction between hybrid and purely mathematical is marc nearly a matter of
,_ . dogreo then a real distinction.
_i Researchers in the field llote that both approaches are necsseaiT. Hayduk, et aL (ref. 32) conclude,
• after comparing the hybrid program KRASH with the purely mathematical finite.element
_ programe ACTION and DYCAST:
"A hybrid computer program (KRASH) and two finite-element computer programs (ACTION
and DYCAST) have been used to analyse a section of a twin-engine, low-wing airplanesubjected to a 8.38 m/s (27.5 fUs) vertical impact. A vertical drop test experiment was
_. performed at the NASA Langley Impact Dynamics Research Facility. The results of the
analyses demonstrated the capability of all three computer progrmna to quantitatively
simulate the significant dynamic response of aircraft structures under impact loading."
"Because of the variation in complexity of the KRASH lumped-mass model (177 DOF
(degrees of freedom)) and the ACTION (336 DOF) and DYCAST (493 DOF) finite-element
models and solution methods, there were two orders of magnitude difference in analysis cost.
Consequently, the lumped-mass hybrid approach should be used in conjunction with the
finite-element approach, the two approaches complementing each other. The lumped-muse
hybrid approach can be used to evaluate gross vehicle response, design trends, structural
design and impact parameters studies, and gross energy diseipation. The finite-element
approach should be used for analysis of designs where the detailed behavior of individual
components are critical, for obtaining detailed loads required for input to other analyses,
such as a lumped mass-hybrid technique or an occupant simlulator, and for detailed stress
analysies in sizing of structural eompon_nte."
Cronkhite, et al. (ref. 33) agree with the Hayduk conclusions. Cronkhite states:-
"Computer analysis methods are still being verified for metal structures, while compo_tes
will need special treatmant because of their It,,vstrain-to-failure characteristics. At present,
beth the hybrid (KRASH) and fmita-olemant (DYCAST}structure crash analysis methods are
needed. The hybrid type of analysis is ueeful for preliminary design analysis and for
parametric studies of the entire airframe. The f'mite-elemant analysis method has the
potential for detailed structure analysis directly from drawings and may be need to develop
inputs to the hybrid type of analysis. The main problem with a hybrid method is obtaining
structure inpute to the coarse math model. Finite-elenlent methods, being a complete
analysis, nt_edvalidation by test."
DESCRIPTION OF NONLINEAR DYNAMICS COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Cronkhite, et el. describe some of tits many computer programs which now exist:
"Numerous simple-capability hybrid simulations are available (refe. 34 through 39, for
example). Of these, the two mint notable programs are tl'.ose authored by Hcrridge of the
Battelle, Columbus l,abe and by Gatlin et al. of l)ynamic ,_'ience, Inc The work done by
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Ih.rrhlge and Mitchell was direeWd toward automobile crash impact, while that done by
Gatlin. et el.. examiued the vertical imlmet of a helicopter fnm_lsge. This latter progrmv
(called CRASll) simnlaU,a the fuselage as rigid lna_'a c';au..'tod Llynoulincar axial aml
rotary springs in a lw{_h,ternfincd arrangement. Beth of these sinmlatious are two-
dimcn,ionaL
"Of the intermediate-capahility programs, the most advanced and perhal m the most widely
um,dhyhrld simulation is KRASll by Wittlin and Gamon lrefs. 4,) and 41). KRASII utilizerss
""t) arbitrary framuwork of l_iut masses connected by beams to simulate the fuselage
structure, The remaining intermedis_-capability programs nse finite-elcotent cmnpnter
codes and include Shieh's work (ref, 42), CRASII hy Young (refs. 43 and 44), and UMVCS by
Mclvor, et el. (ref. 45). Shieh idealizes the structure us a 2-1) arruy of beams with yieldiag
collfined to the plastic hing_ st their ends, while CRASH and UMVCS use 3-1) medals of a
frumcwork compo_cd of rods and beams. UMVCS could alm_be considered ,thybrid because it
requires teat data-input to define the mmucnt rotation curves for the phmtie hinges st the
beam ends,"
"The detailed crash simulations are all 3-D finite-element codes with the capability of
modeling stringers, beams, and structural surfaces such as skins and bulkhead panels. The
four codes currently awfilable are WHAM by Belytachko of Northwestern University
(ref. 46), WRECKER by Welch, et at., of illinois Institute of Technology (ref. 47), ACTION by
Melosh, et el., of Virginia Polytechnic Institute of Technology and State University (ref. 48),
sad I)YCAST by Pifko, et at, of Grumman Aerospace Corporation (ref. 49 and .50). WItAM
currently can be used to idealize a structure which contains only isatropic material. It uses
partly interactive yielding, i.e., the effect of shear stresses on plasticity is neglcct_,d.
WRECKER contains the same formulations as WItAM but also has the added convenitmce
features of graphics and restart. ACTION also has partly interactive yielding, and it can be
used only with a structure renal.curled with isotropic materials. Additionally, AC_I'IONalso
contains an intermdly varied time step with numerical error controls. DYCAST can idcaliu, a
structure constructed of orthotropic material. Its features include folly interactive yielding,
internally varied time steps with error control, restart, and graphic output."
A mnmnary of the assessment of these specific crash simulations is given in table 5.2 (from
Crenkhite et el., rof. 33). Note that the hybrid codes do not account for collapse or failure under
combined loads because the crash data iapute are derived from h_sts with a single load. All of the
finite-element codes excep_ Shieh's ran account for multiple-load components. The crush teat can _
furnish the hybrid computer codes with data to analyze orthotropic laminates and c.>re-sondwich I
prate!s, while only DYCAST of the finite-element codes can analyze an orthotrepie material.
None of the evaluated finite-clement codes can currently analyze a rare sandwich. WRECKER is
the only one of these codes which will account for strain rate effects in a logical way. by
detennining the local strain rate and adjusting the atiffuesses. All the hybrids can account for
joint failure mxd cril_pling because these effects are part of the crush test data.
The program ADINA (ref. 51) has capabilities similar te I)YCAST and will also be ¢_msidercd.
DESIRABLE ATTRIBUTES IN CRASll 81MULATION COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Three |male attributes are considered in evaluation of erash-ahnulation cmnputer programs--
technical capability, "_ennanence," and ease of use.
The most obvious attribute needed by a crash dynamics program is tee)utica] ealmbility -- tl:e
I Hi
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Table 5.2-Computer Crash Simulations Assessment
Item Hybrid Finite Element
',-' Plastic collapseand crush All All
with-combinedloads None All except Shieh's
Material failure All None
withcombined loads ........ None None
Skin & bulkhead All WRECKER, WHAM,
(Poorly) ACTION, DYCAST
Anisotropiclaminas with All DYCAST
cored sandwiches All None
Beam cross-sectiondeform. All None
(crippling)
Joint deform. & failure All None 1
Strain rate stiffening Kamal WRECKERHerridge ':
With local variations None WRECKER
i.
i
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progranl should be capable of modeling both elastic and plastic material bebavi_}r,and also be able
to handle large structural deformation including bucklillg.
i The ability to simulate impt_ctin a general way is also very desirable, A general interforcn,!c model
' would permit investigation of phenmnena such as plowing, in which changes in the aircraft
__ geometry daring impact can modify the eh_;ractarlstieaof contact between the aircraft and ground
which in turn can change the sliding resistance of the ground. In the models investigated herein,
;. contact can be modeled only if the general behavior of the contact is known in advance, i.e. parle of
• the structural model which contact and direction of contact.
} ,
Lack of a general purpeeecontact model in crash simulation codes investigated herein could be a
serious drawback.
From the standpoint of a user, the permananee of a code is important. Permanence means that
someone with a veetod interest is looking after the code so that someone is available to answer
questions and also some assurance that the code will not soon become obsolete through neglect of
theoretical advances (which are happening rapidly in the field of computer simulation of structural
dynamics).
J Alnmst as important as the theoretical analysis capability of a program is its ease of use, Important
i features in this category iuchide:
I I. Thorough checking of input data for errors, and well designed error messages which pinpointthe error, help the user understand what is wrong, and (when appropriate) indicate probable
corrective action. For example,
)
"Error--Singular _ :obian_ is a very unenlight_ning error message.
"Error--element 27 is badly distorted. Check sequence in which nodes are specified" is much
i more useful.
2. "Grace under fire_ -- From time to time it is almost inevitable that a computer program will
encomlter a situation in which the computation cannot proceed. This can occur through errors
r in the inputdata which are so subtle ordifficult to detect that normal errorchecking of the input
data mia_s them, or through limitations in the theory on which the analysis depends• It is
important that the computer programrecognize this situation when it occurs and print enough
diaguestic informationthat the user can figureout what wexxtwrong. If the program stops in the
middle of the computation without providing good diagueetie information, the user can waste
days tracking down (often by trial and error) the error.
3. Well organized display of computed data. The output mast be legible and complete.
4. Availability of graphics aids. In finite-element programs, the large volume of data needed to
describe the structure and the (larger) volume of information cmnputed for the structural
analysis make automatic plotting of beth the input data (i.e. the nodes and element_) and the
eompuh, d data (e.g. time history information) mandatory if a program is to be used as an
enBineering tool.
#
Ease of use in usually not considered in evaluations of crash simulation progranm, probably due to
the evaluations being made by (or in clese coordination with) the program developers rather than
by a disinterested party.
It8
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Program efficiency has been deliberately excluded from consideration. A meaningful definition of
efficiency is nearly impossible to obtain. The coat of running a problem is not a good measure since
it depends not only on the computer used, but also on the method by which computation ccata are
reckoned at the particular installation, Moreover, advances in computer dssign continually reduce
computation cost and also change the relative importance of use of different resources (e.g.
central, processor time, disc access, etc,) Error checking, considered to be highly coat effective,
would be inefficient by this measure since it would increase computation cost of a particular run.
COMPARISON OF KRASH, DYCAST, AND ADINA
Three computer programs were selected for review. KRASH and DYCAST were selected based on
the recommendations of Cronkhite et ai.:
"The major conclusions of this investigation on computer crash simulations for advanced
materialapplicationsare:
1. Thereisno satisfactorysinglexistingcode
2. Hybridcodesaretheoreticallyincomplete
3. Finite-elementcodescurrentlyacksufficientadvancedmaterialcapability
'Therecommendationforcurrentcrashsimulationsonadvancedmaterialsi touseKRASH
withapplicablecrushtestdataforpreliminaryparametricstudiesandgrossevaluations.For
a detaildesign,DYCAST canbeusedforanalyzingorthotropiclaminates.However,thiscode
isstillunderdevelopmentandhasnotyetbeenexperimentallyverified.Itisnotcurrently
possiblatoperformanextensived taileddesignevaluationfastructurewithsandwich-core
construction.Thistypeofconstructionholdspromiseforincreasedenergydissipationwith
advancedcomposites."
The computerprogram ADINA (AutomaticDynamic IncrementalNonlinearAnalysis)was
selected,baaedon in-housexperiencewiththecodeof theanalysisofcracking/crushingfor
concretestructuresunderlarge,transientleads.Featuresofthethreecodesaresummarizedin
table5.3.
KRASlI__
IntheireviewofKRASH, Cronkhite,tal,reported:
I. "TheKRASH analysiswas foundtobe a usefultoolforstudyingeffectsofvariousimpact
conditionsand parametervariationson theoverallcrash-impartesponseoftheairframe,
whethertheairframeisofmetalorcompeeiteconstruction.
!
2. "rhcre is excellent documentation and correlation of the KRASH program (refs. 52-55).
These documents should be useful to anyone working in the area of structure
crashworthiness and simulation whether or not the KRASH program itself is used. _
"KRASH has many useful built-in crashworthiness features, such as:
• Energy summaries
• Occupiable volume change and penetration
I19
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Table 5.3-Comparison of Program Input Features
CilaracteristicTypes KRASH DYCAST ADINA
note I)
Element Types TRUSS TRUSS TRUSS
(T) BEAM BEAM BEAM
rigid links 3-D membranes 2-D plane
stress, plane
strain
__: 3-D solid 3-D membrane. (plan stress
Core-Sandwich Axisymmetric
2-D
--' plate shell or solid
3-D solid
thick shell
Thin shell
• 2-D fluid
J3
3-D fluid
Material Model Curve linear ortho- linear orthotropic
tropic elastic- elastic, non-linear
plastic elastic,
thermo-elastic
elastic plastic
(Von Mises
or Drucker-
Prager yield,
thermo-elastic-
plastic-creep
(Von Mises
yield), Mooney-
Rivlin Material,
concrete model, •
user defined
Isotropic
or Kinematic
hardening.
Mass Model (T) Lumped Lumped or Lumped or
!, consistent . consistent
Geometric Nonlinearity yes yes yes
(T}
I2U
.¢
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!Tab_ 5.3-Comparisonof ProgramlnputFea_res (Conclude_
CharacteristicTypes KRASH DYCAST ADINA
(note 1)
iIntegrationMethod Euler Newmark, Newmark,
(T) predictor- Wilson, Wilson,
corrector Central Difference CentralDifference,
i fixed time Modified Adam al] fixed
_i step/predictor-
corrector/timestep
variabletime step
(exceptcentral
i difference)
Plot capability
time historyof
displacements, no yes no
velocities (note 2)
accelerations
(u)
Deformed Structures no yes no
(u)
_pecialCrash Output
energy
distribution yes yes no
Structuralc.g. yes no no
computesoccupiable yes no no
volume(u)
Documentations
Theory manual (U) Complete not available on complete
single document
User manual Complete preliminary complete
i(u)
Size of user community small very amall large(u)
Notes:
(I) The symbols(T), (U) and (P) used in the characteristiccolumn indicate
the type of feature;T refers to Technicalcapacity,U refers to user
convenience,and P referrsto "permance"- the likelihoodthat the program
will be maintained.
(2) Plot capabilityfor ADINA is being developedby ADINA's authors.
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I• Automatic rupture of elements
• DRI and man modul
• Friction and plowing
• Soil
• Sloped surface impact
"Because of the coarse mathematical representation of the structure, tile major problem with
performing a KRASH analysis is involved in the 'art' of modeling and obtaining structure inputs to
the program."
Cronkhite, et al. found a number of errors in the KRASH code and weaknesses in the analysis, as
well as an inconvenient input sehem_e some FORTRAN coding errors that were discovered are the
following;_
1. "The printer plot routine contained etray dimensioning errors that occurred randomly when
plotting element loads and relative deflections.
2. "No input for external crushing spring_ c_used all material properties to be zeroed out.
3. "Maximum external spring load after bottomil_g out was internally set to ten times the load
just prior to bottoming out which in some eases did Jlot slow the vehicle down. This has since
been fixed by making the cutoff load ten times the maximum load used before bottoming out.
4. "The damping coefficient for beam elements remains a constant value even through the
element stiffness has been reduced by the stiffness reduction factor KR. The damping should
alsobe reducedby thesame factorasthestiffness."
"Forengineersaccustomedtouser-orientedstructuralnalysisdigitalcomputercodes,suchas
NASTRAN, theinputtoKRASH seemscumbersome.A preprocessortohelpconvertNASTRAN
inputdatatoKRASH inputmay partiallysolvethisproblem.Thiswouldalsofacilitateus r
trainingon theKRASH program."
Cronkhitetal.recommendeda numberofcorrections/improvementsbemade toKRASH,
I. "Becausetheairframestructureoftenfailslocallyata weakspot,aplae'Jchinge lementfor
theinternalstructuremodelingi8needed.Also,scalarspringswouldbeusefulformodeling
seatsandmain rotorpylons.
2. "Theusershouldbeallowedtoapplyarbitraryboundaryconditionstothemodel.
3. "A 12by 12directinputmatrixoptionwouldessentiallya lowsubetrurturing.
4. "KRASH now usesa fixed-timestepintegrator.A variabletimestepprocedureshouldbe
employedtoimproverun times.Also,an implicitintegratorsuchas theNewmark.B_ta
methodshouldreduceruntimesaswellasimprovenumericalstability,
" _" 5. "A rigid body motion analysis for impact such as rullover where no significant structure
:_ rt,sponse occurs for long periods of time would greatly reduce solution times.
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": 6, "Damping should be added to the external el)rings.
L
7. "The stiffness reduction features (KR) should apply to element damping as well as stiffne_.
" 8. "Input improvements
i_i • Add descriptive names to identify data types
• Allow arbitrary mass point numbering by user
• Develop a NASTRAN to KRASH input preprocessor
9. "Add structure plotting capability -- deformed and underformed."
DYCAST
Cronkhite,tal.reported:"ThisdemonstrationfDYCAST asa crsahworthinessdesignanalysisto lpoin doutitsusefulnesswhileindicatings meneedforimprovement.Themainitemsinthis
assessment are:
1. "Gross dynamic behavior was displayed, including overall structural deformation and
motions of critical masses.
2. "Detailed dynamic response was shown in the deformations, strains, stresses, and loads on
individualstructuralcomponentsformetalsand orthotropiecomposites.
3. "Detailedstructuralmodificationswere indicatedby notingoverloadedcomponentsand
equipmentattachmentpointsandshowingactionoftheenergyabsorbers.
4.. "Computationalcoatswereacceptablymoderate,using1.9CPU minutesperprobhm-time
msecfor471degreesoffreedom,whiletherestartfeaturepermittedsmalltimesegmentsto
be runinsequencewithout yingup thecomputer.
5. "Immediateimprovementsneededarereboundfrom thebarriersurfaceand automatic
failurecriteria,whicharenow beingimplemented.
6. "Futuredevelopmentsneededare the additionof a core-sandwichplatoelement(for
honeycombandothercoredstructuralcomponents),outputofoccupantdecelerativenjury
parameters,andcalculationofenergyconsumptionand distribution.
7. "Testverificationisa veryimportantneed to explorethe rangeof applicabilityarid
accuracy."
It is significant that Cronkhite is apparently satisfied with the DYCAST input scheme and does
not report any analysis or coding errors. Some of the recommended improvements have since been
made.
ADINA
°.
t, The ADINA program has been developed by Dr. Bathe at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (ref. 51). There is an active user group which holds regular conferences regarding
ADINA engineering applications. ADINA has dynamic-analysis capability roughly equivalent to
12:t
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I}YCAST, but in addition has static.analysis capability {linear or nonlinear) and can perform eigen
valuc/eigan vector calculations. A noteworthy featur_ of ADINA is the extensive checking of the
input data for errors and the relatively complete set of error messages flagging errors which
develop during execution, for example, singularity of the stiffness matrix. The major deficiencies
are the input scheme, which is "fixed field" and relatively difficult to locate individual data items
in, and the lack of a variable time stop numerical integration scheme.
Existence of an active ADINA user group is a significant asset, and a user without continuous need
for nonlinear dynamic analysis should give ADINA serious consideration based on this alone.
Existence of the user group assures that assistance will be available to extend or recheck an
analysisata laterdate.
SUMMARY
Thereisagreementbetweenresearchersincrashdynamicsthatbeththehybridapproachandthe
purelymathematicalfinite-elementthodareneededatthecurrentleveloftechnology,Cronkhite,
etel.notetheinconvenienceofcopingwithmultipleinputschemes.
Sincethehybridandpurelymathematicalfinite-elementanalysismethodsarecompatibleand,in
fact,verysimilar,considerationshouldbegiventodevelopinga singlepackageco:nbiningthebest
featuresofbothapproaches.Therearetwoadvantages.First,theuser,who will ikelyneedboth
methodstosolvehisproblem,willneedtobecomefamiliarwithjustone program.S_condly,
combinedanalysisbecomespossible;adetailedfinite-elementmodelcanbeusedforonepartofthe
structure( .g.a seat)whileanotherportionofthestructurecouldbemodeledmore simplywith
hybridelementswhosestaticmechanicalpropertiesareobtainedby statictest.Inprinciple,the
statictestcouldbesimulatedby thepurelymathematicalcode;inpractice,morevalidationfthe
purelymathematicalcodesisneededbeforethisispractical.
A deficiencyinallthesemodelsisthelackofageneralpurposecontactelementomodelcollision
betweentwoormorepartsofthestructure.Inexistingprograms,contactcanbemodeledonlyby
connectingelements,e.g.springs,betweencontactingsurfaces.Thisentailsanticipationofevery
collision which might occur and each individual specification of the contact element together with its
mechanical characteristics. Reference 56 describes an experimental general purpose contact
model, which might be developed into a practical contact element.
TEST TECHNOLOGY
A review of crash tests has been conducted to ascertain the status of test technology. Tests include
fall-seals aircraft and some components. Test objectives, instrumentation, and test methods are
discu_ed. In addition, some static tests applicable to structural crashworthiness are reviewed.
Programs to test full-seale aircraft have been conducted by NASA, the FAA, and the U.S. Army
over the last 30 years. These programs have treated small propeller.driven transports, general
aviation light aircraft, and helicopters. During this time, testing technology has advanced,
particularly in the areas of instrumentation, data acquisition, and processing.
Seats, fuel cells, and lending gear have been tested statically and dynamically in development and
certification testing to design crash leads. In addition, as a part of research programs some
substructures have also been tested.
The purpose of crash testing has been to auese crashworthincss, level of crash loads, crash
response of the aircraft, and crashworthiness performance of design modifications. More recently,
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as analytical methods have evolved, some teata have also had the collection of data for verification
of analyses as an objective.
In the material presented below, selected teats are presented as representative of a technique. The
test methods in some cases have been quoted from the reports and in other cases have bsen
summarized.
FULL-SCALE PROPELLER.DRIVEN TRANSPORTS{Tent Track Method)
Early crash tests by NACA of full-seale World War II vintage propeller.driven aircraft (refs. 57
and 58) had determination of crash loads and effects of crash parameters on these loads as an
objective. These tests were part of n crash-fire study and utilized the test facility developed for
that program.
Aircraft were propelled along a track, gear sheared off, and then impacted a shaped earthen
barrier to simulate impacting the earth. Angles of impact up to 30 ° at speeds of about 100 mph
were obtained. Floor accelerations at various stations along the fuselage were measured. In
general, the aircraft impacted the shaped barrier in the vicinity of the cockpit. This type of test is
representative of a flight into obstruction where the obstruction is an earthen mound. Some tests
were performed to simulate the effect of hitting trees with one wing to produce a ground loop.
Acceleration data were obtained with instrumentation and processing equipment representative of
the late 1950s. Due to differences in aircraft structure, crash energy levels, absence of analytical
tools, and to the small amount of data on the crash performance, the test data have limited
application to commercial jet transport. However, the data are of historical value and do provide
some insight into crash loads. Further they served as models for later testing.
In 1964, the FAA conducted two crash tests of complete aircraft. A Lockheed L-1649 (ref. 59)
transport aircraft and a Douglas DC-7 (ref. 60) were tested using methods similar to the NACA
tests. In these tests, instrumented seat installations and dummies with seat restraints were
included. In addition, high-speed camera coverage of the aircraft interiors was provided. Floor and
dummy accelerations were measured.
Instrumentation problems due to teat equipment acceleration environment on the DC-7resulted.in
the luse of much of the acceleration date for that test. In addition, the DC-7 almost overran the test
range, illustrating problems of controlling the test vehicle during crash impacts.
While these tests provided some good crash loads data, particularly for the seat/occupant, the
value of the test data would have been enhanced by the availability and application of analytical
methods to the data. Lack of such methods has limited the application of the crash loads to the test
conditions for the type of aircraft.
FULL-SCALE CRASH TESTING OF GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT (Swing Test
Method)
FuU-seale crash testing is performed at the Langley Impact Dynamics Research Facility (refe. 61
and _2). This facility is the former Lunar Landing Research Facility modified for free.flight crash
test .g of foil.scale aircraft structures and structural components under controlled test conditions.
The basic gantry structure is 73 m (240 ft) high and 122 m (400 ft) long supported by three sets of
' _ inclined legs spread 81 m (267 ft) apart at the ground and 20 m (67 it) apart at the 66 m (218 ft)
level. A movable bridge with a pullback winch for raising the test specimen spans the top and
ii transverses the length of the gantry.
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_i Test Method
The aircraft is suspended from tile top of the gantry by two swing cables and is drawn back above
the impact surface by a pullback cable, An umbilical cable used for data acquisition is also
suspend d from the top of the gantry and connccta to the top of the aircraft, The teat sequence is
i_ initiated when the aircraft is released from the pullback cable, permitting the aircraft to swingpendulum style into the impact surface, The swing cables are separated from the aircraft by
_.._. pyrotechnics just prior to impact, freeing the aircraft from restraint, The m]lbilical cable remains
attached to the aircraft for data acquisition, but it also separates by pyrotechnics before it becomes
taut during skid-out, The separation point is held relatively fixed near the impact surface, and the
flight path angle is adjusted from 0° to 60" by changing the length of the swing cable, The height• of the aircraft above the impact surface at release determines the impact velocity which can be
-_. varied 0 to 26,8 m/s (60 mpb) The movable bridge allows the pullback point to be positioned along
i the gantry to insure that the pullback cables pass through the center of gravity and act at 90 a to
the swing cables,
To obtain flight.path velocities in excess of 26,8 m/s (60 mph) a velocity augmentation method has
= been devised which uses wing.mounted rockets to accelerate the teat specimen on its downward
swing.Two Falconrocketsaremountedateachenginenacellelecation-undprovideatotalthrust
of77,850Newtons,
Instrumentation
Dataacquisitionfromfull.scalecrashtestaisaccomplishedwithextensive photographiccoverage,
bethinteriorandexteriortotheaircraft,usinglow-,medium-,andhigh.speedcamerasandwith
on-beardstraingagesandaccelerometers.Straingagetypeaccelerometers( angeof250and750g
and0 to2000Hz)aretheprimarydatageneratinginstruments,andarepositionedinthefuselage
to measureaccelerationsbothinthe normaland longitudinaldirectionstotheaircraftaxis.
Instrumented anthropomorphic dummies (National Highway Traffic _fety Administration
Hybrid ID are on beard all full-scale aircraft testa conducted at Langley. Restraint system
arrangement and type of restraint used vary from test to test.
Data signals are transmitted from the aircraft sp-_iman through an umbilicalcable to ajunction box on
top of the gantry. From the junction box, the data is transmitted through hard wire to the control room
where the data signals are recorded on FM multiplex recorders. In order to correlate data signals on
the multiplex recorders with external high speed motion picture data, an [RIG A time code was
recorded eimnitaneouely on the magnetic tapes and on films. There is also a 60 Hz time-code
generator with the onboard events recorded with the cameras. A Doppler radar unit is placed
approximately 60 m behind the impact point to obtain the horizontal velocity of the aircraft.
At the time the date is being recorded, the data passes through a 600 Hz low-pass filter. The data on
themagnetictapesarethendigitizedat4000samplespersecond.Digitizedaccelerometerdatais
then passed through a finite impulse response filter and filtered as follows: •
1. Dummy head 800 Hz (unfiltered)
2, Dummy cheat 180 Hz
3. Dummy pelvis 180 Hz
,_, 4. Seat 20 Hz
5, Floor structure 20 Hz
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Motion picture o_mlysisconsists of plotting a dispiscemcnbthuo curve from the film data and fitting
least square polynominal functions (up to tenth order)to the measured displacements and then twice
differentiating the displacements to obtain acccleratiuns. Accalorationn thus obtained cmnpore very
well with the filtered accelerations,
• COMPONENT TESTS USING CATAPULT-METHOD
These tests (ref. 63) are not deail_od to bring the cabinenvironment up to the limits el survivability,
but they are desigl_ed to expose the fuel tank location to a destructive environment.
Crash tests were performed at the National Aviation Facilities Experimental Center (NAFEC)
catapult facility. A compreseed.air catapult was used to accelerate the test aircraft along a 90-foot
track. At the end of the catapult stroke, the aircraft, which was pulled by its noes gear, was
released toimpact an earthen hill of 4" slope. At the base of the hill, a 12-in. by 12-in. I-beam was
installed to break off the aircraft's landing gear. The nose gear was strengthened to withstand the
catapult pulling force, while the main landing gear mounting bolts were sewed in half to effect an
easier separation from the wings. Spoilers were installed along the upper wing surface to keep the
airplane from flying. At a distance of 10 ft from the I-beam, poles were sunk into the hill to a depth
of 18 inches. These poles were spaced symmetrically off the centerline of the hill, at 42 inches and
108 inches each. The poles were hollow mild steel tubing, 4.375-in. outside diameter, 0.188-in. wall
thickness and were 10 ft in length. Small rock piles were located on the hill to further increase the
severity of the crash condition. There are no standards in general use for a crash site as is used in
this type of test; hence, the selection of the type of poles, rocks, and hill were selected to produce a
destructive environment to the fuel tank location. The crash site was intended to be at least as
severe as a crash at an airfield involving airport structures such as approach lights.
In all tests, the aircraft main tanks were filled with water. Accolerometera, CEC type 4-203.001,
were installed on the floor of the aircraft at the longitudinal center of gravity location (station
126). Accelerations in the vertical and longitudinal direction were recorded on an oscillograph. The
data were filtered at 90 Hz.
DYNAMJC SEAT TESTS (Sled Teat Method)
The testing of seats to simulate dynamic crash loads has been conducted by the U.S. Army, CAMI,
NAIX],NASA, and the seat manu._acturers.The Army, following the recommendations of its Aircraft
Crash Survival Design Guide, has had helicopter and light aircraft seats dynamically tested as a
requirement for specification compliance. These teat_ have been conducted at the CAM[ facility or
by Simula, Inc. These test programs have served as development tools in uncovering unanticipated
weaknesses in design details and generally have resulted in an improved crashworthy seat for the
Army application. The Army test requirements include provisions forapplying the teat impulse with
the floor in a pre-warpedposition. While these conditions may represent limiting cases for the Army
usage, the heavier commercial jet aircraft construction may preclude warping to the degree required
by the Army.
The CAMI facility (ref. 64) uses a sled test vehicle on a horizontal track to carry the seat and
occupant {anthropomorphic dummy). The sled is gradually accelerated to a velocity and is abruptly
decelerated by energy ab6orbing wires to apply the teat impulse. Variation in orientation in
mounting of seats permits loading in the desired axis. This procedure has been refined and
generally gives good test results.
Test Procedure
Two impact orientations were used in these tests. The first, corresponding to Test I of
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MIL-S-58095 (AV) (ref. 6fi), produced combined downward, forward and lateral loads on the seat.
The second provide_ forward and lateral lead_ on the seat and correspond8 to Test 2 of
MILoS.Sg095 (AV). Both testa used a floor warpage fixture which rolled the left seat track 10"
outboard and pitched the right seat track 10° down, corresponding to the floor buckling and
warping conditions required for static testa under MIL-S-58095 (AV). An Alderson CO-95
anthropomorphic dummy, S/N 500, weighing 224 lbe furnished for these testa by the Naval Air
Development Center (NADC), simulated the esst occupant. The dummy was clothed in acrylic knit
punts and shirt for these testa. Shoes were not used. Trlaxial clusters of ac_larometere were
located in the dummy's cheat, on the seat pan, and on the floor fixture. Strap load tensiometem
wore placed on the shoulder belt and lap belt webbing. Becanso of the design of the restraint o
system, there was no free webbing on which to locate the tenaiometers, so that each tensiometer
was in contact with the dummy as well as the webbing. Since this may introduce error in the data,
the webbing load da_ presented in this report should be used with caution. An accelerometer was
also mounted on the sled to provide reference data for adjusting the impact pulse. Unless
otherwise noted, sled and floor data were filtered in accordance with Channel Class 60 (0-100 Hz)
seat and dummy accelerometers in accordance with Channel Class 180 (0-300 Hz) and tensiometere
in accordance with Channel Class 600 (0.1000 Hz) of SAE J 211b.
All teats were filmed on instrumentation cameras operating at 500 or 1000 frames per second.
TEST/SIMULATION PROGRAM OF STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS (Drop Tower
Method)
This program (ref. 66) called for crash testing and analytical simulation of helicopter structural
components and correlation of the results.
The primary objective of this activity was to provide a validation of the analytical techniques for
helicopter erashworthiness design developed to date and as improved in this program. There was
also an interest in gathering basic crash response data that could be used directly in design or as
input to analytical procedures.
A nose section of a CH-47 helicopter from station 160 forward was used as the basic structure. A
forward transmission and rotor head assembly were installed. Two crow seats were installed in the
cockpit; a standard CH-47 seat at the pilot location and a creshworthy crew seat at the co.pllot
station. Each seat contained a dummy which approximated the 50th percentile aviator. Total
weight of the specimen completewith seats and dummies was 3800 pounds.
Instrumentation
Types of measuring devices used in this test were aceslerometers, strain gages, and deflection
indicators.
In addition to ± I00 g accelarometerJ some _t500 g shock accelerometers were used in areas where
high acceleration levels were predicted. These were used to overcome previous problems where
high g levels caused circuit saturation resulting in excessive zero shifts with long-term decay
characteristics.
Five ± 100 g accelerometers (CEC 4.281-001) and five ±50 g arcelerometere (PCB Piezotronies
Inc., Model 302A) Weremounted at selected locations. Three deflection indicators ware mounted at
selected locations. Indicator tubes were attached to the floor and pa_sed through the roof of the
! i_" specimen. Eight strain gages were installed on selected structural elements. All gages were
_ unaxial. An additional strain gage was installed on the crashworthy crew seat vertical eolunmn.
=_ All data were recorded on magnetic tape using an FM wide-band [RIG recording system.
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lluisting equipment wee odjuet_l priur to the test to provide a nominal pitch attitude at release of
0° and a drop height of 17.3 ft to give an impect vohwity of 33.:t fife. Roll and piteh attitudes were
aleA_set to 0 °. Four ropes were atteched to the specmnm to limit to 45 ° uny postcrasb rntationl
about the pitch and roll axes.
, Black oral white movies (1500 pps) were recorded at three locations und provided three views: a
rear view of the st_wimen, an oblique view fnxn the right reur and unother oblique view frosn file
,_. loft front.
A 400 pps color movie camera was sot to view the crushworthy crew seat through the left side
t copilot door opening of the cockpit. Additionally, two 24-pps movies were taken at approximatelythe same locations as the two 1500-ppe cameras positioned obliquely to the specimen.
Of the 10 acceleronmtera used, all provided good data for. the inital impact phase of the test.i Subsequent to initial impact, at time 0,06 second, one accclerometer signal was lost due to
collapsing structure of the station 95 bulkhead pinching a wire between the structure and the edge
of the mounting plate for the craahworthy crew seat. This resulted in signal los8 from the
accelerometer mounted on the crashworthy seat-mounting plate. However, the data obtained up to
the time of signal loss is acceptable und covers the major range of interest for a test of this type.
Three deflection indicators were mounted in the test specimen. These were to provide time.history
records of the displacement-of the spot|men's crown relative to the floor, and also to give a post.
teat indication of the plastic deformatiun that occurred.
By using the pretest dimensions of the specimen in conjunctiun with the-post-test gross deflection
indications provided by a rubber grommet sliding on each indicator tube, it is pomsibleto determine
the maximum elastic and plastic deformations that occurred during the crash sequence.
UnfortuunteIy, unly one of the deflection indicatJoraprovided acceptable deflection time-history
data; the other two suffered from poor wiper contact and possible wire bhtding and stretching.
A total of nine uniaxial gages were intetalled, eight at selected locations on the structure attd one on
the vertical attenuator of the creshworthy crew seat. Some of the gages were in areas where severe
structural damage occurred resulting in gage failures, zero shifts, and generally unaceep__ble data.
The strain gage acceptability limitation is the manufacturer's recommended 1,5% strain value for
room temperature conditions.
Te_t Conclusions
This teat provided reasonably good itdtial intpact data for all m_,elerometer channels without
obviously extreme zero shifts or early loss of signal, The modified circuitry und use of 500 g
sccelerometm_s fnr recording impacts of this magnitude shows a marked improvemeut over the
reeulta obtained for test numbers 1 mid 2.
The selected impact velocity provided sufficient energy to cause failures of mutw of the structural
elements without causing excessive collapse. It is apparent that a gn,ater impact veloeity would
have resulted in exee,mive structural collapse and rendered the test unrepresentative of a
survivable crash.
The strain gages suffered front tile effects of adjacent structural failures rendering the data of
questionable value in some iostmwes. In fact. it is proving to Ix, extremely difficult to select
pesitimm for tlu, strain gages where useful data is obtained and adjacent structurel failure does not
iX'Cur.
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i1_a test where limited iuatt'mueutatiun oapahility exist, it ia considered that the use of nmru
m'relemlnet_rs and leas strain gages may prove to be more _t effective in pr,)viding dats suihddc
for correlation with analytical re_ulta,
The deflection indicators again did nut perform well, with only one providing a deflection time-
history. It appears that the problem is due to peer wiper artiun in conjunction with stretching
wire; future testa will incorporate a stronger wire material such as pinna wire. Such an installation
will possess a tower electrical resistance value but it is considered that an adequate recording
system exists to accommodate this, Additionally, the generation of a continuous signal without
wipe chatter will enhance signal recording.
It was unfortunate that-the high speed movie films were spoiled in development since a bettor
nadcrstanding of failure sequences may have been obtained for the primary structural elements.
However, overall structural damage and recorded data provide a good set ofAnformation for
correlation with computer simulation results.
STATIC TESTS-.
Static tests provide useful data on the crash perfornlanee of structures where the inertia loads due
to the local structural mass have a small ef,!'ecton the crash response, Some examples of this are
fuselage structures in shear action, lower fuselage structure, in crashing action, and seat structure
under floor displacement and occupant loads. The inelastic load carrying capability of skin.
stringer, colunma, and torque box sections for large deflections may also be obtained from static
tests, These data are useful in hybrid simulations in validating detailed strnetural models, and in
assessing design performance of some components.
Static teats, whi|e avoiding problems of dynamic data acquisition, do have problems of
maintaining load magnitude and direction, and valid boundary conditions during large deflections.
Internaloadsusuallycannotbe obtainedby straingagesas strahlgagesfailat the large
deflectionsfinterest.Howeverrapidlyreeordingloadcellsand deflectiongagesmay yieldvalid
force-deflectioncurvesfortheloadingcondition.
These techniques have been used successfully in the Army-spnaeored study and in the NASA
General Aviation research on floor structure. Some further development of the methods might be
expected..as additionaltesting is performed.
IMPACT TEST FACILITIES
Impacttestfacilitiessuitableforresearehanddevelopmenteceahworthiuesstestingof structural
subsystemsandofcompleteaircrafthavebeenreviewed.Thereviewisconfinedtoreprcm,ntative
major government facilities,
Crash testing of commercial jet transports, or even structural components involves engineering
prehlems of scale which have been overcome in peat testing but now take on a new dimension, For
the 707 the fuel load weighs 72398,2 kg, the wing tilPto-tip span is 44,42 m, and the ground tOfin
tip distance is 12.94 m. Extension of past teat methods to the commercial jet will require
ingenuity.
Table 5,4 identifies the teat facilities and shows approximate test capabilities. Regarding existing
facilities, full-st'aletesting of cmnnlercial jet trmmportsift,raft may be t_mductt_tat Dryden Research
.... Center. The FAA Tevhnical Center inlproved catapult will have the capet) ity to test enroll jet
transperts like the 737. [K;-9. mid the F-28.
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With rcgacd to teatiug nf au_tructures and components, N_A Langley, the FAA Technical Center,
and CAMI facilities nnly be used. 'l_m CAM! facility is designed fnr testi,tg seat/occupants.
An iulportunt part of test facilities is availability of adequate instrumentation and data acquisition
eqtiipment At a mininmm, the data system should be able to record accelerations of .4:750 g at
fr_quearies of 600 tlz. At learnt24 channels of this type data should be available. The carreut NASA
practice of passing the data through a 600 Hz low-psea filter prior to rccurding may be wstrictive for
stiff substructures. Also high frame-rate (5000.10,000 pps) photographic coverage should be
awniable. At least three cameras are needed to record the structural response. A system for
_." accurately indexing the photograpbic records to the electronic instrumentation is necessary.
!i _= ASSESSMENT OF TEST CAPABILITIES FOR JET TRANSPORTS "i
Based on the above discu_ions, assessment8 may be made of test capability, test method data,
systems, and test facilities needed to conduct the research and development progreana. The
purpose of these test programs is to increase the knowledge of the crash response of the complete
aircraft and components. In order to be effective, such testing must provide engineering restflta in
much greater detail than that currently obtained from accident investigations,
Test Methods
Much research is required to develop test methods. With regard to testing of complete aircraft, the
only carryover from previous testing is the L1649 and DC-7 tests, which apply to the grmmd to
groundscenario. To test the air-to.ground and the flight-into-obstruction scenarios, remote piloting
techniques to control crash conditions, and reliable unheard data acquisition techniques are
required.
Regarding component testing, same carryover from previous testing pertains to the testing of
seat/occupant/restraint systems. While methods of testing for individual seat units have been
developed, there are many problems yet to be resolved. Of particular concern is the variation in
results between what might be expected to be similar tests. Reference 65 shows a factor of
approximately 2 in lap-belt loads that is attributed to the use of different types of dummies. The
Army is concerned about this problem and is conducting a series of testa in which the s_une type of
seat and identical dummy is teated to the _ame conditions at NARDC, CAMIand Simula, Inc. (ref.
67). The results of these testa are to be compared in an attempt to res_lve tee differences being
observed.
In addition, the interface between 0eat track and Buppert structure ueeds definition. Fur light
aircraft and helicopters, deformations of one track relative to the other is usually recommended.
For transport aircraft with desp floor beams, it is not clear that such relative deformation is
obtainable or representative of eremhes. In addition, the input acceleration pulse is yet to be
determined. Such questions as how many seat units or how much fleer structure arc necessary to
adequately simulate crash conditions are unanswered. Should load pulses Ix, combined, phased,
and/or applied in sequence? How do restraint syatetos perform under such conditions and what
occupant should be represented?
Similar problems exist in testing each of the other components. In particular, }loware crash loads
to be reacted at the test.specimen boundaries in order to cause tile structure to simulate the crash
dynamics of an accident? For instance, how much fuselage must be teated in simulating the air-to-
ground Scenario? The ground-to-ground scenario? Are wing reactions uecesaary? Further, does the
nature of the crash response change as a fmlctian of crash initial conditions?
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To answer the kinds of questions present above, correlation between component testing and
complete aircraft testing is necessary. Also, validated enalytical methods arc needed to extend test
resulta to regions where testing is impractical and to correct results where crash boundary
conditions cannot be matched.
, Data Systems
Data acquisition and processing systems developed for the NASA/FAA general aviation program and
the CAMI seat program are sufficient to start test programs. Itowever further development of
improved high g/higl_ frequency aceelerometers is needed. In addition reliable displacement
measuring devices are needed for dynamic deflection and spring hack measurements.
In the area of photography, methods of obtaining good quality high frame-rate (5000-10,000 ppe)
pictures in the crash environment are needed to record detailed structural behavior. Research into
low-light-level television and methods of computerized picture enhancement and data extraction
could greatly increase the data obtained and reduce data reduction time.
Trot Facilities
Complete aircraft testing appears feasible at the Dryden Crash Test Range and st the planned FAA
Technical Center catapult. Instrumentation at both facilities is open to question. At Dryden, unheard
data systems are supplemented by telemetry used for flight testa. The telemetered data are of a low
frequency and of dubious value. Technical Center catapult date system has not bean defined to
date.
The CAMIseat test range appears adequate for near term testing of individual seat unite. Testing of
larger groups of seats and substructure may require testing in other facilities. Other components
might be tested in the assorted estapulta, drop tower, and swing tower8 depending on the problems
of simulating the crash.
ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT RESISTANCE TECHNOLOGY
Current impact resistance design technology is based on the lessons learned from accident
experience. Technology is continually being improved to reflect the latest experience. From these
leseons, experienced engineering design practices have evolved. These practices have developed a
high level of impact resistance in the current commercial jet transport fleet.
The design technology has shortcomings in that meet crash response mechanisms are unknown.
There is a lack of quantitative methods for engineering analysis. There also is a lack of definitive
crash load&This has led to comparisen of designs to existing capability. While this presses has been
successful where a data base e_ste, there is concern for new configurations and advanced
materials application for which no accident data base exists.
Test methods for complete aircraft and for structural compenenta need develol_.ment. The meet
recent transport aircraft crash test was in 1964 with limited results. Jet transport structural
component testing to simulate crash conditions needs development. Size end initial conditions of
such testing, introduces a new set of test problems. Adaptation of existing facilities and the
development of new facilities needs research. Existing test facilities and methods could serve as a
starth_g point for a teatprogram.
Existing analytical methods are research tools. Many programs have technical shortcomings for
_ crash simulation and are not completely validated, but if validated could contribute significantly
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to teat planning, prediction of rcauRa based on state-of-the.art knowledge and theory, and
ix_nterashdata analysis for complex interactions. Model techniques and structural data bases to
_. support crash simulations for both _tructural components and complete aircraft needs
development. Further, the programs need modification, both to make them user oriented before
they can become engineering tools and to reduce the large cost of analyses.
t
For eeaVoccupant modeling the programs have reached a more advanced stage of development
than the structures analysis programs. However, more complete representation of the occ.apant
P'_" and surface contact would permit bettor simulation of occupant response. Problems exist in
_ relating the analytical output to hmnan injury.
As-an overview, the problems have been defined and some analytical and experimental methodsand facilities are available. It appears that the ingredients for research and dev lopment program
exist. With the advent of advanced aircraft the impact response problems take on added
" significance.
RESEARCH TO IMPROVE CRASHWORTHINESS TECHNOLOGY. Requirements for research and development effort that will result in improved technology for
crashworthiness engineering of commercial transport aircraft are presented. The required
- technologyisdiscussedintermsofdisciplines,Problemareasforcurrentand advancedtransport
aircraftareidentified,and areasofresearchanddevelopmentarediscussed.
REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVED TECHNOLOGYBased on the assessment of the current state of technology four goals must be achieved to
-') significantly improve crashworthiness engineering for commercial jet transport aircraft.
;_l First, definition of the survivable crash environment is required. This definition should include
" crashloadsand displacementsforeachscenario.Rationalrelationshipsbetweenthecrashloads
1 and displacements and the range of initial conditions with various hostile environments should be
established.
Second, an understanding of the crash response mechanisms of structural components and of
complete aircraft in these scenarise is required. The effects of factors influencing these
mechanisms must be understood.
Third, validated analytical modeling and test engineering methods must be developed. These
methods should be capable of treating structural components, occupant response, and complete
aircraft. Further the methods mtmt be usable in engineering applications,
Fourth, human factors and injury mechanisms for commercial transport occupants must be
defined. The relationships between engineering quantities such as acceleration pulses, impact
loads and displacements, end occupant injury are necemsaryto provide adequate levels of occupant
: protection.
!_ Achievement of these four goals will permit detailed engineering of crashworthine_ to a level not
now available. Improved technology will permit design considerations affecting crashworthinem
to be treated on a more rational basis and to more fully participate in the design proee_. Further,
- asadvanced esignconceptsand materialsereconsidered,crashworthinessrequirementsmay be
more fullyanticipatedthaninthepast.
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CRASItWORTHINES8 DISCIPLINE
"Mature" crashworthinesa technology might be envisioned as five major areas of activity. Each of
these areas leads to the quantification of crsshworthine_ parameters and understanding of crash
phenomezta in order that protection for occupants might be improved.
! i
The five areas of activity are shown in figure 5.9. The areas are defined to the third level of detail.
_ It is expected that technology will evolve as the program progresses.
_ • DATABASE
Data base activity treats the collection and nmintenancs of data germane to structural
erashworthinese and occupant protection.
! i The data base has been divided roughly into four categories: crash statistics, scenario refinement,
performance norms, and human factor data. For the most part, the activities under each of these
categories are self evident and in many instances represent an extension of ongoing efforts and of
studies conducted herein.
With respect to the establishment of survivable crash initial conditions, more applications of the
work of Wingrove et el. (ref. 68) in conjunction with the NTSB could improve the definition of the
crash conditions. Accurate definition of the initial conditions could enable accidents to be used in
simulations to better def'me the environment in scenarios. Such results would augment the data
from crash testing full scale asrcraft.
To assist the NTSB in developing structural data for erasliworthinese from accidents, an
investigation team of research and engineering-oriented people from government is proposed. This
team would inspect selected accidents to obtain data on the crash performance of structural
systems. It is recognized that a high level of cooperation between the NTSB and the team must
exist for such an endeavor. However, the increase in the amount of engineering data from
accideate could be substantial.
Human factors area needs better definition. Considerable attention has been directed tow_lrd
occupant injury mechanisms. However, with improved structural and occupant modeling,
interactions between occupant and the restraint system and with the surroundings may be studied
for improved design. Of particular importance is the development of a relationship between
engineering parameters and occupant injury. Impreved definitions of occupant modeling
parameters such as spring constants, damping ratios, and kinematics should be developed for
simulations and for anthropomorphic dummies.
METHODS AND FACILITIES
The methods and facilities area is concerned with development and validation of analytical and
experimental methods, teat facilities, and simulation teclmiqurs.
Current analytical pregrams such as KRASH, DYCAST, and MSOM.LA should be kept up to date
and extended. Updating relates to modern progrmn architecture to reduce cunsumption of
computer resources and to facilitate user application, Further, with the advent of more powerful
computers, existing codes should be rewritten to reflect these advances.
Extension of the analyses should more accurately depict the behavior of the structure. Occupant
models should be extended to provide for 3-D response and for multiple occupants in a seat unit.
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For instance, the inclusion of accurate modeling of seat structure and restraint harltcss in
m_, occupant medals to depict the interaction between occupants and structure.
Structural programs should be extended to permit accurate representation of fluid pressures in
fuel tanks under sudden accelerations for the tank rupture problem. Where multiple failure medea
are passible, heuristic logic may be incorporated in the coding to permit the dynamic response to
:_,_ follow _'minimumenergy" paths, These types of approaches may even lead to using the computer
_ to optimize the model while processing the data.
__ Development of modular analysis systems that permit the analyst to use only the modules
__ necessary for the solution of problem at hand is needed. While it is desirable to enhance the
capability of the analysis system, it should not be necessary to drag all these additional features
into the computer for every problem. For instance, if one is analyzing floor structure only, then
modules and storage for occupant response or hydrodynandc forces may not be needed. Efficient
use of computer resources is a must.
Analytical methods and models for simulation of boundary conditions needs to be improved_
Current programs introduce loads into the models through springs or through fixed boundaries,
Accurate representation of this process is necessary if detailed simulated structural behavior is to
be achieved.
_ The level of validation achieved for the analytical tools will affect the usefulness of the tools for
engineering purposes. Hence, every effort is n_ded to improve fidelity of mlalyticul results in
simulating the crash response of structure. Experience and supporting data formodeling that will
extend the applicability of analytical methods and develop confidence in engineering application are
needed.
Creshworthinese test method research and development is separated into four areas:
instrumentation and data processing, dynamic procedures, static procedures, and scale modeling.
Effort in these areas is needed to improve current techniques to better represent crash conditions,
to permit the study of structural subsystems, to acquire data for hybrid simulation, and to allow the
use of scale models for testing large aircraft or components.
While a crashmay have aduration of many seconds from initial impact to final arre_tment, the critical
deformation of structure may occur in milliseconds. This small time inlpesea severe sampling
requirements on instrumentation. Current teat data contains errors due to accelerometer drift,
coordination of events, and to processing problems. Further, definition of actual response may be
incomplete. Deflections should be dynamically measured to properly account for the sequence of
failuresemdthe effects of spring.beck. In addition, the instrumentation must be sufficiently rugged to
withstand the crash environment and still function properly.
Research and development is needed to improve the measurement of accelerations, velocities, and
deflections under test conditions. The application of laser techulques should be investigated.
Photography is particularly difficult and efforte to extend the coverage to high-frame rates is needed.
Picture enhancement procedures developed for space exploration may have application.
Further effort is needed to handle the vast quantities of information obtained in a test and to present
, this information in a readily digestible forumt. This is particularly true of photographic data.
Dynamic test procedures may be separated into complete aircraft testing and structural
subsystems tests. Methods of testing complete aircraft are complicated simply by the scale of the
model, The up-coming test of the 720 aircraft in 1984 will suggest further areas for development.
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Pn_'edurcs for testing structural subsystems need further development. Current t_st nwtheds for
testing seat,s/occupant/restraints have provided good data. llowever, these methods are limited in
m_lcl si_, und in the crash pulse, which may be simulated, hi addition, the construction and
iostxumenttatiou of occupant models still raise m_myquestim_a.In many respects, these problems are
facility related.
Some testing of structural subsystems has been accomplished on fuel tanks and fuselage _ctiona
for small aircraft. These tests have been limited in direction of impact loads and in size of the test
specimen. Extension of these methods to other subsystems and to a more complete range of load
conditions requires effort. Further, the proper rep_sentation of structural boundary conditions
and of-external loads is needed.
Static test results have been found to be useful in obtaining input data for simulations involving
some lightweight, highly stiff substructures. Methods for conducting these types of tests need
development. In particular, methods of applying loads statically to simulate the dynamic load
distribution are required. Further, a method of maintaining the applied loads and their directions
through the largo structural deflections is needed.
Scale modeling for crash tests to provide data at reduced costa and in a timely manner should be
investigated. While scalh_g laws for crash testing are known, limitations on the method need be
developed particularly with regard to model details and for orthotopic materials such as
composites. Problems may exist with regard to ply thickness and fabrication methods for these
materials.
FACILITIES
It is expected that as crashworthinese research and development progress, extension of existing
facilities will be required. For some types of testing new facilities may be needed. A part of the
total program is updating of existing facilities and development of new facilities.
As some facilities already exist in the FAA, NASA, the military, and industry, a team approach to
facilities development should be used. An overview committee of interested parties should provide
goals and policy for expansion and development of the nece_ary facilities.
SIMULATION TECHNIQUES
Methods of simulation need development. Methods of modeling to use analytical tools and of
testing, to identify crash response, need to be developed to levels suitable for engineering
application. Various approaches should be verified and-validated. As better methods are
developed, this information should be made available.
COMPLETE AIRCRAFT TRaTI]gG
Crash testing of complete highly ilmtrtmlented aircraft is divided into three areas: identification of
crash response mechanisms, atructtwal subsystem performance, and advanced concept evaluation.
Each of these areas is treated below.
Complete aircraft testa are required to identify the structural crash reepenae mechanisms
including the interaction of various subsystems. Included in this area are evaluation of crash loads,
structural reeponze, acceleration environment, and scenario definition.
Crash loads and acceleration environment will provide data for compsrisen with calculated values.
These data, in conjunction with data derived from aceidents, may be used to aseeu the adequacy of
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crsshwarthine_ for complete aircraft, Structural response will provide defisetien, failure mode,
and sequence date useful to the a_eMment of engineering methods such as simulation and
modeling. Further, it may be used to evaluate, and refine crash scenarios,
Structural subsystem crash performance may be obtained in the complete aircraft teat. Loads
experienced by the subsystems may be obtained for comparisons with design values and for use in
subsystem testing. Failure medes and sequence may be obtained including effects of interartion
with other subsystems. Energy absorption characteristios of the subsystem may be assessed and
the adequacy of its crash performance may be assayed.
• Complete aircraft tests should also be used to evaluate advanced crashworthiness concepts. For
instance, applications of advanced materials or energy absorption designs for various subsystems
may be assessed. Effects of such components on crash leeds and environment may be evaluated.
As part of this testing, the contribution of the various subsystems in reducing the fire hazard end
in protecting the occupants may be evaluated. Further, the full-scale crash tests afford
opgp___nnityto refine the definition end relate crash loads end displacements to scenarios.
STRUCTURAL SUBSYSTEMS
Research into the crash behavior of structural subsystems consists of beth analysis and test.
Emphasis is placed on treatment of subsystems because the subsystems must perform their crash
function in order to achieve crashworthineee for complete aircraft. Further, it is in detailed
mechanisms _,f faihtre that engineering changes may be affected. In addition, in testing the
subsystem, detailed-ccash-respense of the subsystem may be better measured than from complete
aircraft testing.
The potential for improved crash performance for structural systems has been assessed to provide
some guidance for.the planning of a research program. The potehtial for improved performance is
assessed relative to the crash function. On this basis the aseesement in table 5.5 is presented.
The rating potential for improved performance is given in relative terms; C being good potential, B
being better, and A being best. These ratings are subjective and do not reflect the t4Jfficulty in
advancing the technology. It is expected that some ratings will change as the re._eareh and
development program progresses.
Analytical research treats the methods of modeling the subsystem to depict detailed crash
response. Subsystems of immediate intei_st are wing tankage, seaUoccupent, floor/seat/occupant,
and fuselage sections. In this endeavor, the full power of analytical programs may be used to
represent the structure in detail. Results of these analyses should be validated with subsystems
tests. Computer programs may be assessed for technical deficiencies end simulation techniques
may be developed for engineering application.
Testing of structural subsystems will permit identification of detailed failure mechanisms and
sequences of events in simulated crash conditions. In addition, these results may serve as a basis
for comparison for the evaluation of advanced concepts. In many instances, representative metal
structure suitable for testing may be obtained from overagsd transports being retired from service,
Further, such structure specimens are within the teat capacity of some existing facilities.
i Advanced material appliostione for some subsystems may also be tested as a part of the metal
specimens. As the applications advance, new specimens may have to be fabricated.
t
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t Hu|_ystems should be t_sted over a range of initial conditions compatible with those used for
r comple_ aircraft.
ADVANCED CONCEPTS
Rcm_srchand developmantfor advancedcrashworthine_scanceptsincludesareasof new •
nm_rials,energyabsorbingapplications,andageneralcategorycalled"constructionc cepts."It
isanticipatedthatascrashworthinesetechnologyisdevelopedandasnew structuresandmaterials
technologyisappliedtoaircraftdesign,advancedconceptsmay benece_arytoprovideoccupant
protectioni crashes.
The new-materialsareaisconcernedwith developingtechnologyforunderstandingfailure
mechanisms,and forincreasingimpactreslstanesandenergyabsorptioncharacteristicsofthese
materials,principallycomposites.The effortreatsmaterialsatcouponorsmallspecimenlevel,
anddealswitheffectsofhybridmaterials,plyorientation,etc.
Fireresistanceof advancedmaterialsshottldbe investigatedinbethsmallspecimensand in
structuralcomponents.Methodsofimprovingburncharacteristicsshouldbeevaluated.Structural
performanceofthesecomponentsinthepresenceofcrashheatpulseshouldbeunderstood.
Energy-absorbingapplicationsareconcernedwithseatsandimmediateoccupantsurroundingsand
with "parasitic"materials/devicesintroducedspecificallyto provideenergyabsorption.An
exampleofthelatteriscrushablematerialapp:iedattheundersideofthefuselagetoprovide
energyabsorption.
Constructionconceptsareconcernedwitheffectsofapplicationftheadvancedmaterialsto
aircraftdetailsand componentson thecraahworthine_ofaircraftconfigurations.At thistime,
thecrashresponseof aircraftprimarystructuremade withnow materialsisunknown.Itis
conceivablethathistoriccrashfunctionsoftheaircraftsubsystemsmay havetobemodifiedinthis
processand new strategiesforprotectionfoccupantsdevised.
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q_, 6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Otto bu,ldred and fifty-three jet transport socidenta huvo been studied in depth. The stetus ofstructural crashworthincss t chnology has been reviewed. Conclusions resultiug from t se st dies¢_ , .
_. are pre_ented and discussed. Based an these conclusions, prolih;m areas relat.ing to commeread
• transp_rt arc identified for future research itd development. 1,in dly, a research and development
program is recommended.
When censidaring all the eannnereiul air transportation system safety related problem areas it is
believed that the meat stgnificant reduction in fatalities can be achieved by simply reducing the
number of accidents. No significant technological breakthroughs are required to achieve this goal. In
section 2, it was shown that approximately 76% of the commercial jet aircraft accidents have been
attributed to cockpit crew factors. Therefore, research and study of these factors in areasof cockpit
design, system design, and crew human factors should receive major emphasis.
Another safety-related problem area is the airport environment. Studies of ground traffic control
systems and ground operation procedures should be directed toward elimination of collision
accident. The severity of many veer-off end overrun accidents could be substantially reduced if
hazards on and around the eirport were eliminated.
Current.commercial jet transport aircraft possess s high level of cresliwor thinesa. This is due in part
to stronger structure, less volatile fuel and improved design methods. Design methods are
continually being improved baaed on knowledge gained from accident experience. It is desirable to
continue this improvement of existing designs and to retain their beneficial characteristics as future
designs using advanced materials and concepts are developed. To achieve this will require
substantial advances in structural crashworthiness technology.
CONCLUSIONS OF THE STRUCTURAl, CRASHWORTHINESS.ST.UDY
First, the greatest potential for improvedsurvivability in centmetcial jet transport aircraftaccidents is -
in the area of fire related fatalities. Research relating to prevention of fuel fire merits the highest
priority. Time is a critical element associated with escape when a severe fuel fire exists outside the
aircraft or when the aircraft is sinking in deep water. If flame and smoke enter the fuselage paa_nger
area immediately after the aircraft comes to rest, the probability of escape is reduced substantially.
Retaining fuselage integrity and delaying entrance of smoke and flame is essential if survivability is to
be enhanced. Debris and obstructions that hinder movement of persons on the escape route cause
delays that reduce the probability of survival. Consequently, factors that would increase the available
time for egress or reduce the time required for egress is esaential. Fuel additives as in the anti-
misting kerosene program, rupture reelstsnt fuel tanks or cells, and structural improvements to
protect fuel tanks and occupant8 should be subjects of research.
Second, structural integrity of fuel systems, fuselage, and landing gear are leading candidates for
improved craahworthinesa. Structural integrity of fuel systems is a key factor in prevention of
peetcraah fire. L_tegrity of the fuselage cenlz'ibutes to the reduction of fire related fatalities by
preventing or delaying the eutL'yof fuel, fire, and smoke and by maintaining egress routes. Main
landing gear that are more tolerant to off-runway cunditiene would continue to provide ground
clearance for the wing and engine pods thereby reducing wing breaks and tearing of tank lower
surfaces, and engine pod sccubbing or separation.
Third, where trauma fatalities have predeninmted, the energy alamarbingprotective capability of the
aircraft structure generally has been expended and the aircraft has experienced major structural
!
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d,unagc. This is dim.o_,d iu stwl_on 5. llow,wer, traunnl fatalities slight b*, r,_duced hy inqwoving
,,nergy ahmwpl hUl ealmhility alld fiim,hlgc nLrltctI11'alintegrity. Wltilc eurr,_nt occupant mq11Jrt,a!rahlt
systems Itiivl' iierfornled well in accidents, little is knowll of tin, rchttitlnailill IietwPl,iI occalmllt
rcl_l_lnsc lord sfrurtorai tiyll,lnlil' cllaracteriaticq of tile re,at, fhsw, attd fnm, htgl,. Only reccntiy has
Inish,ling pri,grc_i,d to whcr_, mime of this ls,iulvior ran Is, store thoroughly exphwcd. This
I_ccotnes parth'nlsrly iltl|ml"tallt for a|lpiicatiooa of advanced nnttcrhd_. |*'llrthcr, aircraft ocrllpallt
ilnlmt't lt!,lerllllCl'!IC¢'dShitpl_wedileflnilion.
CRASIIWORTIIINI'_I4S IqlOBLEM AREAS
llas,don tilt,m, cotlchlsions,prohlcnlareaa forfntnro atruItnrlll Cl'ushworthinei_ resi'al'chanll
dcvehtpnlenl,arelwes,nl_d.'l'ht,s,pl,,.!,hlellllu'eattlrecategorizt'dwithregardh,carrellllirt,rafl,
advlnlccdaircraft,and full-st'ah_crashh,sl& Withineachcategoryprohlentareasarepresenh,din
orderof in'iorily.The prohh,nlsar,,shown infigure6.1.
Postcrashfirehozard realm,lion through lhe devolopmetltof fueladditlves,inqn'ovcdfirt_
resistance tcrhnology, ialproved occupant egret, alxtt fuel eontainuwnt have high priority. 'Phi_
atlbject Itaa-|_,en t_,at,_ in tile SAI"ER conunittet, rt,eonlnlendatiolts (rqf. 69). Structural crash
resl_mSc is conccrned with tonk ruptore ineehmlimns and with cal)in interior eqltilmtent. Fuselage
structural integrity also plays all ilnportant role in the ptmtfire hazard by prevent ing entry of fuel.
fire slid smoke throllgh hl"eaks in l.hc fnstdage Illld ill prott'_.'ting established egress rootes hy
ntaintalnillg the fhsw strocture and operable th_w_ .rod hatches.
The role t,f inain landi._g gear in ntainhtining ground clearance for the wing and fitsclage has |s,en
seen in se,'ti_it .t. A gear with increased resialllllCC to aeparatio;t ill rough terrain may rednee file
likelihot_l of wing tank breaks inn| hulk lower stlrfltt'e tears, engitte pt_t st,paration, and could also
elilninatc .,_mlc friction fires.
In addition, fn_,h.ge ,qlructural illtegrity provides the ot'eupant with a protective shell aud with
energy ahm_rbing load paths.Methisla of increasing break resistance of tile foselage arc seeded.
Sinliliarly,iiptinli_ttionof fust,hlgt,cnergy ab_rplioo is lleedtwl,hnprowuttenlof slruclltral
iutegritywilltendtort_lucelraunlaiujury.
Occupant injury reduct.ion is concvrned with fltxwls,affoceupanffrt_straint sysh, lna. 'Pile system
iionlioear dynamic rcsponst, nt_'da to L_, onderstt_)d. Cummt conlnlereial practice defines tile
problem ill terms of shttic enveloping wduea |mst, d on accident experience. For new lightweight
wits, the efft_'t of departure_ front privets destines on occopaot ha2alrda or injury |sm,ntial shonh|
I_, nndersb._t_t. Of intrt.ieular ¢onet_rn i8 dynamic rcsponst, of the t_'eopltlltS ill Itcw l_4,ats os
txl,nlparl, d to t'onvqotional re,sis im [_)th re,at and t,,ccnpltnt interact with flt_,r aceelerlttioll Ituls, s.
Tllis r_apotll_ involves the complete st,at sysleln front fl_)r stxucture and st,at athleholcnt.a to
impacting aprrounding objects. A similar problem exists for tilt, conventional st,at to a lt,_.,_l'
ext,,at. Rest, arch into the effects of file puh_* on both tile st,at and occop:ult is necdcd.
Methods of ac¢ident+ovelot_ analy_,s are nt_eded for a_,t_ing craail I_,rforulamce of sircraft and
atructura|COmll'tlnelll#,Sot'itnletllod8providea nletltntfilrparitole|ricstndiesIntd extrapohltion
froln crash teat anti aecldellt data to el.her _.'enario eouditions. I'roven ailunhlthln techniques ar_,
Iio:etqtary for engint't, rhlg pltrlml_S.
Crash pt,rformaoee aast, t_qlllellt of _le aircraft atnl structural eolnpOllqltlll itet*ds ilnllroventent.
Sillt'_, t'ost of full-t_.ah, aircraft teat_ precludes nlauy b,sts, it is ilnl_trhult to extract as much
engiln_,rhlg data as 1_4ihh, front ao.'idellt,_, b'orsonlq a{ridents, ill which tile air,'raft has not been
completely tleatroyed, additional supls,rt It, the W'l_lt by ilnlmct dyuanlh's r_,m,ltrch permmnel
fronl NASA and the FAA Inay prt,duce IllOrt, data. Tilts dais is needl,d Its ._lttttiyaccideut I_,lutvior
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Figure 6.1-Structural Crashworthiness Problem Areas
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with analytieal mcthods and for alma:alien testing of structural components. Ill addition, such
data will be useful in refiuolueut of the accident scenarios.
Advaact_l aircraft prt_hlcms are concerned with tile intxoduetinn of advanced mat4,_risls,
b_ graphite/epoxies in particular. Problem areas exist in material crash perforlmmce, advanced
cemponent performance, and with aircraft occupant protection concepts. Problems with material
_ performance inehales high energy impact resistsnt'_ and burn characteristics, l)esigu latitude '
afforded by thesc materials in ply orientatiolt and intxodu,-tion of modifying nmterials may permit
desirable impact characteristics to-be achieved. With regard to burn characteristics, these
advanced materials may provide protcctio,l to the occupant by not meltiug in the prcsence of a
heat pulse while retaining a char barrier and by reduced friction sparking.
Crash performance of structural components made from advanced materials must be compared to
that of eurrcnt structural components. Differences in performance must be assessed for their
effec£ on accident perfmanance of the complete aircraft. Impact response mechanisms of advanced
components must be uuderatood in order that accident performance might be optimiu,d.
New occupant protection concepts for advanced aircraft may be required. Current metal aircraft
have inherent properties contributing to crashworthine_ provisions in addition to other deeit,m
conditions that :nay not be present in advanced aircraft. Consequently. it may be nece_qary to
introduce new approaches to occupant protection.
Since accident performance of full-scale aircraft has such an important role in crashworthinc_q.
problems of testing fall-scale aircraft must be addressed. In addition to technical problems of test
methods, data acquisition, and reduction° tile severity levels of the testa must be within the
envelope of survivable accidents for maximum application of the resale. This requires further
refinement of the accident scenarios and implies some knowledge of huma,i injury tolerance. These
problems should be resolved prior to the phumed test of the 720 aircraft.
RFA'OMMENDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
A research and development program is presented. One objective is to understand the crash
response of current designs and to develop structural impact technology that might improve
current commercial jet transport aircraft and serve as a basis for the assessment of advanced
aircraft structure. A second objective is to understand the crash perforumnce of advaut_i
structural components. A third objective is to obhtin crash environmental data from fall-scale
complete aircraft tests for validation of technology mid for asee_sn)eut of crash scenarios.
Recommendations are given for current metal aircraft, advanced aircraft, and for fall-scale
complete aircraft teats. !
CURRENT METAL AIRCRAFT :
f1
Re_eareh on reduction of the poeterash fire hazard is recommended. SAFER (_mratittee
recommendations on fuel additives, fire rceietsnce, and fuel contaimnent technology are
supported.
With reslgx't to the structural role in fuel containment, research into tile various meehanielns of
tank rupture is recommended. Experimental and analytical methl_ls of shnalating tank rupture in
crash conditions should be develol_d. Ram,arch should include fall-scale aircraft and cmnponent
teatrag of structural improvements and of devices or toehniqocs to reduce the fuel flow rate from
fractured tanks.
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To improve oecupm_t cgreM, the effee_ of representative crash accelerations and displacements
an containment of cabin interior equipment and cantcnta should be determined, Galleys, overhead
compartments, ceiling panels, lighting, and other interior appointments should be studied to reduce
blockage of egress routes. For water entry, new designs and teehniquse for storage and
deployment of lifo rafts and floatation equipment that will facilitate egress and eliminste blockage of
exits should be developed.
Research to improve etructaral integrity of the fuselage is recommended. Studies into the
mechanisms of fuselage breaks, maintenance of protective shell, optimization of energy absorption,
distortions at doors and hatches and floors for the crash scenarios should be done. To accomodate
waterentry, studies of design improvements that will eliminate tearing and rupturing of the fuselage
lower surface by hydraulic action of the water (some inward crushing would be tolerable) thus
improving the floatation capability should be done.
Main landing gear accident performance in rough terrain should be studied. Crash loads and
displacements for existing gear concepts for representative hazards should be determined, The
interaction of the gear and the attaching structure should be understood. Advanced concepts for
improved crash performance should be developed.
Research for trauma injury reduction is recommended. Studies to ascertain the effects of fuselage
structural arrangement on the acceleration impulse and floor displacement experienced at the points
of seat attachment should be conducted. Effects of the shape, magnitude, and duration of the seat
acceleration impulse on eeat/occupantJreatraint system response should be obtained for current
seats and fornew lightweight seats. Also seat capability in terms of both static and dynamic loading
should be established. Effects of occupant parameters such as mass, size, distribution, occupant
accelerations, restraint effectiveness and seat deformation should be obtained. Effort should be
made torelateengineeringmeasurementstooccupantinjuryandinjuryindices.
Crashenvelopeanalysesneed to be developedforassessmentof ersshworthiness.Existing
computerprograms uchasKRASH andDYCAST may serveasastartingpoint.Limitsofvalidity
ofsuchanalysesneedto be established.Methodsofaccidentsimulationand thedatabaseto
supporthisapproachshouldbedeveloped.The technologyofthesemethodsshouldbeextended.
Researchforcrashperformanceassessmentshouldbe done to refinetheaccidentscenarios,
Effortstoobtaindatafrom selectedaccidentstobetterdefinetheinitialconditionsand the
sequenceofeventsareneeded.Engineeringdataforaccidentsimulationshouldbeobtained.
ADVANCED AIRCRAFT
Researchisrecommendedinhighenergyimpactforadvancedmaterialssuchasgraphite/epoxy,
Effectsofdesignparameterson impactresistanceshouldbedetermined,Ways toincreaseimpact
resistanceandbarncharacteristicsshouldbesought.
With respecto advancedcmnpenenta,a programtodeterminecrashperformanceshouldbe
conducted.Analyticalnd experimentalcrashsimulationsshouldbemade.Advancedcomponent
perforu_anceshouldbecomparedtoenrrentcomponentsand differem'esidentified.Methodsof
modifyingtheperformanceshouldbeexplored.
It is anticipatedthat intpactresistanceof advanced materialand energy absorption
i _'_ characteristics of components made of them materials may be sufficiently different from current
metal aircraft that new concepts of occupant protection might be needed. Of particular concern are
P "
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wing troika, (uselage iategrity including energy abecrptla,_, and the floodseatY occnpant/rcstraint
system. Nvw npproachvs to occupant protection should be investigated.
FULL-SCALE CRASH TESTS
The planned 720 crash test should be instrumented to obtain data on structural components and
seat/occupantJrestraint systems. Crash response modes and loads on both the structural
componenta and the scat/occupant/restraint system should be obtained. Full-scale tests should be
used to refine the scenario.
j _ Depending on the succe_ of the 720 test, additional full scale crash teats should be consideL_d,
Future testa would serve to evaluate other scenarios and to more completely define the crash
environment and crash response mechani ms. They would also be useful for validation of analyticBl
mefllods. As advanced materials are incorporated into future aircraft, full.scale testa for occupant : !
protection concept validation should be considered. An objective of this program is to minimize the
_. need for testa,
fuU-scale cr_h
_ RECOMMENDED PROGRAM
The program recommended for inclusion in the planning for the NASA/FAA Crashworthinese
Research program for General Aviation and Commercial Jet Transport Aircraft is given. While the
'_ complete development of the crashworthiness technology is a worthy goal only major segments are
suggested.
?_ Major s_gmente of the program are identified. A strong emphasis is placed on the performance of
_:_._ advanced composites. The segments include fuel containment, fuselage integrity/energy
__ absorption, floorlseattoccupant response, complete aircraft response, accident investigation,
_i component performance, and support technology. The elements of these segments have been
discussed in the body of the study and in section 5 in particular,
A tenative schedule through 1990 for the recommended segments in the NASAIFAA research and
_ development program pertaining to commercial jet transport aircraft is shown in figure 6.2. The --
schedule is based on task priority, current state of the technology, estimates of available facilities,
and thnelinese to aircraft applications.
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company
P. O. Box 3707
Seattle, Washington 98124
August 10, 1981
i
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APPENDIX A
_to
• Accident Definition
(As Defined by the National TransportationSafety Board)
"Aircraftaccident"meansan occurrenceassociatedwiththeoperationofan aircraftwhichtakes
placebetweenthetimeanypersonboardstheaircraftwiththeintentionfRightuntilsuchtime
as all such persons have disembarked, in which any person suffers death or serious injury as a
result of being in or upon the aircraft or by direct contact with the aircraft or anything attached
thereto, or the aircraft receives substantial damage.
"Operator"means any person who causes or authorizes the operation of an aircraft, such as
the owner, lessoe, or bailee of an aircraft.
"Fatal injury" means any injury which results in death within 7 days.
"Serious injury" means any injury which (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours,
commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received; (2) restdt8 in a fracture of
any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose): (3) involves lacerations which
cause severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle or tendon damage: (4) involves injury to any
internal organ; or (5) involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more than
5 percent of the body surface.
_rIull loss" means damage due to an accident which was too extensive to repair or, for
economic reasons, the aircraft was not repaired and retraced to service.
_ubstantial damage"
(1) Except as provided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, substantial damage
means damage or structural failure which adversely affects the structural
strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and which would
normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component.
(2) Engine failure damage limited to an engine; bent fairinge or cowling; dented skin;
small punctured holes in the skin or fabric. Damage to landing gear, wheels, tires,
flaps, engines accessories, brakes, or wing tips are not considered "substantial
damage" for the purpose of this part.
A _survivable" accident is one in which the fuselage remains relatively intact, the crash
forces do not exceed the limita of human tolerance, there are adequate occupant restraints,
_,_. and there are sufficient eBcaps provisions.
i.._ -_
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: .. APPENDIX B
i 'rile following 1980 ac_idsnta would be good candidates for additional study',
1. 707 2/27/80 Cliiml, Manila, hun IoM, 3 of 135 were fatalities, severe fire, bm'd
touchdown, wing failed.
2. 707 5111180 Sobelair, Doucela, Cameroon, hull lose, no fatalities, no fire, veer
! =_' off.
3. L-1011 8119180 Saudi, Riyadh, hull loss, 301 fatalities, cabin fire in flight, landed "
but no evacuation.
4. 727 9/3/80 Pan Am, San Jose, Costa Rica, hull loss, no fatalities, touchdown
i, short, no fire,
5. 737..........L0_/80-. Air Florida, Port an Prince, substantial damage, no fatalities,
veered off runway, separated gear, fuel leak through crack in
fitting.
6. 747 11119/80 Korean, Seeul, Korea, hull loss, 14 of 226 were fatalities, severe fire
(nonfuel) touchdown short, gear separated.
7. 727 11121180 Air-Mieronesia, Yap Island, hull loss, veered off runway, no
fatalities, severe fire.
8. 707 12120180 Aerotal, Bogota, hull loss, no fatalities, touchdown short, severe
fire.
15'-'
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APPENDIX C
Thisformappearingon thefollowingpageswas usedforthedatasearchoftheaccidents.
It is presented here as a convenience to the reader, i
! 5:3
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ACCIDENT FILE NO, ,,
ACCIDENT IDENTIFICATION
DATE TOTAL ONBOA_D
A/cNODEL _ (+NON-REV.)
^IR CARRIER PASSENGERS
LOCATION _TAL FATALITIES
TIME (LOCAL} TOTAL SEP,IOUS INJURIES
FLIGHT PHASE IMPACT SURVIVABLE YES NO
DAMAGE, (HULL, MAJOR)
TYPE-OF ACCIDENT TERMINATE IN WATER
IN-FLIGHT FIRE
GROUND IMPACT - NO FIRE
GROUND IMPACT - MINOR FIRE
GROUND IMPACT - NOD. FIRE
GROUND IMPACT - SEVERE FIRE
DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT
l
STRUCTURE RELATED TYPE
NO STRUC_'dRE DESCRIPTION COCKPIT DAMAGE
FUSELAGE BREAK WING SEP
BELTS/SEAT SEF GEAR BEP
TANK RUPT ENGINE/PYLON SEP
FLOORE _
DEBRIS FUEL LINES
DESCRIPTIOM-AT IHPACT LOCATION .
i,
TERRAIN AT IMPACT LOCATION
A/C ATTITUD _-AT IMPACT
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pILOT ACTIONS
FLIGHT DATA RECORDER ANALYSIS FLAPS
AVOIDANCE ACTIONS
ROTATION SPOILERS FLAPS
BRAKES REVERSE_THRUST POWER
STEERING OTHER CONTROL APPLICATIONS .
A/C CONFIGURATION AT ZHPACT
GEAR L _LG R MLG NOSE GR
EST.--FJJEL-QT, GAL. NO. I NO. 2 CW NO. 3 NO. 4
AT IMPACT - A/C SPEED RATE OF DESCENT
IMPACT "G" LOADS - FWO DOWN SIDE
WING DAMAG/PUEL SPILL
HOW AND WHERE SPILLED
WING BOX RUPT BY GEAR SEP OR ENGINE STRUT SEP
QUANTITY SPILLED MAJOR MOO MINOR
SEPARATION AT W.S. - LEFT RIGHT
X-RUPT X-EXPLO. TANK RUPTURE NO. I NO. 2 CW NO. 3 NO. 4
ENGINE SEPARATION NO. I NO. 2 NO. 3 NO. 4
ENG. STRUT. SEP. NO. I NO. 2 NO.-3 NO. 4
LOG. GEAR ERR. OR COLLAPSE L MLG B MLG R MLG -- N.G. --
WING lq/EL FIRE _ WHICH TANK(S)
- HHICH ESGINES OR STRUTS
SEVERITY EXTREME MODERATE MINOR ,,,
SOURCE OF IGNITION
HOW LONG (TIME IN SECONDS) AFTER A/C MOVEMENT STOPPED UNTIL FIRE BECAME SEVERE
J
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PDSEL_GE D_MAGE
CA_Ih _ FLOOR DAMAGE _ , ,
fUSELAGE ,'_EAK LOCATIONS (BODY _TA° S) --
'_ r _ SEPARATION PARTIAL SEP.
COCKPIT DAMAGE EXTRF.J4E MODERATE MINOR
_ PASS. SEAT SEP. MOST ---- SOME FEW NONE
GALLEY SEPARATION (WHICH} ,
OVERHEAD STORAGE COLLAPSE
BODY INTERIOR PANEL COLLAPSE .
WHAT DEBRIS HINDERED PASS EVACo
FUSELAG_E/HATCHES WERE - JA]_4_)
- BLOCKED
EXTERNAL FUEL-FIRE ENTERED PASS. AP_ (HOW OR WHERE)
LWH {BOTI_OM) FUSELAGE TORN/RUPT. - EXTREME NOD. -- MINOR --
FUSELAGE FIRE (NON-FUEL) - INITIAL LOC.
- IGNITION SOURCE
SIZE/EXTENT OF BURN AREA
VENTILATION PROBLEM - SMOKE/FUMES
COCKPIT - SEVERE____ NOD. -- MINOR NONE
UNSOWN
PASS CABIN - SEVERE -- NOD. -- MINOR -- NONE -- UNKNOWN
VUSELAGE- TAZLNOUNT_pENGZNEA/C
_zME BURETDEBRISD_.AGED_SELACE(L_TIONS)
- PIRE DEVELOPED IN FUSELAGE i
ENGINE/STRUT FIRE BUI_,ED INTO FUSELAGE
FIRE/SMOKE ENTERED PASS. COMPT. SEVERE NOD. -- MINOR
FIRE (OTHER THAN ENGINE RELATED)
1.56
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CREW & PASSENGER EVACUATION
TIME TO EVAC SURVIVORS (SECONDS)
NU_ER OF PASS. THAT EVACU/_TED THAU ),_NTRANCEDOOBS
_ERG. HATCXES
BODY BREAKS
m,TKNO_I
, .
SLIDES/CHUTES - NOT USED USED 8UCCESSFULLY
SOME _L_LFUNCTED (NO.) -- EFFECTED EVAC.
SO_ RIPPED OR BURNED (NO.) EFFECTED EVAC.
SURVIVORS THROWN OUT THRU BODY BREAKS i_
4 _
NUMBER FOUND IN SEATS PERCENT
IN ,ISLE (ON FLOOR} MOST
OUTSIDE A/C FEW
ONKNOWN SOME, ETC.
CAUSE OF DEATH - TRAUMA - INSIDE A/C PASS/CREW NUMBER
OUTSIDE A/C PERC/_IT
-FIRE/SMOKE - INSIDE A/C MOST
OUTSIDE A/C FEW
-UNKNOWN 8OME, ETC.
PANIC MAY HAVE -- DID OCCUR -- OR UNKNOWN
¥'TALITIES MAY EAVE -- DID -- RESULT FROM THIS
ER_RG. LIGHTING USED NOT USED -- UNI_O_I
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L!
TIME (MIN,) A/C 1'_INED Ab'LOAT ALL OE PART
A/f" HESTS ON I30_POM (PARTIAI_LY OUT OF WATER) .--SLIDES/It_'TS USED N T USED _ UNKNOWNL'_
LIFE VESTS AVAILABLE USED -- NOT USED UNKNOWN
-vl, FUSELAGE REMAINED INTACT _ DROKEN/SEP _ RUPTURED -- UNKNOWN --
_-i_. FATALITIES DUE TO TRAUMA NUMBER
i " DROWNING (INSIDE A/C) ._ PERCFNT{OUTSIDE A/C) MOST
_- UNKNOWN SOME
,JUDGEMENT ITEMS (SEVF_RITY INCLUDES BOTH A/C DAMAGE &
FATALITIES}
GEAR SEPARATION/COLLAPSE CONTRIBUTED TO SEVERITY OF THIS ACCIDENT
DID
MAF HAVE
DID NOT
ENGINE/PYLON SEPARATION CONTRIBUTED TO THE SEVERITY OF THIS ACCIDENT
DID
MAY HAVE
DID NOT
FUEL TANK REPTURE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SEVERITY OF THIS ACCTDENT
DID
MAY HAVE
DID NOT
FLOORS/IX)ORS/DEBRIS CONTRIBUTED
DID
MAY HAVE
DID NOT
BELTS/SEATS
DID
MAY HAVE
DID NOT
FUSELAGE BREAK/SEPARATION CONTRIBUTED TO SEVERITY OF THIS ACCIDENT
DID
MAY HAVE
DID NOT
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APPENDIX D
Review/Appraisal of the U.S. Army's,
Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide
USARTL-TR.79.22A,B,C,D,E
for Other Applications
D.L. Parka
D.W. Twigg
ABSTRACT
The newest update to the U.S. Army's Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide for Army aircraft was
reviewed for ideas that might apply in other systems and therefore bear further research.
Philosophically, many features were compatible with the philosophy and practices for commercial
systems. However, the Guide does not make allowances for widely varying differences in crash
characteristics and inherent energy absorption features from one system to another, e.g., from
small rigid body aircraft with minimal subfloor volume for energy absorption to large flexible body
aircraft with large subfloor volume for energy absorption. Additionally, the orientation is for
survival under any circumstances _hat Army operations might encounter--a far more hazurdoua
set of circumstances than will occur for commercial veldc|_. Accordingly, this appraisal does not
get into all criteria in the Guide but instead provides a review of those features that may bear
further consideration in research and development studies.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The purl_,of the present study is to review and critique the new U,S, Army'a (',rashSurviwll l)e_dgu
(|uide (ref, 1)-1)for research ideas that might ultimately benefit commercial uircraft safety end thus
bear further research attentiun to resolve potential value in conmwreial air_'raftapplie_ilone. It is also
intended to distinguish these elmnents which may and which may not readily transfer from light and
small rigid body aircraft to large flexible body transports.
The authors of the new Guide accepted and are to be commended for responding to a major
challenge. They have attempted to refine earlier editions of the Guide and to indicate more room for
trade-ells than earlier issues implied. For example, the third edition of the Army Crash Survival
" Design Guide more carefully constrains the guideline recommendations to the small rigid Ix_dy
airplanes used by the U,S. Army than earlier editions, i,e., the light fixed wing alrcreft and
helicopters, Additionally, the authors indicate many of the trade-ofreend realistic constraints that
must be considered relative to the guidellnce, introducing the possibility of waivers by the Army,
based on trade-ells of objectives versus realistic design constraints. The indicated trade-offs
illimirats potentialproblems in gelle_g within vehicles, and by extension problems in attempts to
_ generalize guidelines developed for the Army to large flexible body commercial airplanes.
Since the 1967 and 1971 versions of the Guide, many areas of progress in development, in test and
evaluation, and in operational experience have added to the fund of knowledge. However, guidelines
or criteria spelled out in the earlier Guide were in fact sometimes unduly restrictive, sometimes
difficult-to-impossible to achieve, and conservative even for the Army objectives. Ill this latest
version of the Guide, these constraints are more apparent, more need for tradcoffs from the
"criterion _ conditions are recognized, and diatinctioua between military and commercial
environments are more obvious. However, and perhaps partially due to the greater autonomy the
Army has as beth purchaser and user, the new Guide does not yet really address minimum
requirements that must be met; the orientation remains one of setting goals as trade-off positions.
The new Guide is in five volumes, In this appendix, information is abstracted, collated and
_:.. synthesized across the five volumes to integrate the information into one single abstract summary.
This summary is a synthesis and critique of the U.S, Army's Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide
in that it is in the main constrained to research possibilities for other systems, Accordingly, it
]B' includes information that may be relevant for commercial aircraft research efforts, and includes
questions regarding the Army Guide position, Since there was significant overlap and some
considerable redundancy between volumes, a major element in the present effort was to abstractand correlate related information from all volumes. Information herein follows the _me general
format. Volume titles and contents are as follows:
Volume I -- Design Criteria and Checklists
Pertinent criteria extracted from Volumes II through V, Provides for updating earlier related
military standards (ref. D-l).
_ Volume H -- Aircraft Crash Environment and Human Tolerance
Crash environment, human tolerance to impact, military anthropometric data, occupant
environment, teat dummies, accident information retrieval.
Volume HI -- Aircraft Structural Craohworthiness
- Crash load estimation, structural response, fuselage and landing gear requirements, rotor
,- requirements, ancillary equipment, cargorestraints, structural modeling.
l(iO
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Volume IV -- Aircraft 8eata, Reatraints, l,ittera, and Padding
!. Operational and crash environment, energy ahserption, neat design, litter requirements,
[ restraint system design, oecupant/rcetraivt system/seat modeling, delcthalization of cockpit
f and cabin interiors.
, Volume V -- Aircraft Peatcrash Survival
Poatcrash fire, ditching, emergency escape, crssh locater beacons, retrieval of accident
information.
General types of subjects covered include:
1. Crashworthiness of Aircraft Structure--The ability of the aircraft structure to maintain , i
living space for occupants throughout a crash.
2. Tiedown Strength--The strength of the linkage preventing occupant, cargo, or equipment
frombecomingmi_ilesduringa crashsequence, r]]
8. Occupant Acceleration Environment--The intensity and duration of accelerations li
experienced by occupants (with tiedown assumed intact) during a crash.
4. Occupant Environment Hazards--Barriers, projections, and loose equipment in the
immediate vicinity of the occupant that may cause contact injuries.
5. Postcrash Hazards--The threat to occupant survival posed by fire, drowning, exposure, etc.,
-- following the impact sequence.
To date three editions of the Guide have been released, the first in 1967, an update in 1971, sad a
totalrevisioni 1979.
BACKGROUND DISCUSSION
As aammariz_ inthenew AircraftCrashSurvivalDesignGuide,theU,S.Army Transportation
ResearchCommand {now the AppliedTechnologyLaboratory,Researchand Technology
LaboratoriesoftheU.S.Army AviationRceea_h and DevelopmentCommand (AVRADCOM)
initiateda long-rangepmgcam intheearly1960s,withtheobjectivetostudyallaspectsofaircraft
safetyandsurvivability.From thispregram,itwas intendedtodetermineimprovementsincrash
survivalthatcouldbe made ifconsiderationweregivenintheinitialircraftdesigntogeneral
survivabilityfactors;figureD-1.1expandson aspectsof°Ccashwortl_inem_ as definedby the
newestversionoftheGuide.
Inordertodeterminewhichcriteriaandguidelinesmightbeappropriateforcommercialaircraft
forpresentpu_sos, itwas nseemmrytodeterminethepurpossof individualguidelinesand
crit_ria.The reasonisthatcriteriaand guidelinesarenotusuallydirectlytransferable.For
example, design criteria levels in the Guide are not based on theory; rather they are obtained by
estimating the crash loads which occurred in past crashes of light, rigid body Army aircraft. In
turn, s number of related assumptions were involved. Large, flexible body cummercial aircraft
with a large cargo hold in the lower fuselage are clearly different in design features that will affect
crash loads and probable dynamic responses in direct contrast to those expected for the smaller
and lighter rigid body Army aircraft. Accordingly, the conditions upon which criteria are based
must differ.
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The new Aircraft Army CrashSurvival DesignGuide gives three distinctly different dsscriptioamof the
purpoae of crashworthy designs, but all with the same criterion levels: (1) to eliminate mmecessary
injuries and fatalities in relatively mild impacts (COMMENT:"unnecessary" is not dofined), [2) to
contain occupant deceleration levels within human tolerance in severe crash environments, or (3)
(bynumerens implications) to survive any crash "combat ready _,All three criteria in the Guide refer
to the same deceleration levels, In contrast, Federal Air Regulation Part 25 (FAR 25) states that
design for commercial aircraft is "to give each occupant every reasonable chance of escaping
serious injmT in a minor crash landing" when using restraints and other safety provisions, with
,- _ landing gear up, and with lower deceleration loads and uses a correspondingly lower criterion level.
On the surface, the first two goals of crashworthy design stated in the Guide (to eliminate
_. unnecessary injuries and fatalities in a minor crash and to auure survival in a severe crash--still a
" somewhat speculative outcome) may seem consistent. In actuality, the two goals are frequently in
opposition. A design feature designed to operate at low crash loads to prevent injury is often
inefficient at high crash loads, and presence of the feature may in fact degrade the overall
performance at the high loads. This is an extension of the comfort versus safety prohlem--a
system designed to be comf rtable at low crash loads may very likely be less "safe" at igh crash
loads. An example is the 5 mph barrier crash requirement in the automotive industry, Bumper
systems designed to provide 100% protection (to the car) at 5 mph may provide less protection at
higher speeds than might otherwise be the case. Unfortunately, the Guide appears to treat these
criteriaasthoughtheywereinterchangeable.
"Survivable"commercialaircraftaccidentsaregenerallynearairportswhereexternalassistance
forevacuationandquickmedicalattentionareavailable.Thus,eventheinjuredhaveareasonable
chance for survival. This is in stark contrast with military crashes, which may occur in a combat
zone without prospect of external aid so that the need for self sufficiency is more pronounced.
_: Goals to totally avoid injury are vastly different from goals to reduce injury potential or otherwise
improve safety in even the feasibility of implementing practical improvements.As its own regulator and consumer, the Ar y can set and adjust goals and thus need not
distinguish between crashworthiness goals, guidelines, and criteria. As pointed out in Volume If,
the Army may itself opt to retain, adjust, or waive any of same when compliance is demonstrated
_'_ to involvean unacceptablecompromisein systemobjectives,performance,or costs.These
_ distinctions are, accordingly, not rigidly observed in the new Guide. Neither the lack of distinction
_ ingoals,guideLinesand criteriauorwaiversarepcactlculintheciviliane vironment.Rulesare
lawsthatmust bemet withoutexceptionandcannotbetradedoffwhen a givenrequirementis
demonstratedtobe impractical,orshown toeffecta seriouscompromisesome othernspsetof
systemoperation.
ItshouldbeemphasizedthattheArmy'sdesignguidewas writtenexpresslyfortheArmy'slight
aircraft(helicopterand singlenginepropeller),whichmust include,by definition,perations
involvinga varietyof"normal",training,remoteaustere,and combatsituations.The aircraft
consideredfortheupdatedversionoftheguidewereconstrainedtoa vehiclemissiongrossweight
of12,500poundsorless.
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2.0 DEFINITIONSOF TERMS
i
The (|uulc defines epecializcd tcrme related to creshworthiuese at the begmmng of tach volume.
_,veral of these definitions are paraphrased l_crcin for the convenience of the reader.
GENERAL TERMS
Abrupt Decelerations -- Describes the short duration shock accelerations primarily associated
with crash impacts, ejcctinn seat shocks, capsule impacts, etc. One second is generally accepted as
the dividing point between abrupt and prolonged acesleratio,m. Within tile extremely short
duration range of abrupt accelerations (0.2 sec and below), the effects on the human body are
limited to mechanical overloading (skeletal and soft tiseue stresses), there being insufficient time
for functional disturbances due to fluid shifts.
:iI. COMMENT:Within the Guide, high loads used to define criteria are less than one second durationand most typically le_ than .050 see. The authors state that this region is where effects on the
human bodyare limited to mechanical overload of structure and tissue since time is too short for fluid
shifts. In large commercial aircraft, pulses are generally accepted as ranging up to 0.2 to
0.25 seconds.
Human Tolerance -- A selected array of parameters that describe a condition of human body
dscelecative loading, i.e., a crash pulse for which it is believed there is a reasonable probability of
survival without major injury (this is also termed "whole-body toleraAce_). "As used in this volume
(liD, designing for the limits of human tolerance refers to providing design features that will
maintain these conditions at or below their tolerable levels to enable the occupant to survive the
given crash environment."
Human tolerance to the crash environment is a function of many variables, including unique
characteristics of each person as well as the impinging loads. Loads are transmitted from the seat.
the restraint system and the surrounding environment. Tolerability depends on load direction,
body orientation, and the critical nature of the load relative to a body member. For example,
conditions wherein the belt rides up off the iliac crests of the pelvis may contribute excessive
abdominal loads, or skull fracture may result from head contact, or the type of loads applied to the
spine may create injury.
COMMENT:Definition implies that it is possible and practical to design to human tolerance limits
and assure era'rival without exception; in actuality, other text dearly indicates this to be
considered a goal which is not necessarily achievable. Resulting implications are misleading to the
newcomer to the field.
The Term"G"-- Refer_to the ratio of acceleration encountered to that from gravitational attraction
on a given body at sea level, (i.e., relative to 32.2 ft/asc2). In use herein, "G" increments are
referenced in multiples of same, so 5 G is 5 times the normal forces on the body.
Survivable Accident -- An accident in which the forces to the occupant(s) are within tolerance
limits and the surrounding structure remains substantially intact to provide a livable volmne
throughout the crash sequence.
COMMENT:Definition of survivability varies between volumes of the Guide. One is to "eliminate
unneceseary injuries and fatalities in rehtively mild impacts" (Volume 1).Another is to "minimize
occupant accelerations to survivable levels in a severe crash environment tVulumc II).
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Survival Envclope -- The range of impact conditions wherein thc eccupiablo area of the aircraft
remains substantially intact, (i.e., wherein forces transmitted to occupants do not exceed the limits
of human tolerance when state-of, the-art restraint aystams are used). As a precauticn, accident
investigation will not necewrily show that survivable conditions may not have existed in an
accident that may appear from postcrash inspection to have been survivable; elastic recovery from
crash induced deformation can mask actual crash conditions.
Submarining -- The rotation of the hips under and through the lap-belt as the belt slips up and off
the iliec crests of the pelvis caused by forward inertial loads on the legs. "Lap-beltslippage" can be
a direct result of the upward loading of the shoulder harness straps at the _.entsrof the lap-belt.
• (figure D-2.1, from ref. D-2).
Dynamic Overshoot - The amplification of decelarative force on cargo or personnel above the
impact deceleration force resulting from dynamic response of the system. For example, a loose
system can dramatically increase peak loads.
SEATING GEOMETRY
See figure D-2.2, from MIL-STD-1333, MIL-STD-850, and U.S. Army's Aircraft Crash Survival
Design Guide (ref. D-3, D-4, and D-l).
Design Eye Position -- A reference datum point based on the eye location that permits the specified
vision envelope required by MIL-STD-850, allows for slouch, and is the datum point from which the
aircraft station geometry is constructed. The design eye position is a fixed point in the crew station,
and remains constant for pilots of all statures via appropriate seat a_ustment.
Horizontal Vision Line -- A reference line passing through the design eye position parallel to the
true horizontal and normal cruise position.
Back Tangent Line -- A straight line in the midplane of the seat passing tangent to the curvatures
of a seat occupant's back when leaning back and naturally compressing the back cushion. The seat
back tangent line is positioned 13 in. behind the design eye position as measured along a
perpendicular to the seat back tangent line.
Buttock Reference Line -- A line in the midplane of the seat parallel to the horizontal vision line
and tangent to the lowermost natural protrusion of a selected size of occupant sitting on the seat
cushion.
Seat Reference Point (SRP) -- The intersection of the back tangent line and the buttock reference
line. The seat geometry and location are based on the SRP.
Buttock Reference Point -- A point 5.75 in. forward of the seat reference point on the buttock
reference line. This point defmce the approximate bottom of an ischial tuberosity, thus
representing the lowest point on the pelvic structure and the point that will support the most load
during downward vertical loading.
Heel Rest Line -- The reference line parallel to the horizontal vision line pessing under the tangent
' to the lowest point on the heel in the normal operational position, not necessarily coincidental with
the floor line.
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II
Design eye position
Horizontal in.
vision line
t desired
I_ minimum
back angle
Thigh tangent _ 31.5 in.
/line o
I • :k tangent
/ . _/ I line
90 o Buttockreference
; ,' line
/ _/I0 ° minimum reference point al_ --
/ ' 20 • maximum -5.75 in.
,_. / / for hell- _--Horizont
copters, reference point kplanes
_- ' 5° minimum \"'---'--l../-- for others Heel rest line
(Not necessarily the floor)
Figure D-2.2 - Seating Geometry (From Army CSDG)
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STRUCTURAL TERM8
AirframeStructuralCraabworthincss--The abilityof an airframestructuretn maintaina
prcmtectiveshell around occupants {luring a crush and to minimize magnitudes of avcelerations
applied to the occupiable portion {_fthe sir{,raft during crash impacts.
Structural Integrity - The ability of a atructur_ to sustain crash loads without collapse, failure, or
deformation of sufficient magnitude to cause injury to personnel, or prevent the structure frmn
performing as intended.
Static Strength -- The maximum static load that can be sustained by a structure, often expressed
as a load factor in terms of G.
Strain - The ratio of change in length to the original length of a loaded component.
Collapse-- Plasticdeformationofstructuretothepointoflossofusefuloadcarryingability.
Althoughnormallyconsidereddetrimental,incertaincasescollapsecanprogressina controlled
fashion,maintainingstructuralIntegrity.
LimitLoad--Ina structure,limitloadreferstotheloadthestructurewillcarrybeforeyielding.
Similarly,inan energy-absorbingdeviceitrepresentsheloadstwhichthedevicedeformsin
performingitsfunction.
Load Limitar,Load-LimitingDevice,orEnergyAbsorber--Thcseareinterchangeablenamesof
devicesusedtolimitheloadina structuretoa preselectedvalue.Thesedevicesabsorbenergyby
providinga resistiveforceappliedoveradeformationdistancewithoutsignificantelasticrebound.
Bottoming--The exhaustionofavailablestrokingdistanceaccompaniedby an increaseinforce,
e.g.,a seatstrokingintheverticaldirectionexhauststheavailabledistanceand impactsthefloor.
7,,
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3.0 AIRCRAFT CRASH INFORMATION
Authorsof th_ i)t_ent edition of the U,S, An_y's Aircraft Crash _urvival Design Guido recogniT_and
accept that trl,de-offs must be accomplished relative to earlier sta_(I criteria, New gen(_rationArmy
I_ aircraft are being procurredwith stringent crashworthine_ ro.quir_,mente,based on "gfith percentile
survivable accidente" ss defined in an earlier study (ref. I)-5). The new Guide emphasizes that
con_ponent changes recommended by earlier editions, or tho_] that might be implemen_d in
attempts te resolve more s_cific problems, muy not numningfully improve erashworthinese in some
ii fixed system designs. Accordingly, the authors Imint out that retrnfit improvements are limited and
, may result in prohibitive weight and cost pel_alties if requirements are too _vere or too rigidly
, applied, although some retrofit packages ere feasible. Individual _ch )logical up.sisals _eome
nseessary,
Army aircraft for which this present Army study was intended include rotary wing and fixed wing
aircraft under 12,600 pounds, the small rigid body aircraft used in the Army mission. These aircraft
are relatively unyielding during crash impact unless speeifie design provisions arc incorporated.
Anything exceeding the equivalent of u free fall of 100 ft in any of these aircraft is considered to be
nonsurvivable. Resulting aircraft-related criteria arebased on design factors that might be applied to
such aircraft in order to reduce the degree to which human tolerance criteria might be approached,
and thus improve survivability.
Human tolerance in the crash environment is the basic criterion for crsuhworthinese, and is related
to acceleration magnitude, duration and rate of change. Crash environment data discussed in the
Guide and herein relates information on factors that can be used to cnbencc this environment, Other
factors influencing survival are:
1. Structural collapse, from impact or supporting large mass during impact
2, Structural elastic deformation
3, Structural penetration
4. Structural strength protecting egress operation
5. Structural strength of landing gear and seat restraint support system
COMMENT:Three different survivability goals are indicated or inferred in the new Guide, One is to
elhninate "unnseessary" injuries and fatalities in relatively "mild"impacts. A second is to design "for
the limlta of human tolerance'...to maintain conditions at or below their tolerable levels to enable the
occupant to survive the given crash environment. A third is implied, to survive any crash and be
"combat ready."
BACKGROUND DISCUSSION
The Army approach to improving survivability has been in two stakes, first by improving the
"eraehworthiness" of existing aircraft as practicable, then by influencing design of new aircraft
through aseurin_ consideration of improved capabilities. Army objectives for their "ersehworthy"
' aircraft relate to minimizing injuries and fatalities and controlling structural damage so that "a
survivable environment is more likely to be maintained." Army criteria were related to combat goals,
_" in order to produce a positive morale factor and improve combat effectiveness. The army
accordingly gives great emphasis and apparently considerable funding to maximize protection
afforded to occupants by each subsystem without really addressing what minimum requirements
169
O0000002-TSF13
tmight be. Inprovidiug maximum protection aa the anthers of the updated Al_ny Gradesee it, a vert'ezd
crash impact is a series of energy absorbing strokes that occur as componentsdifferent
ductile
_' yield. They use landing gear stroking to absorb a significant amount of energy', the fuselage
contributes to abserption and pruvides a protective shell for occupants; the floor, seat, and restraint
systems contain occupunts within the shell and provide additional energy absorption to reduce
c_;upant decelcrative loading. Additionally, weapon sights, cyclic e_ontrela,glareshields, instrument
panels, armor, and structure are to be delethalized.
COMMENT:The authors of the new Army Guide do not follow the more common engineering
, practiceof allowing a cumulative system credit bssod on a summation of capabilities for components
to some minimum requirement goal for energy absorption. Instead, they emphasize maximmn
protection possible from each subsystem, taking the position that it is not possible to simply specify
human tolerance and vehicle crash conditions. For example, they take the position that designers
must also consider probable crash conditions wherein all subsystems cannot perform their desired
functions, e.g., no landing gear absorption of impact energy, since helicopters may not contact the
ground via the landing gear. Criterion levels that are actually oriented to maximum possible
performance are thus also recommended in the Guide for each individual subsystem, e.g., ;n energy
absorption requirements for seat and restraint systems.
This amounts to extremely conservative engineering practice, since cumulative capabilities are
accepted standard practice and since most design criteria are based on specifying minimum, not
maximum,requirements. Opinions, practicality, and even estimates of feasibility will vary, creating a
difficult-to-impossible situation. Secondly, design goals are not usually specified or accepted as a
design practice. Additionally, the practice of generalizing from the worst case for one system to
other aircraft that seldom, if ever, encounter that case is hard to justify (e.g., generalizing vertical
loading criteria from upside down landing of a helicopter, or using helicopter based impact loads that
are due to rotor thrashing, to set criteria for fixed wing aircraft with their vastly different impact
circumstances).
AIRCRAFT CRASH ENVIRONMENT
Statisticalstudieswereconductedtodetermineimpactconditionsforrotarywingandlightfixedwir_g
aircraftofmissiongrossweightno greaterthan12,500poundsduringtheperiod1960through
1965,and 1971through1976(VolumeHI)(alsoref.6).Casesselectedhad atleastonesurvivor
andoneormoreofthefollowingfactors:(1)substantialstructuraldamage,(2)postcrashfire,(3)
personnelinjuries.Numeroussevereaccidentswereexcludedfromconsideration,suchasmidair
collisionsrfreefalldropsof100ftormore because,"Suchaccidentsalmostinvariablyresultin
random,unpredictablecrashkinematicsandnonsurvivableimpactforces,andareoflittlevaluein
establishingrealistic rash survival envelopes that would be useful to the
aircraft designer."
COMMENT:In view of typical impact speeds compared to helicopters and light aircraft, most large
commercial aircraft accidents may fall in this high load category.
conditionswerefoundtobesimilarf omrotarywingtolightfixedwingSTOL aircraft,and, ]Impact
exceptforlateralconditions,weretreatedasbeingthesame.Impactvelocitiesw re"known"for
whatappearstobeasomewhatarbitrarilyselectedsampleof40 aircraftoutof600+ accidentshat
were reviewed (with errorain estimated impact velocity "probably"not exceeding + 20%), but could
not be established for other aircraft crashes. One half the vehicles that could be appraised were
estimated to experience a vertical velocity change of 24 ft/sec or less (equivalent to free fall of 8 ft,
11 in.), and 95% were estimated to experience a vertical velocity change of 42 ft/sec or less
(equivalent to free fall of 27 ft 5 in.). Longitudinal velocity changes were approximately 28 ft/sec for
the 50th percentile and 50 ft/sec for the 96th percentile crash.
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Impact accolorsfionmwere estimated by the original accident investigation board and recalculated by
the survey team. Additional analyei, was perfonned for cases that "appeared to be near the upper
limits of survivability," The 40 aircraft u_d were selected from an overall review that covered 563
rotary wing and 92 fixed wing aircraft, of which 373 were used to establish impact conditions.
Impact attitudes were alas used from tile added collectien ef crash data for 108 attack helicopters
and 10 cargo helicopters for the period 1971 to 1976. The statistically meet frequent impact
involved trees. It wa_ famed that loeae _il could bebeneficial, or alternatively could actually increase
decelerations (e.g,, if the structure dug into the ground).
Since insufficient lateral data were available, lateral velocity changes were inferred from
" circumstances of the helicopter and light aircraft accidents to be 25 ft/sec, supplemented by recent
i studies suggesting 30 ft/aec. Based en the above the thrce-dimensienai resultant for velocity
• changes did not appear to exceed 50 fVsec, although vector summing is s_ identified as
inappropriate.
i Floor decelerations were estimated from the foIlewing equation; however, this may well overestimateGave if the peak in fact occurs early in the pulse (see appendix D-A, fig. 1).
V2
Gave = 2_
Overall, the authors concluded that 95% of the "survivable" helicopter and light fixed wing aircraft
accidents involved average vertical accelerations of less than 24 G (with "peak"accelerations of 48
G, assuming triangular pu_se shape). Average longitudinal accelerations wore 15 G and average
lateral accelerations were 16 G (most particularly during auto rotation into trees, fuselage rotation,
then lending on the side). ActuaLly, most accidents occurred with small yaw and roll angles.
Accidents involving pegtcreali fire were considers _ where possible, but burn damage in many
accident_ precluded analysis ef impact forces. Still ott_ersprovided insufficient or inadequate data
for detailed case analyds.
Earlier impact criteria u_-_iby Army were based on an early decision to increase crash survivability
that appearsto have been somewhat arbitrary (Army Crash Survival Design Guide, first and second
editien) to a level based on a study in the 1960 to 1965 time period (Halay, ref. D-6) which defined
a survivable crash a_any crash with at least one survivor, and setting objectives for Army aircraft to
the 95th percentile loads for such conditions, The authors of the new Guide emphasize that, new
that serious attempts to meet the criteria have been incorporated to some extent in a number ef Army
aircraft, it would be a mistake to continue using a floating baseline (i.e., the 95th percenti]_ crash)
since it could only lead to a never-ending increase in crashworthinese at the expense ef aircraft
perfermance. Accordingly, the 95th percentile criteria i_ dropped in the new Guide_nd the design
pulse derived in the earlier effort continues to be recommended for Army use (figure D.3.1).
COMMENT:The rationale for selecting only 40 aircraft for the sample analysis not totally clear.
There is a reasonable likelihood that many of the cases that were, accordingly, not included in the
study could very well have been mere mild but were not survived fur some ether reason than
deceleration, such as fire. Additionally, much is based on the very cenmrvative case ef a 95th
percentile accident; however, data reported within the Guide suggest a factor of 2 + in magnitude
between the 90th and the 95th percentile accident, which varies considerably from the normal
magvitude of the "ruestatistical differencebetween 90th and 95 percentile (a 20% change rather than
a 200% change). There is no clear justification for the 90th or 95th percentile survivability goal to be
adopted, other than as an arbitrary goal for which the degree ef feasibility remains to be determined.
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Figure D-3. 1 - Typical A/rcraft Floor Acceleration Pulse (From Army CSDG)
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The 95th percentile objective was _pparcntly adopted as eudx an arbitrary obj_tive for the Army,
which has the option ta set goals and determine feasibility in a specific design context, and then also
has the authority to _ aive tho_e elements that are not considered feasible and practical within the
c',mW,xt of Army needs.
C,mtinued Cmnment: Now, after _everal years experience, the general al_preach and commentary
i,rcsented by pre_nt authors suggest that the "critm.ia"are really guidelines and goals from which
practical trade-offe must be made. Additionally, the exclusion of certain types of severe accidents
causes no problems for the analysis of light aircraft crashes for Army purposes and given their
freedom to waive guidelines. A light aircraft accident of sufficient severity to have "random,
unprectible crash kinematics" would rarely have a survivor. This is not true in the commercial
environment. Because of the size and inherent energy absorption from body flexing of a large
_- commercial aircraft, crash forces to which the occupanta are exposed can vary considerably through
lhe aircraft. It is not uncommon for there to be a few survivors even in a severe accident at flight
speedsand with "unpredictable crash kinematics." Thus the methodology for establishing crash load
criteria developed in the Guide should not be applied to commercial aircraft.
AIRFRAME STRUCTURAL CRASHWORTHINESS
In the updated Guide, discussion starts with the basic requirements for survival, i.e., a protective
structural envelope and the attenuation of impact forces. Basic design goals/requirements are also
_.. stated, recognizing that improvements may be feasible but using qualitative terms in recognition that
achievements wiU be limited.
AIRFRAME CRASHWORTHINESS
General Design Considerations--The U.S. Army'eAircraft Crash Survival Design Guide appears to
_ be specifically intended to define criteria for vehicles designed to support the Army capability "to
conduct prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. _ All the combat ground-
support functions described involve the potential of exposure to enemy fire while at some
nominal altitude, i.e.:
!. Command, control and communications
2. Intelligence
3. Mobility
4. Fire power
5. Combat service
support
JB The Army inventory includes beth helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft. The maximum capacity of
_: any listed aircraft is a crew of 2, with 20 pa_engers. The helicopter inventory usedfor such
parpoees includes (figure D-3.2):
1. Observation (OH)
__ 2. Attack(AH)
3. Utility (UH)
il 4. Cargo (CH)
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5, Training (TH) {with its own spt_ial ¢asoa_
I Fixed-wing aircraft include (figure 3.3)
I. U-IO
4
i; 2. u.s
4. U-8
5, C-12
6. UV-18
7, OV-1
However, the authors suggest that information preeented in the airfram_ 'n sa
volume (Volume HI) applies to any light aircraft.
They qualify this in the same paragraph, in a statement that the impact environment is similar for
all types of existing light fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft except for lateral impact. Lateral
impact levels for cargo and attack helicopters are said to compare to light fixed wing aircraft, and
other helicopters experience a more severe lateral impact environment.
The authors go on to state that experience and reason indicate that there will continue to be
accidents that threaten occupant survival. However, their position is "acceptable aircraft
structures should always provide the greatest possible degree of occupant protection from crash
conditions. All available information should be considered ... to ensure that new designs will
be'aceeptebly' crashworthy." They consider desirable conditions to include multiple load paths to
keep the structure intact in spite of localized damage. However, they recognize that excessively
strong structure does not necessarily meet this objective; in the nonyielding modes, it will
contribute high acceleration and involve beth weight penalties and e_lergy absorption constraints.
The 95th percentile design load limits based on severecrash accelerations in this guide sot several
new criteria comp._red to the earlier version; they also tend to shift the emphasis from peak
accelerations to average accelarationa, Their requirements (for a severe crash) compared to FAA
requirements for a minor crash are shown in figures D-3,4 and I).3.5.
Impact conditions may include:
Helicopter
1, Vertical impact from power failure during low power maneuver at low altitude
2, Inverted impact (and other impact attitudes) following rotor contact with wires, trees, etc.
Light fixed-wing
I. Vertical impectwith stall near ground
175
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• impact Acceleration Pulse
• direction Velocity duration,
(aircraft change, ,Iv Peek Average &t
axes) (ft/sec) (Q) (<3) (sea) Comments
I
_, Longitudinal 50 0.104 Triangular
;: (Cockpit) deceleration
_. pulse:
- _t_
Longitudinal 50 O.130
(Cabin)
i Vertical 42 0.054
Lateral 25a 0.097 &t calculated
30b 0.104 from known or
assumed values
for Gpeak and &v:
2Or)
At =._
g Gpeak
_' a) Light fixed-wing aircraft, attack and cargo helicopters.
b) Other helicopters.
Figure D-3.4 - Summary of Crash Impact Condition= for Helicopters and Light-Fixed-WingAkcraft Design
177
00000002-TSG07
Comparedt_ the figure 3.4 data, commercla]aircraft size certifiedaccording
to FAR PART 25.561,EmergencyLandingConditions,Para (b) which requiresthat
"...thestructurebe designedto give each occupantevery reasonable
chanceof escaping serious injury in a minor crash landingwhen
! .
i (I) proper use is made of seats, belts and all other safety
design provisions;
(2) the wheels are retracted(whereapplicable);
and
i (3) the occupantexperiencesthe followingultimate inertia
i forces acting separatelyrelativeto the surroundingstructure:
(i) upward 2.0g
(ii) forward9.0g
(iii) sideward1.5g
(iv) downward4.5g or any lesserforce that will not
be exceededwhen the airplaneabsorbsthe landing
loads resultingfrom impactwith an ultimatedescent
velocityof five f.p.s, at design landingweight."
Verticalloadingto 6.0g for a type I (transport)seat was later
imposedto accommodategust loads (TechnicalStandardOrder TSO 37.136,
AircraftSeats and Berths,TSO C3qa; and NationalAircraftStandard
(NAS)BOg, Specification-AircraftSeats and Berths,JanuaryI, 1959).
3g cargo nets are used, which are also cited in the Guide as used
by the U.S. Air Force in the USAF 463C pallet systemwith "statistically
rare likelihoodof causing injury."
FigureD-3.5 -FARPa_ 25 C#_na
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2, Longitudinal impact with obstacles, (e,g,, mountains, ground obstacles) or nose.down diving
attitude
3. Cartwheeling
Secondary impacts such as hitting a ridge after the initial crash are "generally less severe for
occupants." Hazards from detached components (e.g., engines), penetration (e.g., by trees), and
fire and water become more severe.
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
In the Guide's discussions of helicopter and light fixed-wing aircraft crashes, it is stated, ...'The
structural damage that produces occupant injury is generally the same for both types of aircraft.
Structural damage in _evere accidents cannot be avoided. However, improvements in airframe
structure and optimization of element dletributioncan work to control hhe manner in which structural
damage occurs so that a survivable environment is more likely to be maintained."
The structural scenario is one of localized deformation at contact until kinetic energy is absorbed
over arelatively long stopping distance or until enough structure is involved to producea significantly
shorter and higher deceleration force. Likelihood of damage increases with build up of large
decelerative forces, which may in turn cause aircraft buckling and compression of the protective
cabin shell. Cabin deformation may be reduced by permitting parts to break free on impact; however,
this may produce no significant reduction in impact loads.
Variations on this Army scenario of crash loads, direction and build-up include: (1) Longitudinal:
deformation of forward areas in such a way as _ form a scoop which picks up earth. Alternatively,
the nese might roll under the aircraft. In more direct, head-on crashes into the ground, the nose
generally deforms to destroy the occupied section. (2) Vertical: from high sink rate or roll-over which
crushes occupiable volume, or transmits high raft/ca! _lnadsto the occupants. (Lateral toll-over
occurs with helicoptem). (3) Lateral impacts: from rotor actions or roll-over that relates to the high
center of gravity with hollcoptera and from spin-in with light fixed wing aircraft. (4) Lateral or
longitudinal: transverse bending loads may deform or rupture the shell; (5) Any of the crash
scenarios may create floor buckling which may degrade integrity and strength of floor structure, or
lending gear may penetrate the fuselage; and rupture of fuel or ignitable fuel containers is a frequent
cause of fire.
DESIGN REQUIRI_ENTS -- (GUIDELINES) GENERAL
According to Guide authors, "aircraft systems should be designed to prevent occupant fatalities and
minimize the number and Severityof occupant injuries to Severities as were defined in figure 13-3.4to
the maximum extent practical." Areas cited for attention include:
1. Deformation of airframe protective shell in a controlled, predictable manner to minimize forces
on occupants and maintain the protective shell, minimizing earth scooping, buckling, and failure
loading of floor structure
• 2. Tiedown strength
!-"- 3. Occupant acceleration environment
i._-_ " '_" 4. Occupant enviromnent__hazards
_-_ 5. Postrrseh hazards
-', 179
.....
!
00000002-TSG09
Stated (helicopter) imtmct criterion eomiitinns are to ram a wall at 15 ft/sec ]ongitudinuily {similar
to low speed antomotlve }romper teat) with the aircrew to both survive and evaeuata_the cockpit,
and with the airframe capable of Iongit odimil (frm_t end contact) of 4{)fl/aec without reducing the
-' eaian cmnpartment by more than 15%,I..
Guidelines include recommendations for sufficient strength to prevent bending or buckling failure,
fuselage to buckleoutward rather than inwan|, personnel to bc positioned away from likely fuselage
_ fracture/failures points, sufficiently strong structure provided around surrounding exits to assure
i. posterash operahility, and cargo tiedowns included that will restrain cargo should fuselage bending
failure occur. Other considerations are to avoid reducing the width of the occupied areas by more
thm_ 15%, or permitting either lateral collapseor structural intrusion of occupiable portionsthat would
be hazardous to human life (including entrapment). Wings and empennage should fail outside the
i occupant protection area. l*lugineand (helicopter) transmission mounts should stay attached and
avoid hazardous displacements. Helicopter rotor blades should not displace in a manner hazardous
to occupants during rollover in roll or pitch (on sod), or from the force generated by strikes by the
outer 10% of rotor spanon an 8-in. diameter rigid cylinder. Failure of the landing gear should not result
in failure of seats, restraint systems, or tiedowns. Load limiter attenuation is suggested, to contain
loads to lese than those produced by 20 fffsec vertical impact velocity.
COMMENT:These goals offer no particular problem as guidelines. However, it is very likely nearly
impossible to assure that such objectives can be met in advance or have been met after the fact.
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT RETENTION
Retention of ancillary equipment at criterion loads is "required. _ Load limiting devices should
minimize the likelihood of equipment to enter an occupant strike envelope. Stowage should provide
easy view of the area and easy, reliable accessibility in a way that cargoshifting or fuselage distortion
will not prevent access. Single motion, five-second removal should be provided. Stowage space for
nonrestrained items that arenot regularly carriedaboard an aircraft should be provided in all aircraft,
T_tisspace should be located so that the items stored in it cannot become hazardous to personnel in
a survivable crash.
Ancillary equipment includes:
I. Emergencyequipment
Oxygenbottles
Fireextinguishers
First aid kits
Portable searchlights
Crash axes
2. Survival equipment
Survival kits
Life jackets
Locatorbeacons
Specialclothing
Foodand water
3. $ubeomponcnts
Panel.type consoles containing control circuitry
Radio and electronic equipment
Auxiliary p<_werunits
IMO
Batteries
Special equipment
4, Miscellaneous equipment
Navigation kits
Bricfcases
Log books
Flashlights
Luggage
Toolboxes
INTERFACE OF RETI_NTION SYSTEMS WITH AIRFRAME, AND CARGO RETENTION
Occupantretentionehouldensurethatoccupantsareretainedinprocrashpositionsduringcited
crashloads.Additionally,occupant/cargoetentionsystemsthatinterfacewithairframeandcargo
restraintshouldutilizetiepointsthatareintegraltotheframe.Load_shouldbeevenlydistributedand
tiedownsshouldhandleloadsattheworstcaseanglewithoutyielding.Loadlimitersshouldbeused
when structureoffuselageand floorisnotstrongenoughtohandlecargocrashloads.However,
netsusedtorestrainsmallcargoshouldfeaturelowelongationcharacteristicsinordertoreduce
traveltoa minimum.Army Guidecargoloadcriteriaare16G peak(8C.,ve)witha longitudinal
velocitychangeof43 ft/socincontrastotheUSAF successfulexperiencewith3 g systems-
USAF 463cpalletsystems.When cargoisstowedbehindthepassengers..."lowercriteria(90th
percentilepulse)areacceptablesincea netdesignedfora givenloadwouldbeloadedtoa lower
valueinmostaccidents,";bythesamereasoninglateralrestraintwithaloadlimiteriscalledoutas
10 G (peak,triangular;5 Gave)and 21 ft/secfroma 90thpercentilecrash.
More specificfactorsinretentioni clude:
1. Crew andpassengerlocationsrelativetocargo
2. Typeofaircraft
3. Likelycrashmodesversustiedownbackupstructure(sin_plest,mosteffectivetiedownshould
be used)
4. Type of cargo restraint criteria, aircraft response to crash load and clearance envelopes
5. Aircraft and cargo tiedown provisions
6. Cargo/personnel clearance envelopes
7. Type of restraint devices available (and potential for deterioration)
Cargo restraint load limitsre are recommended by the authors of the Army Guide°to maintain load
level end control physical motion of shifting cargo to space not occupied by personnel. A buffer
spacing is recommended for personnel aft of the cargo, to allow for restraint system elasticity (for
cargo restraint with a 5 G rebound load). Ailditionally, combining restraint devices of differing
el_ticity and yield points of cable, rope, e_'ap, or chain should be considered since premature failure
of stiffer devices may set off a chain reaction. Guide authors indicate practical limits of displacement
are a significant factor in related trade-offe, but tiedown design loads may also be important.
Although the goal does not appear to be specifically related to personnel safety, the Army Guide
authors recommend design of the cargo floor for 16 G down-loading (peak ar average not stated).
Additionally, protection against forwardand lateral displacement requirements, as well as down and
up are not defined since they are not considered to be as pr'o.ntially hazardous.
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COMMENT:Tile rc_ulting Army recommendations for load limit factors are included in figure D-3.6
which appears to represent some kind of a two-way limit on dynamic and static loading. These
curves are used hy the U.S. Army, hut have not been justified as a new hasis for setting criteria.
CA_mpar_.dto USAF _nd FAA commercial 3 G netting restraint criteria discussed earlier, these criteria
arc quite, conservative. Additionally, tile dr_lmatic change in load level criteria as the "survivable _
erash changes from the 9,Sthpercentile to the 90th percentile is puzzling. Results indicate that this
may not be.true statistical sample. To say the least, it is unusual fora change amounting to a factor of
2 to occur in this percentile spread regardless of the parameter (or, ill other words, aczotmting for
50% of the total range).
AIRFRAME PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS *
Authors of the Guide take the position that certain criteria are applicable whether results are
approximate or precise:
1. Structure surrounding occupiable area must remain reasonably intact, without significantly
reducing space. Otherwise other "efforts to improve survivability .., are futile."
2. Ideally, %tructure should minimize occupant accelerations to survivable levels in a severe
crushenvironment while maintaining the requiredsurvivable volume, retaining large mass items,
interior eqnipmenq seats and cargo," and considering effects from roll over, cabin penetration,
etc.
By U.S. Army philosophy, aircraft structure should first be designed for normal loads, operations,
performance, apace, fatigue life, etc., tb.en secondly to handle normal payload conditions. Then "the
effects of crash loads must be considered to determine where structural modifications are needed to
improve crashworthiness."
COMMENT:This reinforces earlier conclusions of the present critique, that the new Guide gives
greater emphasis to practical improvements for safety and survivability purposes after basic mission
design is completed.
FUSELAGE CONSIDERATIONS
Design of the fuselage can control both the degree of collapse and the level of acceleration
experienced by occupants during a crash. On the one hand, selected regions can be designed to
withstand greater forces without collapse. On the other hand, deformation and collapse of other
structure in unoccupied regions can be used to improve energy absorption potential. Other variables
and trede-offa to be considered include the following related U,S. Army design cor.cepts, However,
design considerations listed below may not be applicable to commercial jet aircraft. For example,
operating speeds for large commercialaircraft hardlymake survival of a 30 ° impact at 130 kn landing
speeds a likely outcome; this is not unlike the evaluation by Guide authors of tOO ft free fall as
unsurvivable.
Related U,S. Army Design Concepts
Longitudinal Impact
t. Methods of reduced earth 8eeopiag for lo_.gitudiaal impact, including deformetiot_ control al_d
use of the overlap from shingling of joints in skin to prevent skin deformation leading to
_,, scooping of earth.
2. Impact angles up to 30 e, including the rapid change in pitch angle to reolign the fuselage with
the impact surface, and associated
IM2
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Figure 0.3.6 - Load Displacement Requirement for Cargo Restraints (From Army CSDG)
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• Fuselage bending failure
• I_ffecta on floor structure
• l)eer_aso in occupant volume
V,,rtical lmpae=t
1. More limited eanrgy absorption stroke
" • Shorter distence, fewer trade-off modelB
• Energy absorption strokes can include:
• Gear
• Fuselage
• Floor
• Seat
• Cushion
2. Control of conditions for vertical collapee
• Dissipation of energy according to where the mass is concentrated,
• Structural design to control both elastic (recovering) and plastic (deforming) energy
absorption and for cabin integrity design to enhance absorption below floor level
Lateral Impact and Ronover Protection, from:
1. Design of butt line beanm, longitudinal floor beams, and main box frames
2. Preventing intrusion by rotor blade and other external members
Other:
1. Energy absorption by incremental rotor whipping and failure, or by wing loading and failure
(wings can absorb up to 5 G)
2. Breakaway wing fuel tanks
3, Engine motmt_ keeping engines (helicopter and front located fixed/wing) attached to basic
structural member
4. Rigid emergency ._xit structure to prevent deforming (to withstand at least a 5 G load)
5. Emergency exit access for rapid egress
6. Fuel Tanks
184
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• Maximum passible distance to oceupiable areas
• Away from probable ignition sources so much as feasible; (engine compartment,
battery, other primary ignition sources)
• Away from probable impact damage, e.g,, landing gear penetration
• Controlled, tank structural deformation, e.g., by regular etructaral shape to
- minimize deformation pressure
• Fuel cell supports to deform without tearing
Materials and Structural Properties
Material contributions to controlled colhpso for failure modes of metallic, nonmetallic and compamte
materials include:
1. Controlled collapse mechanisms
2. Material failure modes that do not produce projectiles
3. Jo!nt designs and fastener selections that control failure mechanisms and minimize the
formation of projectileak
Applications of material properties for crashworthinese include absorption of energy through
structural deformation, degree of protective shell distortion/retention for the occupiable section, use
of surrounding structure as a buffer, and occupant protective devices. Material ductility helps to
ensure that crushing, twisting sad buckling can occur without rupture. Nonsparking material on
impact surfaces helps to reduce post crash fire hazard.
Examples of controlled failure medea inci,,de:
1. Minimize inward buck_Angstructures, such as sidewalls, bulkheads, and floors.
2 ...... Use deforming joinm and attachment fittings to control failure modes.
3. Minimizemateri_'_that suddenly unload with brittle fractmee, causing additional impulse effsote
sad potentiall._ progreesive failures in adjacent structures.
4. MinimizefaJiureeof members that result in penetration by jagged ends into occupied space or
fuel cells, or by failed structure or exterior agents. ]
5. Avoid exceesive distortion of emergency exit surrounds that might constrain the postcrash
opening of doors or windows.
6. Protect flammable fluid containers from penetratisa
Some of the new materials charaetaristice and trede.offs that are already recognized are:
1. Structural designs may aim contribute to controlled deformation.
185
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2. Composilea _we weight, hut have different strength versus ductility prol_,rlies. Additional
e wrgy ahmu'hmg m tt,ri i,_ sh'ait gic areas may I_t'otne neeeat_|ry St leered ete 'gy and load
limiting al_u'hing conceltta frntn the t]uhte are prem,nted in figures D-:t.7 tun] D-'LS.
:l. Alttttllnt| ively, finer tu tt_rials sut'h as heueytyonth and structural reams Fatty achieve zldetlttalx!
energy ai_rhintg per|'orlnant.e, l[owever, minion reqtllrealonLs may lintit tust_.
,I. Tlwrinal ntisotateh of ttcw lnaU_rials may hecoute a problem from uuequal expansion and
cout Factiou due to UOtlnal tempera|ure changes, l_,preaellt_ttive eharueteristio.q are provided in
the Guide.
( .oats'oiled deformation for heheoptel'S t tit peruut ft 11u_, of the lsudmg gear m aver fatal stroke for
_ane impact rattles. Use of landing gear for euergy alw_)rption offers, pohmtiully, a large ahsorpl ion
fsctor for vertical loads (e.g., an 18-in. stroke, 18.25 (| peak, 9.125 Gave, Iosd limited gear at 100%
efficiency would totslly absorb a 42 flJsee impact velocity)• However, little advuntsge from hmding
gear fuilure is suggest_ed fur lengitudinal impact -- at 160 mph, binding gear failure is suggested by
fl_eGuide to absorb enly 1% of the kinetic energy. Additionally, avoiding huzards from gear failure in
identified as a significant problenv, the recoutmeudat_on is u design that ktx,lm the gear away from
the fuselage or front fhuumable fluids, or even sets up the gear to |_, carried away on impact.
CtIMMI_INT:l)istiuctions in ol_,raLiens aud de.sign on the one hand and ill inherent stl'uetot_d flexihility
and ductility on the other hand, when compsring hu'ge flexible body aircraft to the rigk{ Igldy small
aireraft, will make u great deal of difference in both the type, qnslity, and degree to which the ulKwe
structural features might be beneficial. For example, hmding gear are speeif r dly identified as a
potentially large energy ulk,_r_,r in the rigid.body aircraft for low speed vertical impacta, but offer
_iltle energy absorption at "high" speed horizontsl impacte that approximate stall spe_s for large
conuuercial transports. Also. hmding gear locution and the conditions of impact offer a different
situation so far as gear failmx_ is coat'erned Guidelines re tit' i t, t ) ' ' _ , ' ' • ' '
• g d t g t t ntutrueat n are sundur to t xtstlng
FAA requlreutenta.t .g.. o t" fl.rusion ofge.lLr lute theeleetrica and fnelaystemswhen the gear ft|ils.
Accordingly. this m,ction of the Guide effered a nnutber of guidelines and qualifications that bt,ar
consideration in design. Ilowever, quoted criteria levels cannot be upplied to eomnwrcial uircraft
unle_ re,arch can establish levels appropriate to large flexible-i_ody aircraft.
EVALUATION TECHNIQUES
ANALYTICAL METHODS
Smmlat_on may be by unalyttcul models, settle models, et mputt r t todelsand full-scale testa m order
to provide |_th abeervation of complex ink_ractiana and u rational [_tsis for the sequencing of events.
lend_ and modes of failure. Volume 1Hof the Guide Im'm'uta a major sectiou on the basle eletllcnLs of
_mu, of these methods. They will not be uhstraetcd here.
As (mt.tita_t in tile Guide. numeruus computer siululatiou mcdel_ ill psrtieular tin, being develola,d for I i
um_in sinmlution evahtatiotts, kt_olueare boitlg develol,_l for attpport of prelintinal.'y des gtt studies;
othem for more sophisticate_ um,s. The five nadn eh|sm, s of models that are ueed include: i
1. Simplified spring InaaB ntt_lels J i
2. Generalized spring niat_ nttxte_
3. Ilyhrid nn_lt,l$
18t_
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/-outer tuba .Inner tu_ 7
i_ . / . __ller| /
i'L W_a Slot in inner tu_
• (a] Wire banding - absorbs energy by plastic _ndAng
of wire over roller|
\Plaet oal y
Thin-wailed metal roll tube_ _-- defusing
(roll),region
(b) Inversion tu_ - absorbs energy by Inverting
a thin-walled tuba
Inner tu_
(c) Rolling tutus - absorbs energy by rolling wire
helix between concentric tu_
& ,_ Deleted
._ housing :i
\_ J/ (d) Tension pulley - absorbs ane¢_
_...____Jv/ by plastic spreading o( the
pulley housing
Rgure 0-3.? - Examplesof EnergyAbsorbing Devices (From ArmyCSDG) i
J
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_ /
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// ruble provide
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He foam in cente_
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aeml-t ube provldea rout inq
v0rtica! and lAterAl /
erlerqy &bmorptlo_ Outer (;ub4s may be
...... _--T/iI-_¢/ foam 'illod for an
_r_':'._T'1:.:_:_,d._:l_7:',,.o,pt,o,
,0. ,°,:, ,
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double-tube aubp _ruct u_e
around crushab|_ cote provides
verticat and lateral enerqy Absorption
_jj.o.o,oooo,foam provides.... addltlo_al
- • , _ vertical and
Vectlcal impact 3U zmpa ¢
BeAms and bulkheads m_lt
provide progrllllVe collapse
--and anarqy ablorption and
I react vertLcaiw io_qitudlnmi,
and lateral Ifupact loadl
Itructu_-al floor removed)
/P":' \ \
core or • " core face baiaa
fo_m or core aktnm corr_ated
COFe
|necgy-abaorptlon concepts - b_am¢ end b_lkheads
' (vertical InStil, (From Relerence 251
Ftgur_ D-3.8 - Sample of Energy Absorbir;g Concepts (From Army CSDG)
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4. Frame type models
5. Finite-clement models
The first two elsseee differ in level of detail, Frame type models use beam elements instead of spring
elements and lumped or rigid body ma_es at beam element intersections. They may be two-
dimensional or three-dimensional, Hybrid models require static component tests to obtain
mechanical properties of structure. The f'mite-element approach uses more formal approximation
approaches for more discrete definition of structural representation and properties. Finite-element
models tend toward increasing complexity and computational coat, However, none of the modeling
procedures is totally free of testing requirements and analytical judgment. The reason ia the
extremely complex process for vehicle structure deformation under crash loading, whicli involves:
I. Transient, dynamic behavior
2. Complicated framework and shell assemblies
3. Large deflections and rotations
4. Extensive plastic deformations
COMPUTERIZED METHODS OF ANALYSIS (State-Of.The-Art Summary,
Not From Guide)
Impact dynami_ of a real crash involving complicated structural design are too complex for manual
analysis; however, modeling methods offer an eventual capability that could provide a simulation of
all the dynamic interactions. For example, numerous dynamic models of the human body have been
developed for crash impact analysis to predict the response of the occupant, restraint and/or seat
systems.
One-, two-, and three-dimensioual models have been developed. More broadly described in this
present report are:
1. Dynanfic Response Index (DRI) (ref. D-f)
2. SOM-LA (Seat Occupant Model: Light Aircraft) (ref. D.7)
3. PROMETHEUS (now PROMETHEUS HI, two-dimensional mode with restraint performance
integrated with body dynamics and other cutputa similar to SOM-LA) (rot, D.8).
Oeculmat Modelinj Summary
r -. Three oeeupan_simulation computer programs are evaluated in following paragraph with regard to
- their ability to produce useful engineering trade-off data regarding relative safety of a restrained
'. occupant: a one-dimensional model (DKI),a two-dimensional model (PROMETHEUS II1)and a three-
dimensional model (SOM-LA).
The one-dimen4ional (DRD model is usable only for seat ejection evaluation and is of no use for
• evaluating the safety of commercial aircraft. The two.dimensional model (PROMETHEUS HI) i8
suitable for producing sophisticated engineering trade-off data and is being used for thie pu_,
." subject t_ the limitations impend by the two-_,men_ional .eture of the simulation. The thr_
dimensional model (SOM.LA)needs modeling improvements before being usable for engineering
_ 189
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purposes. The needi.'d improvements are t_chnically difficult and fall into the realm of applied
r_,_,urch. Although SOM-LA is not currently adequate for evaluation of restraint sysh:m
_' la,rformsnce, it provides a rough approximation of the gross motion of the occupant for purpe_cs of
i obtaining the dyna,nic loads on the seat structure.
The possibility of merging these programs with a large finite-element computer program such as
I)YCAST is alas considered and a procedure for accomphshing the merging is proposed.
Program Calibration
i Computer modeling of transient structural dynamics is a relatively _lew technology, and standardsdefining what is s good structural dynamics computer program are still evolving, {Occupant-
. simulation is a special type of structural dynamics), As a consequence, each new structural
dymmscs computer programmust individually earn acceptance in the engineering community before
!j its calculations will be utilized by designers.
There are two aspects to acceptance. First, the program must produce believable results. That is,
predicted dynamics should appear reasonable and credible to the designer and the designer should
be confident that the program models the main dynamic effects. To enhance_believability, the
program output should contain, in readable form, information which assists the designer to
understand the dynanuc events (such as time-histories of system forces). Graphic aids are
alsohelpful.
The second ingredient vital to engineering acceptance is demonstration of program accuracy. That
is, demonstration of capability to reasonably predict an actual test. Achievement of predictive
accuracy is usually a very difficult and time consuming process for occupant-simulation codes
because of the nonlinear nature of the problem and the difficulty in obtaining measured values for
dynaudc parameters. The calibration of the PROMETHEUS HI occupant-simulation computer
program will be described to illustrate how this process might work.
Instrumentation data from several sled tests were obtsined from the Federal Aviation Agencies Civil
Aere Medical Institute (CAMI),Physical data for the anthropomorphic dummies were obtained (limb
weights, measurements, spring constraints). Properties were estimated where measured data could
not be found, One of the CAMI tests was then simulated by PROMETHEUS.
When the initial simulation did not provide satisfactory correlation with test data, the problem was
attacked from two directions. First, it was evident that the restraint system model in PROMI,_HEUS
was inadequate, so a more asphisticated mathematical model of the lap belt and shoulder harness
was developed and added to PROMETHEUS. For example, the lap belt was refined to permit the
slipping a_oclated with submarining, the shoulder ham. was refined and ehe_t/ehoulder flexibility !t
was added to appropriately incorporateharnem/body interactions and slipping of the harness on the
: shoulder.
The second approach,which was attempted concurrently with the first, was to purameticaUy vary the
mechanical properties of the simulated occupant (such as neck stiffness and damping) in
PROMETHEUSsimulations and nots the re6altmg trend_.The parametric variations hell_l provide a
feel for the occupant dynamics and nerved as sensitivity studies to identify the iml_rtant dynamic
parameters. Some dynamic effects were obasrved which were not influenced by the parametric
variations; additional modifications were made to the mathematical modeling in PROMETHEUSand
parametric evaluations completed to approximate these effects. Additional cycles of modeling
_" imprevements/paramettlc variations continued until correlation with actual test datawas achieved.
P
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The resulting modeling changes to PROMI_I'HEUS were quite extensive; so much so that the
correlated model was renamed PROMETHEUS llI. Figure D-3.9 smnmarizes the parametric
variation_ und modeling changes required to achieve calibration.
After calibration, an independent test case was simulated with PROMI_'THEUS,producing good
agreement with actual test results involving a real Part 572 dummy in sled testing. Figure D-3.10
indicates the correlation finally achieved.
Review of Occupant Simuintion Computer Programs
Three occupant-simulation models are reviewed in following paragraphs, These consist of a one-
dimensional model (the spring-mass model auociated with the Dynamic Response Index (DILl),and
acomparison of a two-dimensional model (PROMETHEUSIH)and, a three-dimensional model (SOM-
LA).
The models ere examined from two viewpoints -- first, as a tool for engineering design of a
seat/restraint system, and second as a passible candidate for integration into a large structural
dynamics simulation computer program in order to model the complete system (aircraft, seat and
occupant) in a single simulation.
One-Dimensional Model _DR[) -- A one degree of freedom dynamic-response model of a human
occupant has been proposed (ref. D-5). The model consists of a simple linear spring and damper,
and a point mass. The spring is sized by the compressive stiffness of the lumbar vertebrae and the
damper is sized by human vibration tests.
The DR[ is an injury scale associated with this model. The DRI for a deceleration pulse is the ratio of
the peak compressive spring force which occurs when the model is excited by the pulse to the
weight of the point mass. To associate tolerance levels with the DRI, the DRI was calculated for
existing ejection seat designs. The computed DR[ values were plotted against the percentage of
ejections in which spinal injury occurred; the curve thus obtained represents an approximation of
injury probability as a function of DR[.
Both the simple occupant model on which the DR[ is based and the DR[ itself are very limited in
application: the simple model could only be used forcases in which the loading is purely vertical, that
is z such as in ejection seats. It is obviously not applicable to model a restrained occupant under
forward loads', in this ease the main effect is the combined stiffness of the restraint system and the
occupant's pelvis/cheat. Even for +G z acceleration the model is difficult to use since potentially
significant effects, such as the effect of seat pan stiffness, are neglected.
The DRI is based on a model which does not adhere closely to the actual dynamic8 of an ejection.
The seat pan stiffness is not considered, nor is the distribution of body mass along the spine or the
weight of the occupant. Thus, the DRI can be expected to produce useful data only in crashes which
are pretty much like a seat ejection-- that is purely + Gz acceleration, seat pan stiffness similar to the
stiffness of a fighter pilot's seat and the occupant strapped tightly in.
The Army (;rash Survival Design Guide says of the DRI:
"Although the Dymnaie Response Index (DRI) ... is the only model correlated extensively for
eje_tionseat spinal injury prediction, it has serious shortcomings foruse in accident analysis. It
assumes the occupant to be well restrained and erect, so that the loading is primarily
compressive, with insignificant bending. Although such conditions may be assumed for
ejection seats, they are less probable for helicopter crashes, in which an occupant may be
191
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leaning to either aide forbetter visibility at the time of impact. Further, the DRI was corn_lated
for ejection pulses of much longer duration than typical crash pulses."
"Amore detailed model of the spinal colanm would yield more rcaliBticrsaulte, but injury criteria
for the more complex respanscs have yet to be developed. Consequently, the DRI is not
recommended as the criterion for use in designing crashworthy scats."
Reviewof Two-DimeosionalandThre_Dimensional Occupant Simulation Computer Programs -- The
following discussion reviews end compares the two-dimensional program PROMETHEUS HI
(ref. D-8) and the three-dimensional seat,occupant model -- light oircraft (SOM.LA)(ref. D-7).
PROMETHEUS III was developed at Boeing in a series of applications for varied purposes, starting
fl_m the Dynamic Science program,SIMULA. The focus of the moat recent, PROMETHEUS HI, has
been on accurate modeling of the occupant and restraint system. PROMETHEUS IH has since been
used extensively to develop data for assisting in engineering design decisions.
8OM-LA development was apommred by the Federal Aviation Agency through a series of contracte
with various companies and universities. The emphasis in SOM-LA development has been on the
detailed seat model. A new version of SOM-LA, termed MSOM-LA was completed under number
DTFA03-80-C-00098. The occupant model has been upgraded in MSOM.LA.
Development of Basis of Evaluation -- Boeing is one of very few places that an occupant
simulation computer program (PROMETHEUS HI) has been developed and demonstrated
sufficiently to be used as a trade-off tool in the engineering design procem. This experience is
drawn upon to establish criteria for continued evaluation of occupant-simulation computer
programs .......
The design questions for which PROMETHEUS ITI simulations were employed to provide
engineering data were quite varied; the common denominator was that all questions related to
relative occupant safety. Of course, and due in part to the limitations of exmting haman tolerance
date, it is rarely pouible to predict with certainty whether injury would have occurred in a given
crash on the basis of a computer simulatio.n: _ qnestio na may also be unanswered in dummy
tests. However, in most cases, computer simulation is the only practical method for obtaining
trade-off date for specific questions, and on a timely basis.
To be usable for this sort of design question, an o_cupant.simulation computer program requires_..................
two majorattributes, il
First it must be able to model a very general structure (not just a seat), and be able to model contact 1_between the occupant and any pa t of the structure. {Forexample, impact of n occupant with the
seat ahead), i j
'1The second feature is that the program must provide data which may be used for estimation of !
comparative injury potential. This means that:
1. The program must have been calibratedby predicting to test data (preferal_,iyfrom live human !
tests or from dummies demonstrating at least partial correlation with t,uman data).
2. Time-histories of foro_ acting on individual body scgrnente of the occupant model should be
printoutand/ur charted,
3. Time-histories of torques acting in joints of the occupant (e.g., the elbow) should also be
printed and/er charted.
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4. Thne varying interualloads acting on flexible I_-xiyaegm{;nte (such as the hunl_tr spine) should
b_,printed and/or charted.
Of course, the standard software features relating to caw. of program use arc also desirabk_ -- that
is, case of input, automatic data checking, legibility of output, and availability of graphic aids.
e
Comparative Evaluation of PROMETHEUS llI and SOM-LA -- Figures D.3,11, D.3.12, and I)-3.13
censtitute eheeldieta of featttroa needed for engineering design usage of occupant-simulation
computer programB, Checklist items were obtained pragmatically from experience in using
PROMETHEUS[] to develop dmign trade-off date, The amount of use of PROMb.WHEUS[] justified
incorperation of meet cbeckl_t items into PROMETHEUSllI; consequently the lists serve mainly to
indicate desirable improvemants in SOM-LA.An improvedversion of SOM-LAis ne._ed MSOM-LA.
The main improvement in the new model is an improved seat model which is capable of modeling
energy absarptian. The occupant model has also been improved by the incorporation of a flexible
segment representing the lumbar spine.
r I
The major deficiency in PROMETHEUS [] i8 that it has only been possible to perform limited,
exploratorycalibrationagainst live human tset data and forsimilar reasons limited exploration of seat
model dyusmice. Added calibration of this type is desirable. A benefit is that mechanisms within the
two-dimensional PROMETHEUS [] model are easier to comprehend than those within a three-
dimensional model, giving an added plus for initial use of a two-dimensional model in calibration
efforts. Other than development which may be required to achieve such calibration, further model
evolution must consider limitations intrinsic to the two-dimensional nature of the model and
distinguish the conditions for using a 2-D or a 3-D model. Of course, current uncertainties in the level
of human tolerance to transient loads are a constraint that must be observed for either 2-D or
3-D models.
SOM-LA could benefit from beth human data calibration and model improvement (from the
standpoint of usefulness for engineering design), There are two major modeling deficiencies -- the
restraint system modal and the difficulty of modeling nonstandard seats and structure. Both
represent difficult modeling problems in a throe-dimensional environment, and the methods
developed to simulate these features in the two-dimensional PROMETHEUS III computer program
do not readily generalize to three dimensions.
SOM.LA has a very primitive restraint system model, The restraining belts are pinned to the body,
se realistic modeling of a restrained occupant is impossible. SOM-LAalso has limited flexibility in
the type of restraint system which may be modeled. Nonstandard configurations, such as restraint
: _- system with crotch or thigh at.raps could not be simulated, In addition, harnese friction is
implemented incorrectly (friction is crudely eLndincorrectly simulated by reducing the tension in
the strap segment rUaning from the lap belt to the shoulder by 12%). Another serious defect is
_,b that cheat compressibility (which offecte ehoulder harness loads) is not modeled.
!m.- Accordingly, thie simple restraint system model is inadequate for engineering design use for
_'- evaluating restraint system pedormance. It introduces uncertainty into the accuracy of predicted
" body loads and acceleratione, since the dynamic performance of the restraint system is one of the
primary sources and conduits of transmisainn of crash loads to the occupant.
The ,_cund major $OM.LA deficiency is the limited seat structural configurations which may be
•1, simulated. It is possible that more generality is available in MSOM-LA. In addition, it is desirable
that MSOM-LAbe capable of simulating contact between the occupant and an arbitrary structure
_ i (e.g., the baals of the seat ahead). _ finite element "contact problem" is difficult and is the
_- subject of current research (e,g., referenC'eD-8).
.......... . ......... 195
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_' ___R__RR_m__Z__ _
FEATURE PROMETHEUSIll SOM-L____.AA MSOM-LA
- -C 'o )
I I Occupant
Segmentmasses, length, I,D I,D I,D
inertias,c.g.'s.
Mechanicalproperties I,D D D
of joints
II RestraintSystem
Mechanicalpropertiesof I,D I I
lap belt
Mechanicalproperties I,D I I
of harness
Ill Seat
Geometry I,D I I
Construction I,D D I
MechanicalProperties I,O I I
IV Crash Pulse I,O I I
VI Interactive(Conversational)X - -
input feature
I • Input,D = Default (i.e., suppliedby program)
Note I: It is assumedthat the MSOM-LA input is essentiallythe same
as the SOM-LA input.
_ _ Z Z i 2 _ZB B _Si_SaB_ZSiSaI_ _Z_ 2m _ _
Figure D-3.11 - Comparisonof ProgramInput Features
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FEATUR_.__E PROMETHEUS Ill SOM-L___AA MSOM-LA
I Occupant
Seqmentcartesionposition,X X X
velocity,acceleration
SeamRnt anqularposition, X
velocit.v_acceleration
Forces on segments X
Joint Torques X
Spinal Loads X
II RestraintSystem
Lap Belt Load X X X
HarnessLoad X X X
Belt Slip X -
Ill Seat
CushionForces X X X
Reactions X X X
Nodal Forces X -
ElementForces X
IV Crash Pulse X X X
V PrinterPlots
AccelerationTraces X X X
(vs time)
Snapshotsof Victim/Seat X
Locus of Segment c.g.'$ as - X X
Functionsof Time .......
Note I: It is assumedthat the outputfeaturesof SOM-LA and MSOM-LA
are essentiallythe same.
FigureD.3,12 - Comparisonof ProgramOutput Features
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FEATURE PROMETHEUS Ill SOM-LA MSOM-LA
I Occupant
SpinalArticulation S links 4 links 5 links
FlexibleLumbarLink X - X
FlexibleCervicalLink X X X
AutomaticInitialPosition X X X ,
Generation
_ CompressibleChest, pelvis,X - -
II RestraintSystem
_ : Realisticfriction X - -
Free to slide on victim X - -
Webbing Stretch X X X
i_'- III Seat
Finite ElementModel X X X
_ Bar Elements X X X
i- Beam Elements X X X
.._. Plate Elements X X
No. of elementsin typical 6* 60 60
seat model
Cushion X X X
EnergyAbsorption X X** X**
_-_ Aircraft InteriorModeled X - -
I IV Crash Pulse
TranslationComponents X X X
•,_ RotationalComponents X X
V Calibrationaqainst
LIP experiment
_ AnthropomorphicDummy X *** ***
• Live Human *** - -
X CapabilityAvailable
• GrowthAvailable
•* Accordingto the SOM-LAdeveloper,Dr. David Laananen,this feature
does not work in SOM-LA but does in MSOM-LA. -I
•** Preliminarycalibrationaccomplished, i
I
Figure D-3.13- Comparisonof Basic Modeling Features
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' hI additiou to th,,m' rom_an'h itl_provoaa+l|ta, m_vol'al atraightforward atlzdrather (,any a_fft.waroi
jlII[H'_IV(qlIOII|a w(lll](I (11ilial|('(_ II_lhility o[ _.hoc'oth,;
t I. (_lih'llht((' and di,lday tilii¢.|lill(orios ill' IoadM ll¢thlg oil tho ix'Ctlllllllt (_!.g., sllhlal _OIIdS,
_ I,R,_lln_llt ftW('o_l, jOint tol'l|llos},
f
'_. |tII|WOVO thO algarithln for oolnputal_oll ill joillt tOl'l|lt(_
In
3. Add printt,r I hit s I tt ahola of so it md tit (up I it far Ipl ni |sing oct'up nit Io" it it a it at It i It d
times ItWo viowa) for n_a|imn and i+_al_blc comparimm with s|ow motimi movies.
incorporation of SOM-I,A into l_+rgo Crash Dynmuic. Coda
it+ ltla_ IR't'('+lbl.o llt't'OttttlI'VIt) at'quiro or predict tlymmt c intor wthms tlf t_'oupant iintl floor, Simpleim_lictio, m may by imaaiblc with SOM.I.A. Action has boon startod within the govcrnnicnt with the
i good to mary tho 3-I) SOM-LA with a large fiait(_.<,Ivmoat oonqm/<,r program (o.g.. tho 3-I) I)YCAST)
in ol_or 1o InlRtei lilt airvnfft t raah in a mnglo ainmhltimi that mmv prolwrly t'oupl0a tho dynamics of
the ocq:tt_lnl_l aad the airt'raft structure.
ro Itx'mnpli_l this marriagt it ia sugg+att_ that the t_x'u|smt. / r( attaint llltK|( 1btt gt_l'at(J,d from tile
SOM-I,A (R+¢tipant/reatraint,/_+at mtxicl and packaged as it "supcr-tslontt'ltl." ']'llt+occupant aupt_r-
t+iqnlqltt wonld thai bc insortt',d ittto the largo fiitite_,h+mt, nt prograllls Its a motltlh,, slthough, as
noted proviously, iluprovt,rttcitta ill the SOM-I,A rctttraint ayah,m mt_ttq are hooded tO model
ot't'uplutt dynamics art'tlratq_ly. Tho cxistiltg SOM.I+A t'a.'l,uplult/rt,atraint syst,.,nt illt½iq| wotdd
probaidy be adcqalite for tho purl_mm,a of cak+u|ating the grotw dyaalnit'a of the at,Ill.
'l'ht+fillih,_tqPmt+nl t't_|e wtmld |_, lifilixed t,+ niifit, l th., re,at - lIll b+.thc SOMd ,A a,,al ml)d,q wmdd
sot t+a, ast, d. (This |)rosunt@Bthe dt+vololmlt'nt of a gqlierlll contact luodc] to shmdate l+ol'¢t+sat+!Jng
hetwt_,a tho at,at and m'cupattt). Thc t'OltUtlt'tmt_lel would bt, tirol,t| to simldatt, re,at t'iltthiolig. 'l'hia
¢oIi¢cpt Ires l,hrof lldvaiil41gt'8:
L---Simuhttion of multiplo m't'upat+ta hs_mwa pa+iblc to.g., a triplc st,lit).
2. Synt,hronization of tho numerical iutogratiml m,htmtea (i.o.. the prot_edunm for solving tho
oquation, of motion lie functim_ of time) in SOM.I,A and the finite-oit+nlont program is not
rt_iuirvd. The integtaifitm scheme of the fhtite-clemont pit)gram is utilized for both occupattt(sl
sad etructurt+.
3. The capability of tho finito+olmnent comput_r can bt) mnployod to noth,i vory goal+Pal at.at
dcaiga_.
i
It would |_, ply|hie to ust, thO largo finito-tqement prt_grant It) inothq tho ocrapant. "['lit,advatttagc of
tht su|a i -th nunt is that ta'cupant m(aloling _,quir_ a t_Ollltft atun s thai arl Itot gt nl rally m'eded in
_ gt.lleral finittt-t, lOlilt,li( Illir,h+lillg of atrtlctur¢++,sut'h a_ limil_4on allgtlhlr inolioll of lillilm at joints.
Mort'_wor. t_,'ctlpant nlt_|o|ittg is rather +q_ecializod, aud the corroct nlcchalli(,a| parauwtora
dom'ribiug tho (g't'upalR are 11otwidely knowu tin sanlo t'am,s ,upporlivo data ala, not known lit all
Aad paral It,lon_ itlultt Iw inforrod hy pars lit tric m, taitivlty teatiltg). Tht a. t wt idd s, diffi 'lilt for a
noum|_,cialiat ht t'olls|Jrtlt't all at_'uratc illt_.tol.
Additioual offort would bt, roquired to mako tho t_'CUllmtt mq_t,r.ch,nwat work; pruvimion for
transmitting input data h) tho au|n+r-q|t,liWlR slid obtainiug printouts of detaih,d twt'tllllllit tinw-
hi_torire is roquirod hi addition, the grnpha+ tmtput frum tilt, fiuite tOt,ilion| | iI.Ogl.lUU{if graphics plmt
pnwt,aaillg ia availahlo) must to, adjust_l to draw tho accupmtt(s) ill addition to the _tructlin•.
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The aamepna'l_h_recould i)oom,dto lift the two_dinmnsionaloccupantmodelfrom PR()M I1:'1'1II,',US
III if a tw(Hlilneusit)ual crash shuuIotiolt wore enqdoyed, llowuw,r, there is litt.h_beucfit It) expect
frolu, for exemple, using sveh s model i,eall ovcrtunllng or cartwht_ding light aircraft Whcre violeul
intccoctione of all thret_ dimensions of motion would be occurring.
SCAI,I_:MODEL TESTING
This third apprcmeh to ¢waluafion is constrained by the dynamic operation of all system ¢_}entetflaill
inlpoct loading. While treed in other areas of testing (aerodynamic, bridge design, buildings, etc.)
crsshworthineaa testing using scale models is more difficult, and credibility becomes more suspect
whcn phmtle deformation and rupture may occur ill the real envireauuent. Such paraumters are very
difficult to represent in a scale model. Appropriately approxinmting the material prola_rties in scale
nuMels ie very difficult.
TEb_I'ING
There will remain vast differences in opinion regarding the degree and type of testing needed to
demonstrate suitability of a given design. Authors of fleenew Guide take the positiun that testing,
i including"instrumented full-scale crash test_ should be conducted to verify analysis performed and
to subt_tantiatethe capability of the aircraft system to prevent occupant fatalities and minimize the
frequency and severity of occupant injuries during crashes of ... criterion level severity."
[nstxumented drop testa for landing gear should be conducted to verify analytical predictions aud
perfornutnce to G criteria, including, 20 fthcin sink rate with 10° nose down and 10° roll. A drop teat
to a sink sp¢_+dtest of 42 ftJsee with level attitude should also be couducted. (Helicopter is implied
fin"drop testa hy reference to rotor lift). Static tests for restraint syotems are recommended to
des;.gn loads, with "sufficient dynamic testa" to confirm that analyses are supported by static Wet.
Ststic testa of components tied to structure by their normal attachment provisious'should I_
required' to demonstaate comparability. Pr_mfloading instead of ultimate crash dcsihql loads is an
ac_eptahle miniature condition.
Design checklists aw provided to nacre easily record and cheek pt,rfiwmance to the strove
txJnditious.Fuel cell considerations are added. Fuel cell items are to keep fuel away from impact area
anti from occupiable art,as, with containment emphasized (e,g., avoid projections that might
puncture; use frangible and mar-scaling eoup!ings where Bcparation might occur).
COMMENT: Army full-st,ale testing of mnall, relatively inexpensive vehicles uses dror towers or
swint@,and testing is obviotmlydramatically different hi achievability mid ccet for their helicopter and
light fixtxt-wingsire'raft. The eo,ltraatlng situation is the very large and expensive vehicles that can
not be readily l_itioned on a drop tower or a pendulum swing, such as the large nircruft in Air Force
inventory and large commert, ial sift, raft where full.scale impact testing is not draw. Certainly, there
are many orderof magnitudes of difference in complexity, test systems, data interpwtation for any
_eriousa tWmpt to do tt'_tingwith a large, flexible-bodysift'raft system with extensive structure and
t'omplicate_lstructural dynamics,
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4.0 HUMAN IMPACT TOLERANCE AND PROTECTION
i.'_ IMPACT TOLERANCE CONSIDERATIONS
•- CRAStl ENVIRONMENTi
The Army a'rcrsft unpact loading scenario varies. Severs intpacte more typically include a sequence
" of events, including: (l) landing gear stroke and wheel failure, (2) fuselage, with both ground and
•" fuselage deformation, and (3) energy absorbing stroke of the seat. For Army aircraft, high
• longitudinal imd lateral loads may be applied to the seat after gear and fuselage deformatian - seme
military aircraft use a "well"or depra_sion in the floor to provide stroke distance, and stroke control
then becomes important. Additionally, allowing any more longitudinal or lateral deformation "than
nece_ couldincreasetheriskofheadorchestimpactot_surroundingetrtzcture."Strokelimiting
il nnd load limiting trade-offs may become necessary.
Crashload trade-offs for the Army'e light aircraft as described in the Guide, are based on a series of
worst ease situations for each of several components with little or no accanmlative "credit" for
beneficial features for each that contribute to an overaII improvement. Thus, design criteria are
specified for components, as well as for the entire system. One example given as a justification is
gear stroke and failure that may occur in a way contributing to lateral loading, such ns from a single
_ gear failure, or from hitting the ground with a high roll angle. In helicopters, continued reliever
_-___ appears common, even without added impulse from the main rotor blades after gear failure.
':_'_ Accordingly, the Guido authors have concluded that multiple directional, complex, and violent crash
_ kineumticaofArmy aircraft(htcludingflipoverorupsidedownimpact)demandstrengthreqtdz_umnta
• " in all directions, including upwardand aftward. Lower inlpact load criteria are inllxeed for these Army
IL:_ aircraft that are less likely to encounter some of the conditions. Crash environment studies for Army
-_. vehiclesal_odistinguishbetweenin,pactloadsforlightfixed-wingaircraftandhelicopters.Fixed-
wingstall/spinaccidantecanprvducehighlateralloadingewithresultantsinthelongitudinal/lateral
(oryaw)plane.Helicoptersshowa highincidenceofsideimpactsorrolloverafteraccidents.
IMPACT INJURIES
InArmy systems,headinjuriesweretheleadingcauseofmajorendfatalinjuries,arcoan_g for3I%
ofallfatalinjuries.Legandchestinjuriestendedtobenext,varyinginrankfromoneairplm_etothe
next.
Breakdownofinjuriesaccordingtoaircrafttypedemoztstratedthatseriousvertebralinjurieswere
lower for light fized-wing aircraft and cargo helicopters then the other6. The rationale presented is
that the etalllspin characteristic of the fixed-wing aircraft and the larger crush diJtance beneath the
fiver of the cargo helicopte,r reduced vertical loads.
HUMAN TOLERANCE TO IMPACT
Diseuesians of human tolerance point out that in spite of the multitude of experiments, few criteria
useful in system detfign have been developed m_dvalidated.
Tolerance data presented are relatively standard in the literaturc, must particularly from a summery
reported by Eiband (fign_e D.4.1, from the U.S. Army'a Airrraft Crash Survival/'esign Guide, aim
used in ref. D-3}. These anthorl reference conditions where injuries have occurred in mine
_ particular csws as a basis for avoidance. Rel_rted are bases for Head Injury CriWria (lllC)
. (recomn_cnded), end DRI for spinal injury criteria (notrecommemled, see "Evaluation Techniques",
2o I
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page to cunm).In the Guide, leg injury criteria are established at 2000 lh for tinw less than 20 masc.
"Although some reseawh has been candueted on the tolerance of other body purta, such ns the
neck, thorax and abdomen, well defined valid criteria have not beeu established." Variations in leg
injury date presented in the Guide illustrate tlio point. Additionally, numerous related literature
reviews have been conducted. Results from _m Aerospace Industry As_)ciation Study by the
Tralteport Airworthy Requiremante Committee (AIA-TARC Study, ref. D-3) are repezt_d in Figure
D-4.2 for information purposss.
Actually, data regarding human tolerance to impact still leaves many areas for uncertainty and
disagreenmnte. One obvious difficulty is that stre_dng the live human body to tolerance limits is
impossible. Testa with volunteers are necessarily at eubcxitical levels. Accordingly, animal research
has provided much of the data that is used, Additionally, human cadavers have been used as test
speeimens. However, age, sex and state of health for live people (and for cadavers) can influence
tolerance. Additionally, mathematical models and anthrepometric dummies are being used to
develop better undemtanding of the kinematics and forces involved and to develop an improved
mechanism for injury prediction,
Overallprobability of survival depends to a large extent on manner of restraint, particularly to cuntrel
the upper and lower torso and protect the head and chest. Strongest restraint load points for such
control are the pelvic girdle, the shoulder structure, and the rib cage. Restraint effectiveneSs is
related to contact ares and force distribution, the body location for application, and the degree to
which residual movement is controlled. However, protecting the arms and leg_ from contacting the
interior during flailing is concluded by authors of the Guide to be extremely difficult; in most cases,
the cocoon that would be required to produce such containment is quite impractical. Another
problem is caused by 1oo_ restraint, which contributes to magnified accelerative forces. The abrupt
halt in forward occopant motion with the taking up of the slack in restraint then magnifies restraint
loads on the body and on the hardware -- s condition called dynamic overshoot.
The authors of the new Guide indicate that their main areas of concern for coufigurations featuring
only s lap belt ave the potential forhead injury and the potential for submarining. They urge use of a
shoulder harness in addition to the belt as a favored 8ulution, although it is recognized that
connecting the harneSs to the belt buckle will pull it up and increase potential for submarining --
which could load up the abdominul wall as well as flexing the spinal column. To counter this potential,
a lap-belt tiedown is recommanded by the authors of the Guide, and is actually tu_d by all services,
COMMENT:In a survey conducted for the TARC 216-10 study, leading eaperte in the field were
specifically questioned about this, with none reporting to have observed submarining when only the
lap belt (without shoulder harness) was used. Trade-ells of belt.harne_ characteristics will be
presented in a later paragraph,
b WHOLE-BODY ACCELERATION TOLHRANCE
The Guide •uther6 emphasize a fact that is seldom diseusz_d. Whole-body chest-to-back tolerance
has been demonstrated to be as muc'o as 45 G for pulse durations leSs than 0.044 sec. This
decreases to 25 G for 0.2 see. Some debilitation and injury may occur st these levels. In other
words, survivability is not s nice simple constant that is readily engineered, and man is not
nece_arily a 45 G system.
Tolerance eetimate_ for aftward loading (eyebal_ in) ere not accurately established. Forces of 83 G
-_ for 0.04 sec haa been experienced in • backward facing ssat. followed by debilitation, shock and
_ on-the-wene medical treatment, Accordingly. the authors estimate tolerance to be between this
83 G and the 45 G, 0.! sec condition accepted for the fnrward facing case.
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Vertical (eyeballs down) loading throatana lumbar compre_iun fracture, agaln with a variable range
for injury potential; potential for viecersl injury ie _eo greater, since vertical lusda place a greater
strain on the suspension system. Eyeballs up loads are on the order of 15 G for 0.1 sec.
Lateral accelerations are less well explored. Volunteers, with only lap belts, withstood 9 G for
0.1 sac+ With belt and shoalder harneM they withstood 11,5 G for 0.1 sec, Other, less well
protected lateral impact cases have apparently suffered serious injury.
From the information presented by Guide authors, rate of onset for the force also has an influence,
although use that is not well understood. Rates as high as 28,000 G/see have been survived under
very special circumstances which provided an exesptionel distribution of body loads. In general,
lower rates of onset are preferable,
According to Volume IIof the Guide several scales have been proposed for tolerance of various body
members:
1. Head.Windshield Impact: Gadd Index
J-Telerance
Effective Displacement Index
Wayne State Tolerance Curve
2. Neck Impact: No index. Two studies of tolerance to rotation
3. Chest Impact Abbreviated Injury Scale
4. Abdominal Impact Little Data. Marked disagreements between investigators.
5. Spinel Injury Potential Models estimating loads available
DRI (spinal deformation, force) (simple model of complex
system)
Wayne State University two-dimensional model
Air Force Head Spine Model
6. Leg Injury Femur Injury Criteria Peak load of 1700 pounds
COMMENT: Rssulte t'rom using such scales provide guideline information that can be used for
"order-of.merit" purposes. Some unpublished reports suggest that further research and
development might be warranted; factors of two or more differenee between resulting "criteria" and
undamaged survival are not unusual.
OCCUPANT MOTION ENVELOPES/STRIKE ZONE8 FOR PROTECTIVE CONSIDERATION
Since kinematics of body action can be violent, dynamic responses of the body with different
restraints have been evaluated to define the motion envelope (including flailing) of all body parts.
Earlier discussion pointed out that containment of limbs was diffieult-to.in_pesalble. Lateral
displacement of the upper torso may be extensive, even with a shoulder harness. However, clearing
the strike zone of etrueturul patti may not be feasible. The alternative ie to design se that tn_try
potential is minimized, e.g., by energy absorbing supports and padding material,
"CLEARED/PROTECTED" (Strike Zone)
Body strike zones are defined for a 95th percentile Army aviator during a downward acceleration,
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web,ring a rcstrsinl _ysh_m_tmisliag of a lap-belt,ero_ql strapamtshoa|di,r ha_w_. A Isp.belt-_mly
cm_figarstiml air!ks zeno is used for older Army aircraft. {fig. D-4.3). llazards are rsted as prinmry
(*hreat Is head nod chest), secondary (lower extremity ilqury or eJllrapment), aml tertiary (llpper
limbs). For Army imrpo_s, head proV._ctioa is cm_aidered e_enlisl, using helmets, paddling ai_d
energy sbm_rbin_'structure.
ArL,asidentified for flight crew protective measures include the instrument panel (peddiag, frangible
breakaway or ductility), rubber pedals (avoid crushing entrapment), control colmnn (break 4 in.
above the pivot point, none through the instrument panel), l%r the gunner, identified areas include
eyepiece kw.ation,inertial harness, a power haulback inertial reel, inflatable restraint to reduce slack,
frangible/breakawsylcollapsahle features (not to exceed 500 Ib of force).
HUMAN BODY DIMENSIONS AND MA8S DISTRIBUTION
The Army Guide uses specific criterion dimensions fordssign of physical or mathematical simulators
of the body. Details are reported in the Guide and will not be presented here. Those presented cover
male U.S. Army aviators and soldiers for 5th, 50th and 95th pereentih and so arenot appru_riate for
women. Also, information on complete dimensional movenlent (e.g., shoulder joint ranges of motion)
is presented, as are inertial properties,
HEAIglMPACT HAZARDS PROTECTION
Geometry of probable head impact surfaces is distinctly different from the flight deck to cabin areas.
Contact hazards in the U.S. Army inventory in 1965 were identified as including the following:
_- Flight Deck: Window and door frames, consoles, control columns, seat backs, electrical
junction boxes and instrument panels.
Cabin Area: Window and door frames, seats and fuselage structure.
Protection can be provided by energy absorbing padding materials, frmkgiblebreakawuy panels,
smooth contoured surfaces or ductile materials in such typical hazard areas.
OTHER IMPACT PROTECTION
,- Concerns as expressed in the Guide include:
_: 1. h_strt_ment Panel Structure: Consider use of energy sbserbiug padding, frangible breakaway
• panels, or ductile panel materials.
_. 2. Rudder l_edal Protect!ca: The Guide maintains that, unless a tiedown strap is used, pelvic
rotation will almest invariably occurwith feet on rudder pedals and with forwardand downward
_ loads, especially if belt is loose. To avoid complications from the various peas!bit!ties, the pedal
, should support both the ball and heel of the foot. Potential for entrapment or crashing of the
seat should he considered.
3. Control Columns: Control of fracture point to near the pivot point is urged. Panel mounted
controllers are not recommended; fracture consequences are considered too uncertain by the
:_:., Guide authors.
_i" 4, Sighting Systems: Location and frangibility and restraint power haul back inertial reel.
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For etwkpit and cabin interior, energy abeorbing paddiug were recommended hi tilt, Guidt, for ur_
within the _trike zone. I)t,aired charaeteriatica included:
1. Adapi_tbility and eaae of preceding
2. lligb energy di_iimtion
3. Effective load distribution
4. Ix_wrebound
.5. Temperature insensitivity
6. Low wate.r absorption
7. Resistance k) chemicals, oil, ultraviolet radiation, and sunlight
8. Nontoxic fume generation
9. Favorable fla,nmability rating
10. Minimal smoke generation
11. Durability and long life
12. Cost comlmtifive
13. Aesthetically acceptable
CRASH TEST DUMMIES
In spite of their limitations, dummies remain one of the primary test tools for dynamic tests. Early
dummies developed in 1949 have progreseed through several evolutions to a standardized, more
sophisticated dummy specified for the Federal Motor Vehical Standards (Part 572) by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Several more recent desil.,mshave emerged, all with the
objective of improving dummy response and repeatibility of performances. Some comparison of
dummy and cadaver response has been accomplished, Comparison testa of dummy designs have
been produced, demonstrating among other things that complex dummies increa_ the number of
test variables to a level that may exceed experimenter ability to control the variables or understand
the interactions in results.
2O8
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5.0 AIRCRAFT SEATS, RESTRAINTS, LITTERS AND PADDING
This section of the Guide commences by emphasizing the subsystems that interface with
occupant_, (including the controls as well as seats, restraints, litters and padding) and also the
basic operational differences between crew soar- and passenger seat& It distinguishes between
passenger seats and litters for transport and crew seats, emphasizing that the crew's functional
requirement and operational responsibilities are "of highest priority" while maintaining that
comparable "crashworthinese" protection is needed.
, BACKGROUND DISCUSSION
Introductory comments in the Guide express the position that a complete systems approach must be
employed to include all influencing parameters, including economic restraint, concerned with the
design, manufacture and over'all l:arformance of the aircraft in meeting nfission requirements.
However, an accumulative systems capability to protect or absorb energy is disallowed; maximum
capability from each component is emphasized.
The intent of this section is to define nfinimmn crash energy absorption "requirements" for seats
and restraint systems. Specified strength requirements are based on the crash environments
adopted in the Army guide update, as are test requirements.
COMMENT:The seat desig'l requirements stated in the Guide are based on the extreme crash
loads postulated to occur in the '_95th percentile survivable Army light aircraft crash." No
recognition is given to the drastic differences in peak leads from the 95th to the 90th percentile
which suggest that the 95th percentile used in the Guide may deviate so far from the normal (and
implied) use of such statistics as to be unreelistieaUy and excessively high as a criteria. Other
guidelines are also influenced by the assumed load levels. The Guide strongly euggeete that seats
should be designed with a vertical energy absorbing stroke to mitigate the assumed high vertical
loads; little discussion is given to interaction between vertical and other dimensions during the
stroke. Better understanding of the influence and means of controlling such interacting
parameters is needed.
SEAT INSTALLATIONS
Per military specification, "each seat occupant is to be provided with a survivable environment
wheit the aircraft is subjected to a 95th percentile potentially survivable impact." This will require
energy absorption and maintellanee of "un.intruded" living space to avoid debilitating injury that
might preclude timely egress after crash impact. Candidate methods are many; sufficient
absorption by landing gear and structure could leave little requirement for energy absorption in
the seat. The converse also holds, requiring a long seat stroke. Restraint design loads transmitted
through the seat to the structure are another variable.
, Vertical energy absorption is mandatory in Army sire:aft seat component specifications because
landing gear also might fail; a 12.in. minimum stroke ie recommended, but may be precluded by
desired positioning of the seat within the aircraft.
COMMENT:The objective correlates with a total airplane objective but continues to leave questions
regardingststietica]Jy tmuaualand dramaticdifferences between 90% versus 95%. It does not provide
assurance that these "whole bodf loads define seat loads, and leaves in doubt the accumulative
effect of such elements ae slack or mispesitioned harness which may be beyond rite control of the
" designer,
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PRIMARY DESIGN CGNSIDI,_RATIONS
Prim_lT design eLmeiderstlons forprotection include the design t_fthe seats to be retained iu positiou
f and u_eof ea integral means of crash load attenuation, Additionally, the o_cupm_t'estrike _;nvelopeshould be "delethali_d ", s term intcrpre_d by the present reviewer to mean padded, frangible,
and/or ductile or otherwise designed so as to aid in the proventio_ of serious injury. Structoral
distertion is discussed i,, terms of its poMiblebenefits for energy attenuation but also of concern is
_ the extant of and effects of intrusion into the occupant envelope. Trade-off studies are necessary.
L
!, RESTRAINT/SEAT/LITTER/PADDING DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The U.S, Army's position is that occupant p_tection attd survival sliould be a primary desigu
e_nsideration for seats; seats should '_oeretained generally in their original positions within the
aircraft throughout any survivable accident." Additionally, "the seat should provide an integral
I. means of crash load attenuation and the occupant's strike envelope should be delethalized."
Seat comfort is considered a pilot's safety-of-flight factor, reducing potential for pilot fatigue in a
short time period, rather than a crash safety deaign factor. Pilot comfort "must not be unduly
compromised to achieve crash safety. _Back angles over 13° and thigh tangent angles 5 to 20 ° are t
recommended in the Guide. (Influence of seat angles will be discussed later). I
Seat comfort is considered a pilot's safety-of-flight factor, reducing potential for pilot fatigue in a
short time period, rather than a crash safety design factor. Pilot comfort "must not be unduly
compromised to achieve crash safety." Back angles over 13° and thigh tangent angles 5 to 20 ° are !,
recommended in the Guide. (Influence of seat angles will be diseassod later). l
,!
Flight crew seats are typically adjustable, to locate the eye position for any precentile body size at i__the design eye point. 1COMMENT:Comfort and safety requirements may be in opposition, as is the ease for the seat back i
angle and for the rigid foam needed for energy absorption versus the soft foam desired for comfort. i
Alternatively, discomfort may lead to erroneous adjustments and improper use of the protective
designs. According!y, to Some extent, a design may reflect trsde-offs related to the unique _
application.
DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR SEATS
The Guide authors point out that seats face any direction, and that forward facing is most
common, but prefer aftwurd facing. Aft facing seats provide "maximum contact area and support."
For forward facing flight deck seats, the authors also recommend a lap-belt tiedown (crotch) strap
for flight crewmen and consider lap-belt-only restraint undesirable; beth upper and lower torso
restraints sre recommended. They consider aide-facing seats least desirable but suggest that when
side-facing seats are used, an upper torso restraint resisting forward motion is needed. Ductile t
material- (for energy absorption) featuring at least 10% elongation are recommended for all
critical members in the primary load paths of nonload limited seats, and featuring at least 5%
elongation for [oadlimito_ seats).
Seata
For Army purpose, Guide authors state single occupant seats are preferred in order to avoid
complicated energy absorbing situations that may occur for multiudt seats that are not fully
occupied. Guide authors considered it desirable that aU seats face in the _ame direction to protect
occupant_ from loose equipment,
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Aftward facing seats wore preferred when practical, to "maalmally distribute body contact area."
Forward facing seats wars considered to afford "adcquat_ protection by the use of a restraint
system consisting of shoulder strap,, a lap-belt and a lal_be|t ttedown (crotch) strap." The authors
consider lap.belt-only restraints undesirable.
COMMENT:Many eyatsnm accept this configuration with an ener_ absorbing surrounding area.
Forward facing seats with adequate reatraints are acceptable as a second choice to aftward faci-.g
seats. When single diagonal upper torso rcetruint is used, it should pass over the nuthoard _hn_ddsr
to contain lateral impact or protrusion outside the aircraft.
Previous side facing seats were provided with lap-beLt reetxuint only. This arrungemertt was
considered by Guide authors to be inadequate, and least desirable from the crash safety
standpoint; however "when no reasonable alternative to their use exists, adequate restraint must
be provided. If a single, diagonal upper torso restrain|; inused, it should be placed aver the forward .............
facing shoulder" (relative to the aircraft).
Shoulder harness provides minimal protection to abrupt acceleration in the side facing
configuration. Lateral torso movement should be minimized or prevented.
Litters
The supine position that litters provide is ideal for .,_smting vertical impacts. The supine position
allows maximum possible contact area and force distribution, and forc_ are transverse to body.
Lateral installation should be provided. It would prevent.body from sliding off the litter
longitudinally, and _rovents the litter from sliding and/or repositinning to become completely
detached from supports.
STRUCTURAL CONNECTIONS
Seat Attachment -- Cockpit seats are floor or bulkhead mounted. Cabin interior seats may be: (1)
suspended from the ceiling with energy atmorberaand wall atsb'flJsed,(2) suspended from the coiling
with energy absorbers and floor stab'dized, (3) wall mounted with energy absorbers, (4) floor
mou_t,._l with energy absorbers, or (5) ceiling and floor mounted (vertical energy absorbers
abeveund below the _aO,
Suspension or mounting of all seats should not interfere with rapid ingre_ or egress.
Hardware Materials -- Material selected for attachment of webbing should be ductile enough to
deform locally, particularly at stress concentration points. This ducti_ty is not as critical when
energy absorbing provisions are incorporated into the seat. On the other hand, consistent use of
, ductile materials avoids the poesibillty of non ductile materiak on nonloed limited seats. Selection
of materials should emphasize:
1. Best strength-to.weight ratiea
2. Maintaining ductility to prevent brittle fuilurse
3. Standard elastic anulysigselection methods for most working life conditions
4. Behavior beyond the yield point analysed for ensr_T abeorptiou purposes.
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RESTRAINT SYSTEMS
DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR PERSONNEL RESTRAINT SYSTEMS
Statistics on U.S. Army aircraftaccidents indicate failure of personnel reetraint harness us a frequent
cause of injuries and fatalities. From Volumes I and III of the Guide, a crasilworthy aircraft is to
"eliminate unnecessary injuries and fatalities in relatively mild impacts." However, Volume III also
states in a different context that the Army goal for scat end restraint systems is to "reduce occupant
decelerative loading to within human tolerance limite," that "ideally ... structure should minimize
occupant accelerations to survivable levels in a severe crash environment." In other wmzls, Army
policies in establishing design principles for personnel restraint systems are to prevent injury to all
occupants ill crash conditions approaching the upper limits of survivability.
Belt and crotch strap remain the standard for U.S. Army flight crews by recommendation of the
authors of the updated guide (crotch straps are to oppose harness loads on the belt). Troop and
pa_enger requirements were different; the most recommended system was an inertial harness
over each shoulder connecting to a centar-body lap-belt buckle, and secondly, a system with a
diagonal shoulder-to-belt anchor strap positioned to restrain the occupant from protruding outaide
theaircraftduringlateralloading(similartoautomotivesystems).
Inflatablerestraintbeltandharnessweredescribedasa morecomplexandcostlyalternativethat
willreducerestraintslackby automaticallyprotensioningthecystemtobettercontrclimpact
response.Anotherrelatedinflatablealternativesairbags,whichareconspicuousintheirabsence
fromGuidediscussions.
Numeroushuman bodyrestraintmethodshavebeenproposed,investigatedand/orused;someare
"exceptionallygood",others"leftmuch tobedesired."Desirablequalitiesare:
I. Comfortablelightweight
2.- Easytoputon andremoveeveninthedark
3. Featurea aingle-pointreleaseeasilyoperatedwitheitherhand,and protectedfrominadvertent
m_ release,.g.,beingstruck
4. Providefreedomofmovement tooperatetheaircraftcontrols,e.g.,throughtheuseofan inertia
reelwiththeshoulderharness
mm 5. Provide sufficient restraint in all directions to prevent injury in a potentially survivable crash
6. Webbing should provide a maximum area, consistent with weight and comfort, for force
R- distribution in the upper torso and pelvic regions and should be of low elongation under load to
__ minimize dynamic overshoot.
_ GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA
Generaldesigncriteriaareasfollows:
_i 212
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1, Comfert should net be unduly compromised by crash survival systems or impr_per adjostment by
u_ers is a likely outCome.Hardware skould not contact bony portions of the torso, and assemblages
should be compatible with the deeiro.I location on the body. Webbing should net be so wide or stiff
as to restrict ventilation (or cause chaffing),
2, Enmrgeney release sheuld be based ene single-point releusc fur the belt-harness combinetien,
operable by either hand with 20 to 30 pounds force and operable regardless of the occupant
i. position (e.g., upside dawn). However, accidental opening should be prevented, The buckling
system should be insensitive to rotation and alight miealignments such as misslignsd pi_s that
,. , might shear in series.
3. Lap-belt anchorages involve a series of constraints: e) It is desirable to anchor to the seat or the
anchorage must accommodate pussible seat motion, b) Both forward and vertical loading must be
accommodated. Submarining (i.e., clipping down through the lap belt) should be prevented.
However, the lap belt eheuld net restrict freedom of leg motion for pilate, c) When necessary to
counteract the up lends of the harness, lap-belt tiedowns (i.e., crotch straps) should intercept the
seat pan (14 to 15 in. forward of the seat back), d) Adjustment hardware should carry at least the
esme design loads as the webbing without slipping, crual_ng or potentially jamming the webbing, e)
Adjustment and release hardware mu_t not be located over skeletal structure (e.g., lap.belt hardware
over the itiac crests of the pelvis) and harness hardware should ride us low on the chest as possible.
f) Allmaterials aheuld be ductile enough to deform locally (with.LU_commended minimum elongation
value ef 10%).
COMMENT:The influence of belt-harness angles are discussed on page 214.
4. Seat structuralconnections: a)Criteria for bolt_ should continue as practiced (10 to 25% safety
margin and typical 0,25 inch diameter to avoid over-torque), and criteria for rivets and welds
should continue as practiced, b)Seat mountings may vary, including combination_ of ceiling,
bulkhead and floor, all using energy shserbers, Structural jeints should permit angular
distortions. Similar principles and criteria apply fur bulkhead mounted seats, c) Guide authors
preferred that restraints be anchored to the seats; the key factor is to permit seat deformation
and associated energy abserptlen to occur (which could be inhibited by anchoring harness to
the floor), and without loosening ef the belt.
5. Webbing and attschraents: Rcat_dnt harness also could vary in required load capability,
according to whet,_er a load llmiter is used, However, authers of the Army Guide suggest e
standard, single strength interchangeable harnuse to avoid risk of a mix up in installation.
Minimal webbing elongation is propeaed as n_ceaesry to avoid dynamic everchoot. It also
mitmnizca potential forsecondary impacts; for this reason the Army resists energy abserptien
applications. Added ptocantiens are necessary where webbing is folded or bent at hardwa_
interfaces, in order to avoid compromising strength requirements, e.g., from concentrated
loads er from _ _r. Energy abserbing webbing is not recommended fm use in seating
systems,
COMMENT: In computer ehnulatieus done in the TARC study, increase in belt strength and
correspending reduction in stretching resulted in a reduction of "submarining tendency", Imnbar
compreseien and seat loads but an increase in restraint system loads and thorax loads, The study
showed (and persenal communication with USAF AMRL confirmed) that a level of belt strength
ezists beyond which further reduction in |tretch avaik little benefit.
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If. he,rile reels arc installed when full fr_._lom of movenn,ut for the cl.cwoo,nda_r is dcmred.
a) lloth impact sensitive nnd rut_ sensitive reels are used. l_,ab*_r,nsitivc reels Ill'*'pr*,h,rred
by Army fi)r helicopters and light fixed wing aircraft let,aura, of the nndtidirertional
I_iidlities for impact, which may not trigger t11oimpact _*nsitiw, systole, h) _altctimes.
retractors or power hsul-haek fi_attn'eaart* also nr,ed. When used, i_wered haul-back
mechsuimus are used to retract slack (e.g., for seat ejection), IIowever, autonmt_,d haul-hm'k
for crash restraint should be avoided, since the tittle lapse between triggering and haul-hack
will result in all added contribution to body loads (the sum of crash and retractor loads).
u, Inflatable systems act mnt'h faster than automated haul-bm.k and have less take up
capability; thus the Army will t_msider influtahle sysb, ms while rejecting autonmtie
haul-hack.
TYPES OF RESTRAINT SYSTEMS
Representative restraints used by the U.S. Army are presented in figure D-5.1 (a through e).
Configuration (a) is the '_dnimum acceptable" U.S. Army system. An improved lateral restraint
system is illustrated in (b). which adds more shoulder restraint against sideways motion. In (e), a
crew chief/gunner restraint system provides for ability to move out of the seat but be instantly
restrained when he returns. Treoplpasscnger systems are illustrated in (d). An automatically
inflatable system is illustrated in (e); this one automatically pretensions to force tile occupant back
into his seat and eliminates potential for looseness and extended dynamic response,
e.g., overshoot,
RESTRAINT ANCHORS
Lap-Belt Anchorage
Lap-belt anchors may be on the seat bucket or on aircraft stxueture. Structural mounting must
assure that the restraint remains effective regardless of seat position. Structural attachment will
not be practical when the seat includes longitudinal load limiting. Lap-belt anchor location is also
considered a comfort factor; locating it too far forward interferes with movement of the legs. Thin
is considered important for pilots but not important to pa_engern since they are not required to
perform operations with their legs.
By Army practice, submarining is considered to be prevented by a lupbelt tie down strap, by
locating the belt so its eentorline fulls '2 to 2.25 in. forward of the seat reference point, and/or by
assuring that the angle between the lap belt eentorline and tile buttock reference line is at least
45 ° (but not exceeding 55°) for u 50th percentile occupant (fig. D-5.2), The 45 to 55" l_ngle has
priority over the 2 to 2.25 in, location dimension. Sub:aarining can also be reduced by ensuring
that the lap belt is tight.
COMMENT:Data on which these conclusions are based appear to b_,twofnld. First, front practice, it
was long ago presumed that the belt should be anchored low and fl)rward enough to keep it oil the
pelvi_, but aft far enough to keep tile ocCUlmntfrom sliding fiwward off the scat -- with 45 to 550 an
obvious solution as effecting the most direct compromise between the two (R.F. Chandler, SAFE
Panel Discussion on Attendant Restraint Improvement Study, Deeember, 1979, Las Vegas),
Another basin appears to have been selected from the data of figure D.5.3, although the referenced
sources do not particularly emphasize, for example, that some dummies are predisl_sed to
submarine, or that the only clear soure_ of hanless angle data (which these data are fn_xo)is bssed
on a boudolier type shoulder hanwsa (with twisting and eontpression ronfimmled) and s scat with
extremely reclined seat back and seat bottom. Shoulder harness crib, ria were ale_ hased on visual
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observatioll of slow motion fihn with 11ophysical measure,scots te support conclusinns regarding
vprtebrtn, colnprcttaiolL
Shoulder llarne_ Anchorage
The shoulder naruess may be plsced either oll the seat back structure or on the basic aircraft
structure. Strap routi_':iqmust avoid the possibility ol interference or constraints frnm seat
adjustment or energy aneorbing stroking. Additionally, the relationship of the harness angle to an
aft horizontal tangent to the shoulder should be minimally effected by seat adjustments. The
: position of the Army Guide is that the aft, horizontal angle of the harness from the shoulder •should not exceed 300 up from the perpendicular to the seat back, and the intercept with the seatback should not be lower than 26 in. above the buttock reference line (figure D-5.2). Lateral
movement in the seat back guide for the harne_ should be restricted to 0.5 in. or less.
i COMME_T: For lower load levels, a much wider range of angles may be possible; otherwise use of
i the same seats by men and women would require two harness systems. The result of systematically
varying seat belt and hanmss angles for a l_aditional "4 anchor" or "4 point" system (with a 9 G
• crash pulse) is illustrated in figure D-5.4, based on the TARC 216-10 (ref. D-3) application of the
highly calibrated PROMETHEUS HI model. Selected combinations showed submarining could be
controlled over a wider range than had been presumed as indicated by belt slip and pelvis rotation
for incipient submarining (2 in. and 27 °, respectively, in the model). Additionally, there was no
marked influence on estimates of lumbar compression loads within the range of + 40° for harness
angles and 250130° to 70° for belt angle (with broader ranges apparently feasible in some special
combinations). (Such data were for a horizontal seat pan and a vertical seat back.)
The TARC study also indicated that s_'atconfiguration (i.e., pan angle and back angle) influences
restraint system performance. Figure D.5.5 illustrates the variation in performance with a
"4-anchor" system as the seat pan and back angles are systematically altered through a range
of settings.
The TARC study also showed that changing restraint system design can have a marked influence
on restraint system effectiveness. Figure D-5.6 illustrates the change in retention perfnrmanee
with different restraint systems configurations. As illustrated, alternative configurations can
provide marked retention improvements with no change in anchorage and no significant penalties,
Lap-Belt Tiedown (Crotch) Strap Anchorage
This strap is to prevent ride-up of the belt when u_vd. It should intercept the seat pan conterline
14 to 15 in. forward of the seat back,
ADJUSTMENT HARDWARE
Adjusters are to carry the full design load of the subassembly of which they arc part, without
slipping or crushing webbing. Required adjustment force should not exceed 30 ]b. Adjusters are
not to be located over skeletal hard points (ilise crest of pelvis, collar bones).
DELETHALIZATION OF COCKPIT AND CABIN INTERIORS
-" The main purpose of "delethali_tion" is to minimize potential for injuries that jeopardize
_' emergency evacuation. The kinematics of body action aseo_iatod with aircraft crash impacts can be
violent, including flailing of body parts. The Army position is that this is rowers with only a lap ]
belt as the restraint, but mnltidireetianal flailing is still extensive with a ]ap.beltlshouhler 1
harness combination. ]!
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COMMI,_'NT:There is little evidence that sm;h dramatic multidimensional and injurious flailing of
the limbs m_cursin largo can]inertial airplanes, Report_ suggest that if it occurs most such action
appears to be allied with the primary impact loading m the fore-and-aft direction, since there is
little cartwheeling or largo lateral acceleration evidenced in largo aircraft impact,
The occupsntg immediate environment ahunld be designed so that injury potential ls minimized if the
body parts flail and contact rigid or semirigid atxucturoa in tile immediate environment. Alten_ativea
are to move the hazardous object (or structure) oat of the flail zone, mount it on frangible or energ_
abserbing supports and/or apply a padding material to distribute contact force over a larger area on
the body member.
ENERGY ABSORPTION
Energy absorbing devices are introduced with the statement that the seat structure must possess
either the capability of sustaining the maximum inertial forces imposed by the deceleration of the
occupantand seat, withm, t collapsing (i.e., deforming or failing), or have suWleient energy absorption
capacity to reduce the occupant's velocity to zero before structural failure occurs. The first
alternative could involve excessive strength (and weight) requirements to accommodate dynamic
overshoot factors of 1.2 to 2.0 (i,e., load factors to twice as large as design loads). The second
using controlled collapsing behaviors offers a more practical approach. It does offer the capability to : :
better control force levels relative to human tolerances. Of course, neither approach is totally
achievable.
COMMENT:Ultimately, design for any approach will be exceeded; there is no way to assure ultimate
survivability. Even the selection of a 95th percentile crash was based on recognition of this fact.
Nevertheless, wording frequently overlooks this fact.
CRASH ENERGY ABSORPTION
During crash loads, the occupant's center of gravity acquires a distinct velocity relative to the
airframe. Maximum relative velocity may become large. In turn, the seat must sustain the applied
loads or possess sufficient energy abeorptiun capability to reduce the occupant's relative velocity
before atrnctural failure oreurs. The Guide emphasizes the desire to obtain the greatest energy
absorbing stroke from the seat (for Army conditions with widely varied impact loads). This
receives independent emphasis without regard to energy abserptiun from other system elements.
Increasing occupant stepping distance during a crash can reduce impact loads and thus improve
tolerebility levels for imposed decelerations. Methods include:
1. Additional crushable airframe structure
2. Energy-absorbing landing gear
3. Seat design with energy absorbing mechanism(s) (e.g., load limiting or controlled
seat collapse)
4. A combination of the above
Common ndscunceptiuna exist; related commen_ are:
1. The seat energy-absorbing system does not absorb all the energy associated with the
impact velocity.
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2. The first comment also explains why slack in the restraint systemor _t attachments is
undesirable;added stroking to eceom,nedatelarger relative velocity will be required to
decelerate the occupant,
3. The seat energy absorbing stroke simply lengthens the stopping distance of the occupant by
allowing the seat to stroke as other energy absorbing processes are nearing completion,
4, Disregarding dynamic rseponse differences, the same stroke distance is required to
decelerate any mass at a given deceleration magnitude, Therefore, lighter people do not
require shorter strokes than heavier people (however, a different energy absorption
' cl,arecteristic is required),
COMMENT:Stroking must occur in such a way as to minimise the possibility of entrngment.
ENERGY ABSORBING REQUIREMF_T8 FOR COCKPIT AND CABIN INTERIORS
Two categories of head impact injury are of primary concern--skull fracture with potential brain
damage, and facial ti_ue and bone structure injury with lesser probsbflity d brain damage.
Penetration by protruding objects is also of concern, Trauma from intercrenial lesions is mentioned,
but without criteria other than to reduce level of acceleration, rate of onset and amount of energy
transmitted to the head.
The Army pasition is that "acceleration experienced during secondary impacts of the occupant
with the surrounding structures must be reduced to a tolerable level." Padding material should
both reduce the deceleretive force and distribute the load for uniform pressure, Candidates for
energy absorbing include instrument panels, glarechielde, other interior surfaces within the strike
zone, and seat cushions.
Empirical System Response -- Theoretical und empirical information is presented on dynamic
energy absorbing response, on empirical development of ereshworthy armored seats, and on load
lindt devices. Extensive discu_ion is not warranted for this abstracting summary. (A much
simpler calculation method based un handbook data is presented in the appendix D-A to this
present report),
ENERGY ABSORBING DEVICES
As eumm_ for the Guide, a multitude of devices for al_serbing energy have been proposed,
developed and tested. Desirable features of such devices are:
1. The device should provide a predictable foree-vemtwdeformatiun trace.
2. The rapid loading rate expected in crashes should not cause unexpected changes in the force-
versus, deformation characteristic of the device.
3. The assembly in which the device is used should have the ability to sustain tension and
compression. (This might be provided by one or more energy absorbers, or by the basic
structure itself, depending on the system design).
4. The device should be us light end small as possible.
5. The Specific Energy Ahserption (SEA) should be high.
i
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6. The device should be economical.
7. Tile device should bc capable of being relied upon to perfi_rmaatisfaet_wily througb_mt the
life of the aircraft (for Army, a miaimual of 10 years or 8000 flight hours) without requiring
maintenance.
8, The device should act be affected by vibration, dust, dirt, or other environment effects, It
should be proteeWd from corrosion.
9. The device(a) should decelerate the occupant in the most efficient manner possible while I
maintaining the loading environment withiL _te limits of human tolerance.
Numerous load limiters have been devised, The concepts are illustrated and described in figure
D-5,7, Body decelerations tend to normalizenear the Glevel corresponding to the limit load factor of
the energy absorb/rigdevice. An optimum device cannot be selected for all apl.,licatious on the basis
of available data. Rather, the data of the figure presents concepts end guidel_.neswhich can be
considered relative to specific applications.
SEAT STRENGTH AND DEFORMATION DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
Design should be based on typical weight of the occupant, not the extreme we:,ght, The restrictions
placed on crew seats, including stroke length, control access, and seat armor limit flexibility of
design options. The weight of combat gear is not included in Guide recommendations for crew
seats. Since the large majority of flight hours are not in combat, it is probable that flight crew
members will also be lightly equipped. This minimizes another problem. If the full range of
weights were to be accommodated, a weight sensitive energy absorbing system would become
mandatory in order to protect the occupants over the full range of weights.
Occupant weights determining the effective design loads for seats recommended design loads are
based on 5th through 95th percentile weights for men, i,e., 144 through 22q lb, for crewmem, with
112.6 to 175.2 lb. vertical effective weight (effective weight reduces seat load considerations by
the amount of the occupant's legs, which rest on the floor. As the authors point out, the ideal
situation would be to permit energy absorbing stroke length for the 95th percentile occupant using
deceleration limits based on the 5th percentile (who would load the system les_ and require more
yielding ductility, i.e., a lower yield, for the same load reduction capability). However, as they Mac
point out, compromises must be made since the resulting needed stroke distance will not ['e
't available in aircraft. A greater weight variation exists for troops and seats should be designed to
accommodate them. The 95th percentile should be considered heavily clothed and the 13th
f. percentile lightly clothed.
COMMENT:A wide variation in occupant weight cannot be avoided in the commercial environment.
Strength
The Guide authors consider that "an elastic stress analysis, as used in the design of airframe and
aircraft components subjected to normal flight loads, is inadequate for the study of all the
structure in a crash situation ... the load carrying capacity of components deformed beyond tile
elastic limit should be considered in determining the ultimate seat strength." "
Strength and Deformation
In discussing this subject, Guide authors first point out that some stroking (or displacement} will
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occur for all systems if they are to remain in place during deceleration loads. A minimum
displacement must be achieved if the system is to remain in i)lace during a given acceleration
pulse. In other words, there is an inherent load deflecti,n curve and travel limit envelope which
imposes definite limits on the ability of any system to resist impulse loading. Intentional load
limiting is thus the control of this deflection to make h_at use of the space available in order to
abserb energy and to optimize tbe occupant's capability to survive the loads imposed. Additionally,
structural joint deformation should be capableof large angular distortions in all directions without
failure, (e.g., bending moment between leg and sitting) including floor distortion and seat
pan distortion.
"-1 PADDING MATERIALS AND PROPERTIES
_ Plastic fesms are consideredby Army Guide authors as the most useful type of materials for energy
absorbing padding. Both slab and molded foams are practical, and they are considered by Guide
authorstopermitselectionevaluationbasedon proceseability;mechanical,thermalandchemical
properties;and cost.Characteristicsof"suitablematerials"includethefollowing;representative
uses are identified in figure D.5.8.
1. Adaptabilityandeaseofprocessing
2. Nontoxicfume generation
3. Favorable flammability rating
4. Minimal smoke generation
i 5. Durability and long life
6. Cost competitive
7. Aesthetic
8. High energy di_ipation
9. Effective load distribution
10. Low rebmmd
11. Temperature insensitivity
12. Low water absorption
13. Resistance to chemicak, oil, ultraviolet radiation, and sunlight
Additionally, relevant mechanical properties include:
I. Density 5. Compressivemodulus
2. Tensilestrength 6. Flexuralstrength
$
3. Tensilemodulus 7. Flcxuralmodulus
4. Compressivestrength
226
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_ 1. Semirigid and flexible urethane foa_
Aircraft, automobile, and furniture seat cushions,
l safety padding, arm rests, sun visors, horn but-
products,tons, bedding, carpet underlay, packaging delicate
2. polyvinylchlorlde foam
Crash padding An automobile head liners and sun
visors, flooring, shoe soles and heels, automo-
bile door panels, seating upholstery sealants,
gaskets, bumperstock.
3. Polystyrene foam
Insulation, packaging.
4. Expanded rubber
Bus and subway seat cushions, truck and ship
mattresses, gaskets, hose insulation.
5. Polyester foam
Short-run, custom-type seat cushioning.
6. Pol_olefln foam
Packaging, gasketlng, water sports equipment, rug
underlay, athletic padding, antivlbration padding.
N_I: _ from A_ _OO,
_r Figure 0.5.8 - Energy Absorbing Plastic Foams and Some Typical Applications
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H. Tear streuglh [2, l_bouml
,_). C'oml_r_,ssimle_,t _;I. Itl_rdm_ss
10. Coluprcssiou defh'ctiou t.l. hnlmet
I I. F,hmgstit_u
APPLICATION OF PADDING MATERIAL AND DUCTII,F: MATERIALS
"In the absence of dots for extremity impacts, it is assu;ned that pudding material that is suitable
for head impact protection is also suitable far protecting extremities." Strike zone areas with radii
o_nchcs or less" should be padded to a "minimum thickness of 0.75 inches".
Ductile. energy tthsorbiug materials and breakaway panels should be used where possible.
Swearingen (ref. I)-9) is cited as demonstrating "that at impact velocities of :|0ftJsee against rigid
structu_ podded with materials even 6 in. thick, unconsciousness, concussion, and/or fatal head
injuries will be produced. The Guide continues, "where possible, deformable strueture and padding
material should be considered to absorb the impact energy and to adequately distribute the forces
over the face" (fig. D-5.9).
COMMENT:Effectiveness of padding has been accepted as being adequate for lesser thicknesses
in commercial aircraft, which also have lower G criteria. There is also s question as to whether the
same level of protection is needed for the extremities. From earlier Swearingen work, it was
concluded that covering a head impact surface with l in. of Koreseal, (since superseded by Ensolite
AH, or equivalent), would be considered to provide for delethslization.
SEAT CUSHIONS
Seat Cushions -- General Requirements
Seat cushions should preclude body contact with scat structure while being light, tough (wear
resistant), easily replaced, comfortable, and ventilated and provide flotation, while minimizing
motion during crash loading and rebound after crash loading. For Army purposes, load limiting
cushions were considered to be undesirable. Net-type cushions are usable if designed to limit
maximum deformation and return movement, and to control potential for submarining or dynamic
overshoot. Furniture type back cushions are acceptable; finally, a head rest should Ix,.providcd to
provide whiplash pv0tection.
Direct contact surfaces of the seat bottom and seat back "should be designed for comfort and
durability." However, "sufficient cushion thickness of the appropriate material stiffness should be
provided to preclude body contact with the seat structure when subjected to either the specified
operational or crash loads .... The conflicting requirements of long-term comfort-versus-crash
safety considerations have made this s difficult design area."
From comfort emphasis in the past, thick, soft cushions were used, spreading the load to avoid
buttock pressure points. Holes or forced sir flow (or net cushions) provided for c_a_liug.
COMMENT: However, the softness of such cushions pernlita a vel_,ity build-up as the soft
material compresses farther. Build.up is rapid during iuitial loading then followed hy a shorter
stopping distanre duriug the final stages of high deceleration loading -- for a nonlinear stopping
characteristic that puts major decelerations over a much shorter distanc,,. In order to minimize
228
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40 G
Figure D-5.9 - Summary of Maximum Tolerable Impact Forces on • Padded Deformable
Surface ($wearingen, 1965)
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surh uiitial mot.inn, crauh safety considerations requiro a muiui_al thickness of m_ft foam. One
approach ttst,n ii cushion ba_e centaur of a "univcrsar' buttock configuration with foam layer, s)
added. Irate-sensitive (conforming, but hard tx)sudden impact) foam can be uecd (m top of the bast,
to e_)ftcncontact somewhat, l,'urexample, a thin layec of anft foam may be u._d on top fi)r comfort
m;tterial and permit cooling air motion.
Accordi,_g to the Guide, seats of light movable weight (less than 30 lb,) ahouht use cushions for
comfort only. Maxitnmn uncompreased thickness should he 1.5 in, unless cushion design and
material properties produce a beneficial result in reduced tranamiesion of force. By Army criteria,-
tile optimum _at cushion will:
l. lie extremely light weight
2. Possess flotefion capabilities
3. Be nonflammable
4. Be nontoxic; will not give off fumes when burned, charred, or melted
5. Be tough and wear resistaut
6. Be easily changeable
7. Provide co,nfort by distributing the load and reducing or eliminating load eonce,_trationa
8. Provide thermal comfort through ventilation
9. Provide little or no rebouud under crash loading
10. Allow an absolute minimum of motion during crash loading
Energy Absorbing Cuahlons
Cushioning materials used to absorb energy include foams, honeycomb, and net-type cushions. "In
most cases, the back cushions will not play a significant role in crash dynamics; however, it will
influence eonffort and can influence the injury tolerance of the spine." Lumbar supports are
desirable; a lumbar support that holds the lumbar spine forward slightly increases tolerance to
vertical spinal loads.
However, use of cushions per ae as load limitere is undesirable. Resulting downward motion of the
torso will produce added reetruint harne_ alack (when it is desirable to minimize same). Also "a
crushable cushion does not make optimum use of the available stroke distance, _ since crushing
space is needed and cushions can be only 75% as efficient as a mechanical load limiter. They "are
impractical in rotary and light fixed-wing aircraft because of the long stroke distance required to
attenuate the high vertical loads" required by Army criteria.
IIEADREST
A 1.5.in. headrest shtmld be provided for occupant head]neck whiplash protection from backward
flexure of the neck. "Cushioningcan he provided by a thin pad and deformable headrest or a thicker
cushion on a more rigid headrest." Results of the TAR(_study (ref. D-3) indicated that a lees tbick
hcadrest would be desirable to accommodate a full range of male and female _mpnlation.
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TEST
Structural Subeystem Teat Requirements
For Army systems, beth static and dynamic t_ts of prototype.sare recommended, including testing
of _at and |ittsr systems as complete units, Component testing is to be used wherever possible.
Subsequently, tests are to include ctuddousin place, seats full up and full back (unless a more critical
position exists) and normal floor buckling and warping conditions set up fox the most critical
impedance to neat stroking. Seat motmts chould be actual ah_raft hardware. Seat deformation
should be measured as near the seat reference point as is possible, Subsequently, only qualityJ
assurance testing is necessary unle_ majorstructural changes occur. If desired, dynamic tests with
loading in all principal directions may be subotituted for static tea_, In static test, both unidirectional
and combined loading tests shogld be used, with tent loads applied proportionately through a body
block restrained in the seat by the restraint system. Multiple tests are specified, using the effective
weight of the 95th percantila male for all but the downward loading, which uses the effective weight
of the 50th percentile male. Multiple occupancy seats should be fully occupied when tested;
additional tests should be accomplkhod for other adverse conditions that are identified.
The authors' diecussion of static versus dynamic testing recommends that static tests be used
because real time observation is possible, structural response information is more comparable to
typically used static analyses, and tests are more economical. However, all U.S. Army prototype
seats should be dynamically tested for two conditions, (1) downward at a 30 ° forward and
sideward tilt and, (2) forward at a 30 ° side facing angle.
To reduce ccete, special dynamic test conditions are permitted for seats having less than a 12-in.
stroke. First, the costly full-scale crash test is considered desirable. However, and secondly,
alternative dynamic testing of the seat only with a two stage pulse is acceptable, using a smaller
initial G plateau representing faiinre of the gear and increasing to a later higher G plateau
representing fusekge crushing. (Landing gear data to be baaed on results from drop test; fuselage
properties are to be determined by the moat comprehensive and rigorous analytical techniques,
supported by teat data).
Personnel Reetraint Harness TeaSing
Army requirements include static and dynamic test of restraints along with the structure to which
attached. Additionally, all components (webbing, tiedowne and hardware in the load path) as well
as eubaasembliea should be ststlcaliy teated separately to verify strength and elongation.
Head Impact Teat Prmmdur_
Head impact test procedurea are moat often to use a head form equipped with an accelerometer
and to propel to impact with the surface to be evaluated via controlled drop, swing (pendulum) or
ram.
Standard Teat Methods for Energy Aboorbing FoamJ
Among tests used from ASTMD 1564.71 (Standard Methods of Tenting Flexible Cellular MaterisS,
' -- Slab Urethane Foam) are beth load deflection and compression set. Numerous tests for various
po_ible applioations are defined. For "reuonable survival potential for head impacts u velocities
up to 20 fusee with a padding th/ckne_ between 1.5 and 2.0 in...,"acceleration of the head should
_ not exceed 60 G and sufficient material must be crushed to reduce the head ve|ocity from
20 ft/eec to 0 ft/sec in the process of abeorbing the head kinetic energy of approximately
_. 60 to 90 ft-lb,"
i_i 231
!" 00000003-TSD06
Evaluation criteria for load distributing applications involves the assumptions that "A load
distributing pad should permit the face to penstt ate the surface easily, then maintain a cushioning
i.- layer of foam between the base and the underlying structure during collapse of the
understrt:cture." In terms of energy absorbing efficiency, Ruseh (ref D-10) is cited as stating:
1. "Energy abeerbirig characteristics of a brittle foam are supel:igr to those of a ductile foam,
;.. 2. "The optimum energy absorbing foam has a large cell size, a narrow cell size dmtribution, and
minimum number of reinforcing membranes between the cells; and
t 3. "Foam composites offer no significant advantage over a single
foam."
232
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APPENDIX D.A
Two topics related to crash puisee are diecuesod herein. The discussion turns on the relationship
e = vT', where v is the velocity eon*ant of the pau_ (the paise is tumumedto stop an object with initial
velocity v),T" is the time coordinate of the eentroid of the pulse, and a is the stopping distance. The
above formula ie convenient to apply since the contreide of standard paUseshapes (e.g., trisngiee,
trapezoids, einueoids) are tabulated in engineeriv s handbooks. The relationship reduces the
problemof seb_:ng_b_differen_l equationsof motion to the simpler geometric problem of computing
T*.
The topics are: discussion of errors in the estimation a = v2/2e, where a is the average pulae
acceleration and.v and e are aa defined_above; _d __s_mp)ified method for computing energy
absorber stroke requirements.
Befere discussing the topics of interest the relationship s = vT° will be derived.
Derivation of e = vT*
Let s(t),i(t) and _(t) denote the position, velocity and acceleration of the vehicle as functions of time.
Assume thatanaccelerationpausex(t)ofdurationT isgiven.Further,
x(O) -- O, x(T) = s, _(0) = v. _(T) = O.
(i,e., the vehicle crashes with initial velocity v, coming to rest in time T and distance 0.
We can wr/te from basic definitlo.'_e:
t
i(1) = v -tf "x'iv)dr (I)
From equation (1),
,T#4
_(T)" 0 _ v *Jo ":_(r)dr,
or
foT'_(_) at - -v (3)
Integration of equation (2) by parts and imposition of the requirement that a(T) ffi e gives
t
T
_t
at'r) --s- -| t'_(t) d_ (4)
ao
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Now define T' as the time ccorditmto of the ccntroid of the area under the deceleration curve -- that
is,
Substitution of equations (3) and (4) into equation (5) gives
: T* = (-s)/t-v)= s/v, Q.I-.I).
Errors in the estimation formula a = v2/2a
If the crash impact velocity v and stopping distance s can be determined, the Guide recommends
the following formula for estimating the average crash deceleration a;
Ifthecrashpulseisinactualityskewedsothatthemajorityoftheaccelerationoccursearlyinthe
crash,equation(6)overestimatesthemagnitudeofa.To seewhy thisisso,considertwoaircraft
crashesrepresentedby thetwo triangulardecelerationpulseshowninfigureD-A.I.The pulses
havethesameaveragedeceleration(v/r)aswellasequalduration,equalmagnitude,andequalarea
(thearearepresentstheimpactvelocityv).Theaircraftinthefirstcrashwillstopinashorterdistance
(a)the_atheaircraftin thesecond,becausethedecelerationisappliedmore quickly.Thus,
equation(I)wouldincorrectlypredicta largeraveragedecelerationforthefirstcrashthanfor
thesecond.
The correctrelationshiprequiresknowledgeofthepulseshapeTo derivetherelationship,first
note that the true average acceleration a is given by
a = -v/T, (7}
whereT isthepulseduration.
The relationship
_,l'*Is= |
was derivedintheprecedingsection,Thus
a = -(v/T)(I ) = (vlT)(vl"*ts).
00000003-TSD09
i Crash Pulse
i-i
.o I Area - -v
Area centr01d
° /__,_ ,,,_. ._._ In this example,T l(hT) = .85,so a ,,.85.v2_Zs.&,,_o*
_o'°_':.:.k
.-. H-If T --................. •
0 T }_T T
Ttme
tJ
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which can be rearranged to read
_t_ l*/{l12)(v212s). (_)
Theimplicationsthatwhenthedecelerationpulseisshapedsothat hemajorityofthedeceleration
t
occursin thefirsthalfof thepulse,i.e.,T*< T/2,equation(6)overestimatestheaverage
decelerationa,whileifmostofthedecelerationoccursinthesecondhalf,i.e.,T" > T/2,then
equation(6)underestimatesa.Equation(6)isaccurateonlywhen theeentroidT" occursinmid-
pulse--thatis,when T* = TI2.FigureD-A.2illustratesequation(8).
Equation(8)canbe usedtobound theerrorinequation(6),For example,the centroidofa
trapezoidalpulseofdurationT must fallbetween(1/3)Tand(2/3)T.Equation(8)showsthatthe
maximum errorinherentinequation(6)fora triangularo trapezoidalpulseis33°, thatis,
2/3(v-/2s) _ d _ 413iv2/2s).
Estimating Energy Absorber Stroke Requirements
The function of an energy absorber is to reduce the peak loads experienced by a passenger. As a
result of energy absorber performance, the crash pulse experienced by the paseenger has a
different shape than the pulse at the floor. The difference in pulse shape causes a differential in
stopping distance between the passenger and floor, which is achieved by deformation of the energy
absorber and is termed the energy absorber stroke.
The energy abserber may be regarded as a filter which modifies the shape of the deceleration
pulse. The stroke distance can be related to this filtering action in a simple, geometric way.
The stopping distance s is related to the pulse shape by the formula
$ = vT*
wherev isthevelocityatimpactandT' isthetimecoordinateofthecentroidofthedeceleration
pulse.The energyabsorberstrokerequirementis
slzokc = S2-SI = v(T2*- TI*)" (t_}
t
where the sabseripte 1 and 2 refer respectively to the floor and passenger. The required stroke is
the initial velocity multiplied by the center of gravity shift cattm_lby modification of the shape of the
deceleration pulse.
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Pulse 1
322 ftlseclsec __ /v - area • 32,2 ft./sec
(10 G) tl'_// Stopping distance s - 2,68 ft ,
..._::.:':
''" l v2/2s • 32,22/ @....:'_ (2"2.68) • 193 ft/sec/sec ••,, • • +,
....-,c_._,£_.R/_ a = 322"0.2/2l 161 ftlseclsec• 5 Gb%_:.:.'
..,......
0 50 ms 200 ms
Time
Pulse 2
v = area - 32.2 ft/sec
322 ft/sec/sec /
.._:;_.:,_._._.:,.t.'i:_:_;:_._qN
0 tO0 ms 200 ms
Ttme
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EquaLion(9) givesan intuitive viewof energyabsorberperformance,For examp|e,equation(9) can
i be applied to compute the stroke distance required by a eimple hind limiter under a triangular
i pules (figure D-A.3). From geometric considerations,
. V_a|
; VTl* _v!=at 2
vT2* _ (2/3)kt(k2at/2)* (k! + 1"12)kaT (lO)
where T is calculated from
t v = a_k._t/2+kaT ( I I)
_i Equation (11) is used to eliminate T from equaUons (10), and the stroke is computed by subtracting
" equations(I0).The formula,
stroke = vT2* - v'rl* = at'(k3/24 + k/2 + I/2k - 1), (12)
iseasilyobtained.Thisderivationiesilaplerthanthederivationi theGuidebasedon integration
oftheaccelerationpulses.
238
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SYMMETRIC FLOOR PULSE
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